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Andreyeva, 'Orthodox' Positions Critiqued

90UN0897A Moscow VECHERNYAYA MOSKVA
in Russian 24 Jan 90 pp 1, 2

[Article by N. Marinich: "Principles and Ideals"]

[Text] "Some people try to rebuke us for not having a clear-cut, detailed plan for implementing the perestroika concept. We can hardly agree with this approach to the issue. I believe that we would be making a theoretical mistake if we were to begin forcing prepared patterns on our society again and squeezing actual reality into the 'Procrustean bed' of patterns. This was the hallmark of Stalinism with which we have parted ways. We act according to Lenin. Acting according to Lenin means studying how the future grows out of today's reality."

M. Gorbachev,

"The Socialist Idea and Revolutionary Perestroika"

Conversation in the Lobby

Having summoned me to the lobby over the phone, Andrey Ivanovich (this is how he introduced himself) would not agree to go to the editorial office for anything. He talked, lapsing into shrieks, about how he dispossessed his own aunt, as the kulaks were dispossessed, for having two horses and a seeding-machine; how he burned icons from the church while his mother cursed him; how starvation knocked him off his feet but he went on collecting grain in the villages for Soviet power; and how he fought in the war and lost his foot in 1944.

"I lived in a communal apartment, worked until I was 70—and all that in vain? I was not building a mansion for myself, I was building a bright future for all of us, and now they have taken it away from me!"

Shaking with anger, with tears streaming down his cheeks, he swung his cane while I wanted more than anything else to take him by the sleeve of his worn-out coat, lead him to a warm room, give him a cup of tea, and tell him about my compassion for him, his torment, my pain for him, for all of us, and hope; to tell him about my 20 years of doubts, which started as early as in high school, concerning communism, about the torment of sleepless nights over Solzhenitsyn's "Gulag Archipelago", over Lenin's 45th volume, and the harsh logic of economic journalism. It may not have been at the same time, but both the gray veteran and I have been participants in the same trials of the spirit, though he thinks that journalists are to blame for them.

Following the publication of the article, "Hostile Whirlwinds Are Blowing..." about the rally in Leningrad there were many calls and letters supporting the position of the author. Noting that some of the speakers made quite justified demands to democratize the party, V. Zakharchenko noted that, unfortunately, this topic was lost amid calls to return to "the hard line" and "an iron fist." Muscovite Yu. Kiselev was in Leningrad on a business trip and was present at the rally which, as he

writes, he did not like. "You should be more intelligent, more enduring, and more understanding"—this is the author's advice to the sponsors of the rally. Similar judgments, and much sharper ones, have been also voiced by V. Belyakov, K. Tsypliyak, O. Longver, I. Beloglazova, and others.

However, it is letters of the other kind, though there are only a dozen of them, and phone calls that are disturbing. One reader told me: "I thought that after the rally they would put things in order in our country and 'tighten the screws', but I read your article and did not sleep the whole night. I nearly died." There were some who were depressed and lost, like Andrey Ivanovich. Several anonymous authors promised to have the correspondent shot or exiled in a barrage of unprintable curses.

This convinced me that, unfortunately, the apprehension that the Leningrad rally would cause this very response and the hope of a segment of the population that perestroika can be rolled back were not without foundation. This means that VECHERNYAYA MOSKVA was right to publish an article the main idea of which was: "There is no way back!"

I am convinced that the rally should not be interpreted as a special signal for the onset of reaction, as they now write in some publications and argue in conversations. However, whether the sponsors wanted it or not (I believe that they did not), the following pattern emerges in at least in terms of time sequence: The rally, voyages to Moscow by Nina Andreyeva, some panicky-conservative—as D. Granin testifies in MOSKOVSKIYE NOVOSTI—at the plenum of the CPSU Central Committee, and subsequently similar speeches at the Second Congress of USSR People's Deputies.

'The Iron Nina' and Her Adherents

Retiree P.I. Kolobanov, who sent angry letters simultaneously to the newspaper and the CPSU Moscow City Committee, resolutely objects to the lines in the article, "Hostile Whirlwinds Are Blowing..." in which this question is asked: Could some of the participants in the rally have yielded to the mood of the adherents of Nina Andreyeva? M.I. Permyakov and V.A. Lapenkov have similar objections. B.V. Gidasov, first secretary of the Leningrad Obkom [oblast committee] and Gorkom [city committee], resolutely distanced himself in a number of newspapers from "the iron lady" of Stalinism. However, it is interesting that the other side, that is, Nina Aleksandrovna herself and like-minded people, received the rally with jubilation. As early as the day after it was shown on TV, a phone rang in our editorial office: "Got it? Your time is over, you perestroika types!"

Several letters came of the kind I had not received for several years. Here are some lines from one of these letters, written by Yu.S. Danyarov: "We now feel tremendous strength in our difficult struggle against you and to restore the honor and dignity of the great leader Stalin. This cleansing will occur very shortly."

Subsequently, I happened to hear a presentation by N. Andreyeva in a Moscow auditorium. USSR People's Deputy B.V. Gidasov would hardly have liked this admission by Nina Aleksandrovna: "He is one of ours." I believe that Boris Veniaminovich would have been altogether outraged had he heard about Andreyeva's program and her organization, Yedinstvo.

At the meeting in the Moscow auditorium, the guest from Leningrad articulated her "principles" in a straightforward manner, without beating around the bush as she usually does for the TV and the press: "Anti-Stalinism is harmful for Russia." "The years when Stalin was in power were the most glorious period for the people." "Everything was right while we considered ourselves cogs in the machine; when we became persons everything went wrong."

They pointed out to her the extermination of the Russian peasantry and the Cossacks, the mass repressions against the people. In the "Archipelago," the following statistic given by professor of statistics I. Kurganov is quoted: Between 1917 and 1959, 55 million people died due to terrorist extermination, suppression, famine, and excessive death rate in the camps, excluding war losses. Even if this statistic is too high the number is still in the millions—and the population of our country was about 200 million people at the time! In response to a direct question concerning these atrocities the intellectual from Leningrad uttered something unintelligible about "the enemies of the people" and measures for maintaining "genuine socialism."

N. Andreyeva branded as counterrevolutionaries those who call for socialism with a human face and wished every misfortune upon them. Let us keep this in mind. The Andreyevs called the people to the barricades in order "to struggle without automatic rifles for now" having ominously accentuated the words "for now." The college instructor, having entirely forgotten about her own social affiliation, berated the intellectuals and referred to herself as "we, the workers and employees of agriculture" and in their name swore allegiance to the red banner which reads "Lenin, October, Socialism!"

Some, for example our reader A. Sokolov, believed her. However, dear Comrade Sokolov, please take a closer look, and you will see: There are no such words on her banner. Instead, there are the words, "Stalin, Iron-Fisted Dictatorship, Barracks." In her opinion, these are the superior socialist values, ideals with which the future of our people is associated.

Of course, we could notice which speeches at the rally resembled to a degree the utterances of "the iron lady" from Leningrad: For example, over there they also called for a determination of who is on which side of the barricade; they also held to account the people who are not leading us "in the right direction;" and they also referred to the opinion of, supposedly, "the working class." However, it is characteristic that the workers of

Leningrad who spoke at the next rally stated that they would not allow their names to be used to cover up the intrigues of the apparatus.

In a word, similarities can be found. However, these details are not at issue. The proponents of an "iron fist" and of reversing perestroika smelled the main point of what happened at the rally, what was in its very atmosphere: equating perestroika with restoring order and discipline only, plus struggle against any dissent whatsoever. At this point, all of our "iron warriors," conservatives of every stripe became enthused; this is when it seemed to them that an end to all of glasnost, pluralism, various forms of property and democratization had come, and the customary task of putting things in order was ahead. After all, they are experts in this matter, nothing can be accomplished without them here!

This is also comprehensible for a certain segment of the populace, generally honest and hard-working people. They worked diligently: A lot was taken from them, and little was given back. They were grateful even for that because they remembered tougher times and sincerely believed that they lived well. Economist T. Koryagina was correct in saying: "These are sufferers—a candle should be lit for our people to mark their long suffering." At present, something incomprehensible and unconventional from their point of view is happening; life is changing. This is exactly how one granny put it to me: "They have been fooling me with their democracy and economics. All that we have to do is not to peek abroad and see that they live better. We've got bread, and that's enough. Also, we need to post a Chekist in every factory shop so that they will not loaf around and steal stuff. This would be your entire perestroika."

Equating perestroika with the old order, as well as with a new "dispossession of the kulaks" and universal distribution of "the assets expropriated" also lies close to the heart of other strata—illiterate, equally poor and aggressive, with the mentality of the downtrodden, who strive to receive a minimum from our society as long as they give nothing back to it. They are the ones who pride themselves on "not having a college education" and who like proclaiming themselves the hegemonic power, though the real working class which has forever been and will be the pillar of our land, despises them. Stagnation was the most cozy time for this new lumpen proletariat. In the new society to which perestroika is taking us these people will have to change their mentality and attitude toward work and be responsible. They can smell all of this.

At the very crest of such attitudes, we find people who have a vested interest in "being in business" in the future as well or, more precisely, at the feed trough. They are categorically "in favor of order," even if it is based on fear and slavery. Let us march toward our bright future, all of us in unanimous ranks, overcoming difficulties. The more difficulties there are the more confident we

get! We may be lagging behind, but, after all, we are the first ones to travel along the path we have taken! He who doubts this is an enemy!

Is that it? However, citizens, we have studied this before...

For All People, But Not for Us

A commander's bass voice yelled into the telephone: "I demand that we be finally given ideals!"

"Don't you have them?"

"For example?"

I began to enumerate: "Kindness, humanity, patriotism, charity, justice, freedom, love of children and your native house."

"This is for all people, but what about ideals for us?"

I responded: "Just the same. What other ideals are there?"

He said: "You ought to be exiled to Siberia!" and hung up.

What was it that he wanted to hear? Perhaps, this: Universal fraternity, universal happiness are the main goals of the communist ideal and the dream of the best minds of various centuries. On top of this, he definitely wanted to hear something like: "Fight mercilessly in order to achieve the ideal." These two notions, "the ideal" and "merciless struggle" have merged so completely in the consciousness of many people over many years that they have formed a single entity.

This is it: Move toward universal happiness through mounting merciless struggle, through creating a person-cog in the machine who is prepared to sacrifice anything at all—entire peoples by calling them traitors: his father who does not accept forcible collectivization, the history of the Motherland, his sacred places, his son sent to Afghanistan, his land destroyed in the name of grandiose plans.

We know now: It is not only important **where** we are headed but also **how** we get there. It is important to separate the dream of human happiness from obsession with the merciless struggle; while en route, it is necessary to proceed from the very general human values which were long considered second-rate or even discarded outright.

'Communism' in Chevangur

I do not know whether the day is possible when absolutely all earthlings will say that they are happy. An ideal prompts you to go toward your goal. However, the further you proceed toward it the broader your horizons, the more profound your knowledge, the more elevated the ideal itself becomes. The ideal was painted as "heaven on earth" so that people early in our century could understand it. According to Marx, the **individual**,

his comprehensive material, intellectual, and ethical development in a society free from exploitation and oppression are the focus of the communist ideal. However, this is possible only on the basis of the highest level of development of productive forces when **"a self-sustaining production process" evolves between man and nature as a result of which man will no longer be an immediate participant in material production.**

It is clear that this kind of development of science and technology in a society is possible in the very remote future, if at all. Perhaps, man himself should change in order to participate in this "self-sustaining process," and change quite a bit—in his essence, in his nature. Perhaps, some new creature is presupposed, say, knowledgeable man rather than Homo Sapiens, intelligent man, man who knows something about Nature, Earth, the Cosmos, and himself that we at present can hardly comprehend. Perhaps, giving up goods-and-money relations entirely is possible only when we come close to complying with these main prerequisites.

Is this a utopia? But every ideal smacks of a utopia. It is not that simple to even comprehend the Marxian ideal. Lenin had a reason for saying: "One may become a communist only after he has enriched his memory with the knowledge of all the wealth humanity has produced." Who knows what new vistas will open to humanity at this time, hundreds of years from now? Can we consider the ideal of the future only within the framework of Marxism even now?

Apparently, everyone comprehends this ideal to the degree his knowledge allows him and seeks available paths to it. For example, for me personally V.I. Vernadskiy and, strange as it may seem, the now quite popular idea about a connection between the human spirit and the cosmos were helpful in coming closer to comprehending the ideal. However, for me personally the concept of a communist society as a society of complete harmony between man and nature where the needs of man are met completely, including creative, spiritual needs, is simpler and easier to understand.

However, attempting to cancel all economic laws without accomplishing the main components of the communist ideal is a utopia pure and simple. There was a reason why the Bolsheviks were criticized for having a theory of distribution while a clear-cut theory of production was absent. It is no accident that Lenin arrived at the NEP [New Economic Policy].

An interpretation of communism which is carried to the absurd appears in Platonov's "Chevangur." It describes a town where "complete communism was organized" due to the murders and elimination of initially the bourgeoisie, and subsequently the so-called "thick petty bourgeoisie," or, putting it simply, average citizens, so that "the ground for communism" in Chevangur would not "turn out to be too narrow and too polluted by the affluent people." So, communism came "because in

Chevengur the only sun was proclaimed... the universal proletarian who worked for all.

"The work of people was not mandatory... labor was forever proclaimed to be a vestige of greed and exploitative animal lust because labor facilitates the origination of assets and assets facilitate oppression; however, the sun itself lets people have quite sufficient, normal diets for life, and any increase in them due to special human work is consumed by the fire of class warfare because needless harmful objects are created." Is this an exaggeration?

But this is close to how many people interpreted the transformation of the world. It seemed to them that it is enough to destroy the bourgeoisie and the brilliant future will come. They will be able to almost stop working; after all, it became firmly etched in their conscience that the exploiters are the source of all evil. As soon as their riches are confiscated, the working people will live almost under communism. This is what many members of the communes which were set up in the former manors of landowners thought. This is what some workers thought. There was a reason why the Bolsheviks were concerned about ways to make the people work. Hence, the labor armies and labor duties. A way out was found in the enthusiasm of labor for the brilliant future. In 1920, V.I. Lenin said: "The generation which is now 15 years old... will live in a communist society 10 to 20 years from now." Subsequently, grandiose plans have promised the people the prompt arrival of the brilliant future on many occasions.

For many years, work in our country was sort of make-believe and unreal—not for yourself, not for your children, but for the future generations only. Many of man's natural needs were postponed until the future. Poverty became perhaps the main virtue in our society, poverty such that not only was there nothing left in the house but there was no house to begin with: "My street address is not a street and a building, my street address is the Soviet Union."

It is much easier to comprehend the early stage of the formation of society which Marx wrote about. We can say specifically: This society should be **more productive and efficient than the old formation, that is, richer, fairer in the distribution of material assets, freer for its citizens.** Briefly, these are the essential goals of socialism. This is exactly what perestroika calls for.

However, for many decades we measured our advancement by the frequent fulfillment of plans on paper only, the socialization of property, and steadfast struggle rather than improvements in the life of the people. So, we ended up ranked below 40th among the states in terms of the standard of living, and lower yet in terms of life expectancy. We are discovering to our amazement that some countries are, perhaps, closer to the socialist ideal in terms of both the well-being of their nations, the fair distribution of material assets, and the democratic freedoms of citizens.

What have we built? The very thing which, as G. Volkov recently observed in PRAVDA, Marx stigmatized as harsh barracks-style communism as early as 1844, describing it as a manifestation of the vileness of private property of "the universal capitalist" which desires to assert itself by formal socialization, as jealousy and the thirst for leveling, as "a negation of the entire world of culture and civilization," as "a return to the **unnatural** simplicity of a **poor** and primitive man who has no needs." For such pseudo-communism, community involves "merely the community of **labor** and the equality of '**wages**' paid by 'the universal capitalist,' the state."

A Downfall or a Find?

At present, we may frequently hear about the supposed downfall of socialist ideals, about the absence of a goal in life. As I see it, only now that we have made the individual the centerpiece we are beginning to find the ideals. The more successful perestroika is the closer we will draw to the socialist ideals.

Indeed, **is not the right to be a master of your own country, a free man, and a worthy person a socialist ideal? Is not participation in returning our Motherland to the vanguard of the world civilization and restoring a dignified life for our native people a most beautiful goal for the sons of this immensely rich but terribly tired and tormented country?**

Were we really closer to universal happiness when Stalin's camps existed and when the peasants were deprived of passports and were almost serfs? Or when the country drifted into indifferent, drunken hibernation to the tune of the rattling of the stars of a hero on the chest of its frail "helmsman?" Or when other peoples looked at us with incomprehension, fear, and even hatred? No, we have taken our first step toward the fraternity of peoples and the commonwealth of earthlings recently, having proclaimed the priority of universal human values, having enriched the civilization of the world with new thinking which roots out "the image of an enemy."

So, why is there this nostalgia for the past which leads to nowhere? Why do even my colleagues, journalists, at times search for something to prop "the wretched Russian soul" with—either a renewed Stalin or a benevolent dream of people who immediately stop being people with sins and spiritual impulses, with various ideas, needs, and passions, mistakes and misconceptions, and become some pathetic wanderers aloof to normal human concerns about building their houses so that their great grandchildren will be able to live in them, feeding and rearing their children, making money for their families, and restoring the dignity of the Motherland?

We need a renaissance of morality and lofty ethics which were characteristic of our people. However, is it not clear that we have lost this greatest spiritual treasure by chasing utopian chimeras, and that it needs to be brought back not by our "**removal**" from a real individual but by **getting closer** to him, by restoring simple and eternal human values which everyone understands and which

include simple moral norms, Christian commandments, common sense, and the responsibility for taking care of your house and your land?

But no, some people are still looking for a new, special idea for Russia only along the old lines. For example, writer V. Skobelev proposes the following idea: "Communism emerges gradually as an association of small production and consumer communes... with their own production and residential land areas, with all auxiliary social services." The members of a commune will be completely relieved of their concern to supply themselves (housing, foodstuffs, clothing, and so on) and of bureaucrats, and for this reason they will begin working efficiently, sustaining communist morality and ethics without fail and out of the sense of duty. The author is absolutely serious when he complains that no one is willing to allocate R15 to 20 million for this "communist reservation."

I think that these futile attempts to definitely attach human souls to either a new utopian idea or a new "leader" are based on the lack of confidence in one's own people, in its natural endurance in life. Also, they are based on forgetting our historic roots, the loss of recollection of the factory hands and industrialists, engineers and builders who amazed the world and the richest fairs to which the merchants of the entire world flocked. Perhaps, the nostalgia for "a strong guide" is rooted in the still habitual fear. This fear is akin to the apprehension of a recently blind person who has suddenly acquired sight: He sees the world in its entire abundance of colors, and this overwhelms and scares him. I have heard that patients who used to be blind sometimes refuse to open their eyes for a week after surgery.

Look at it this way: The distance we have covered, albeit with frightening stages, is nonetheless comprehensible whereas we encounter unprecedented situations on the new path every now and then: Abrupt turnarounds cannot proceed smoothly. However, we have exhausted the old path to the end, to the abyss. We have nowhere to go back to!

What Do We Want?

Our reader, war veteran P. Korolkov, asked in a vindictive and triumphant tone, believing that to this day this question should make everyone grow pale and dumb: "I am in favor of kolkhozes [collective farms] and state enterprises, against all kinds of leasing, against private operators and giving away the land. Meanwhile, you are in favor of various forms of property, that is to say, in favor of restoring capitalism?" Even the concept of the NEP as "a change in our point of view on socialism" which Lenin suffered to achieve is no argument for Comrade Korolkov; it cannot shake his "sacred unshakable principles." However, what is he ultimately protecting?

On the one hand, there are the increasingly barren store shelves, increasingly vociferous complaints about the deterioration of life, increasingly bitter accusations and

demands: "Do something finally, we cannot go on like this!" Economists say: "To this end, you should give up the ideological dogmas running counter to the laws of economics." "We would rather starve and ruin the country than give up the principle"—respond the "unbending ones."

Of course, not everyone thinks this way. Many people demand more and more persistently that economic reforms be speeded up. In the process, 56 percent of the populace polled by sociologists go along with private property; 61 percent believe that introducing it will improve the economic situation of the country and the populace, and only 11 percent subscribe to the opposite point of view.

Those who are not afraid of changes still express their opinion "with trepidation," whereas those who favor our return to the "unshakable principles" are vociferous and aggressive, which becomes the people who have had the Stalinist notion of socialism drummed into them over their entire lives. Perhaps, you still hear them more because they are more vociferous. Perhaps, this is the reason why we always hear, "The people will not understand us!" from the podium of the Congress of People's Deputies whenever a radical proposal of any consequence is made.

Actually, what is so bad about a joint-stock enterprise and a private bakery, workshop, cafe, barber shop, and tailor being next to a giant state-run plant, about a parcel of land belonging to a peasant? What is so bad about a worker coming to own the shares of a plant or a factory and thus his percentage of the profits? Will his labor enthusiasm be boosted or diminished? Will discipline and order become lax or strong at such a people's enterprise?

P. Korolkov objects: "However, in this case everything is going to belong to someone rather than be common. Also, exploitation may evolve, like under capitalism."

However, what do we do about this fact brought up by economist B. Pinsker: In Sweden, the difference between the highest and minimal incomes amounts to merely 39 percent after the payment of taxes and the receipt of benefits? Recently, there was a program about American farmers on TV. On most farms, they cope themselves; however, the TV viewers also got to meet a hired worker. The farmer pays him \$20,000 a year regardless of the profit the farmer himself makes. Sometimes, there is less income left for the farmer than for the exploited worker. This is the "exploitation" of hired labor. It would be proper for the resourceful mind of a dogmatist to start doubting "the other way": Is the hired worker not exploiting the farmer who has hired him?

The main argument of the orthodox is: Private property cannot be allowed to **any degree**, even if it is going to work for the benefit of our society and is under the control of our state, because exploitation of man by man may develop. Is the exploitation of man by a system, a state, an idea possible in the perception of the orthodox?

Perhaps, at this stage in the development of humanity, at issue is not the complete abolition of any exploitation at all, but **the degree** of this exploitation; the issue is how to use any form of property while minimizing the degree of exploitation.

Here are several more numbers. At present, the share of the wage fund in the national income of developed countries comes to between 60 and 80 percent whereas in the USSR it is 37 percent. Economist R. Simonyan, an international relations specialist, quotes the following data: In our country, a 2 to 2.5 times greater proportion of the product generated is taken away from the worker than over there. Usually, they counter by saying that in our country a lot is spent for public consumption—education, health care, social benefits. Passionless numbers suggest otherwise: Funding for these needs in the USSR has also been smaller than in the developed capitalist states.

Some opponents exclaim: "Where does all of it go after all? We must put things in order!" There are many proposals in our editorial mailbag ranging from introducing "simple" prison terms for mismanagement to executions by a firing squad. Do you remember the granny who dreamed of Chekists in every factory shop? As I see it, participants in the Leningrad rally who have proclaimed administrative coercion to be the only remedy for our sick economy are quite like this granny. Certainly, order and discipline are necessary, especially during the current period of transition. However, only profound reforms, switching to market-based, natural adjustment which brings about the economic interest of people and collectives in the results of their labor may cure the economy radically.

Therefore, what do we want: to bring about our complete ruin or climb out of the abyss? What do we intend to proceed from in the future: common sense and economic laws or utopian dogmas, envy, and wickedness?

One and the Same Future?

Reading the letters leads one to think: We sort of lived through a different past because our concepts of the present and the future are just too different. For some, we have behind us one solid triumph of "real socialism," whereas for others a gaping abyss of Stalinism. For some, now is a troubled and gloomy time, for others—a long-awaited hour of renewal. Some believe that mercilessly exploitative, primordial capitalism, which can hardly be found anywhere in this wide world, lies ahead on the course of perestroika; others believe that from tomorrow on market will reign supreme and all of us will live like they do in Western commercials.

These two extreme views are hard to combine. However, it is necessary to come up with an objective picture. Our history includes the unprecedented, mighty October rush of the people to a better fate, the heroic labor and exploit of liberation from fascism, the flight of Yuriy Gagarin to the stars, and the tremendous, incomparable influence on the entire world process of civilization, including our

influence on developed capitalist societies which would not have come to a socially fairer distribution of wealth in the absence of our October.

However, our history also includes Stalinism, repression, and utopian dogmas which have brought about our crisis.

Our present day is a complicated, at times painful process of social transformation. It depends only on us how difficult this process is going to be.

Our tomorrow is just beginning; everything still lies ahead of us. It would be yet another utopia to demand that the socialist ideal be defined clearly and in minute detail and subsequently implemented. According to Marx, communism is not an ideal to which reality should conform but the actual advancement of a society. Therefore, we should live naturally, we should live a full-fledged life, live freely and with confidence in ourselves. We should move forward and try to borrow from the civilization of the world the best it has accumulated while minimizing the shortcomings inherent in developed economies and transforming the experience of the world from the socialist viewpoint.

This is the main goal of the party and its duty to our people. This is why requirements for the communists are very high. This means that all of their actions should be evaluated from this point of view.

Current Impact of Conservatism Examined

90UN0781A Moscow SOVETSKAYA KULTURA
in Russian 20 Jan 90 p 3

[Article by Yuriy Levada: "The Conservative Syndrome"]

[Text] Real rather than declarative pluralism in sociopolitical activities has become a fact of life in our society so quickly that we are ceasing (or failing?) to notice and evaluate it. I admit that the above statement may amaze some segment of the readers. However, I am prepared to defend it quite earnestly. There are no constitutional norms and no legislation that would guarantee or regulate a multitude of public organizations, parties, factions. It is not known when it will appear if we take into account the efficiency of our embryonic parliamentary practices. Nonetheless, pluralism exists and is acknowledged, also by those who cannot stand it. It is so because real pluralism does not begin with parties, factions, and oppositions, with a variety of economic systems, but merely with the recognition of a free opinion (or even a doubt) in a society. Thus far, we have only heard one program which embodies the entire wisdom and might of power. However, it is not greeted with an outpouring of ritual exuberance but rather with open criticism, either moderate or unrestrained, either from the left or from the right, and at times from a direction which is hard to determine, but with doubts in any event. The ancient world knew that doubts mean the end of a ritual and the beginning of cognition.

We have made a beginning though it is just the beginning. There is a long and difficult road between the birth and maturity of our pluralism. We may be merry or sad (it is known that knowledge multiplies sorrows); however, there is nowhere to go back to—you lose virginity only once.

Currently, only references to a syndrome are in order rather than those to groups, currents, or, say, proto-parties of a conservative stripe for the very reason that we are going through some initial, starting period of the emergence of social platforms and positions, the syndrome being a relatively stable set of signs which exercise a certain influence and affect to some degree the conscience and behavior of people.

I would like to stress from the very beginning that I do not at all intend to convict the conservative syndrome and the bearers of it or, on the other hand, its critics in these writings. In an environment filled with the shouts "let him have it!" it is most important not to curse but rather to understand and explain the views of others, including those which are far removed from your own. As I see it, to this end we need to consider the "mass base" of the meetings and slogans, the positions and moods which make the movements of a particular orientation possible rather than the meetings and slogans themselves.

However, which positions or views may we classify currently as being conservative? I say "we" and "currently" because it seems to me that there is no eternal and universal sense in it: In different societies and under different circumstances, various forces define themselves as conservative. In the West, they most frequently call the adherents of preserving liberal values (individual freedom and enterprise as primary, and social protection as secondary) conservatives. No matter how we regard these values (perhaps, currently no one would resolve to shrug them off) we cannot "preserve" them because we do not have them. I believe that when N.P. Shmelev recently called himself a conservative he was referring to the landmarks of economic development which have been mastered and are to be preserved on the scale of the world but which we have not only failed to exceed but also to achieve...

In the cataclysm of our domestic history, at a point where various stages and phases of social development collide, different times have "come together and started an argument." We have thoroughly studied some of what will be the "future"—not necessarily bright—for some people; however, we have not yet approached what was "the past" for many people. (As Mandelshtam put it: "Yesterday? It has not come yet.") We have taken entire classes in totalitarian dictatorship, under "proletarian" banners; we have taken cruel lessons of the destruction of peasant heritage and enslavement, takeover by the state and squandering, and so on and so forth, but we have not studied parliaments or a civilized market. Dreams about a beautiful future which for a long time used to be

considered a nutritious food for thought have turned out to be the embellished idols of the past.

We may seek consolation in the fact that we were not the ones to start "the mixing of times." There are no grounds to attribute it to the eternal uniqueness of Russia or to a coup in history. Such mixing has happened and is happening in all cases when a collision of civilizations is apparent and an attempt is made "to outwit" history. Even if we are the first ones we are at the head of a quite long line. Thus, the conservative syndrome in its most general and simple outline represents the lack of desire, inability, and fear to wake up. However, all of this is far from simple. The very fact that this phenomenon brings together various motives of which people at different stations in life and with different titles are characteristic bearers accounts for its tremendous social weight, its contradictions, and—most importantly—its instability. Some do not wish to give up their positions and privileges, and in the process many of them are undoubtedly convinced that performing their civic duties is associated with these very positions. Others, by all signs considerably less numerous, cannot give up (and do not want to think over) the slogans and formulas of their long-gone youth. (Nostalgia for the past is a characteristic trait of the consciousness of people who are growing old and of social groups in their twilight period). The third group is driven by the habit of obedience to or hope for the paternal care taken of them from above (the paternalistic complex). The fourth group is driven by the fear of the unknown, and so forth. Within the conservative syndrome, two "currents" are present and distinguished—conservatism of the top, of the holders of power and symbols, and conservatism of the grass roots, that is, the "holders" of the habit of obedience.

Therefore, what can our contemporary, domestic conservatism conserve (or, at any rate, what does it try to conserve)?

Social institutions of the recent and somewhat more remote past or, more precisely, the splinters of these institutions and confidence in them. Their own positions—or their remnants—in the system of institutions of power and influence. Finally, whatever has remained in the consciousness of our society from the illusions and prejudices of the past—in total, so to say, quite a lot, but these are splinters of a monolith smashed to pieces. A system of absolute power without its apex—without an absolute authority, absolute fear, and absolute confidence. An administrative economy without its erstwhile isolation, without any hope for efficiency, without growth rates, without resources, and so on. A cracked pyramid of power. Finally, the ruins of ideological bastions about which it was said correctly that not one stone can be taken out of them: Either they are untouchable or a ruin, and there is no other choice—such were the features of this extremely rigid design.

It has long been noted that people bid farewell to the authorities and fears of departing epochs easily and even merrily. However, giving up illusions is always more complicated and sad.

The conviction that an impenetrable wall exists, a certain sacred barrier which separates what is "ours" from everything else—alien, dangerous, and unacceptable—is to this day the most effective source for the preservation of the entire complex of comforting illusions. This wall took longer to build than its analog in Berlin. It was diligently painted with all kinds of what seemed to be durable paints: There were "the historical destiny," superpower interests (repainted "class interests"), and appeals to national culture or the spirit of Byzantine Orthodoxy. In any of its variants, the wall should have confirmed that the very thing which is pernicious for others is always healthy and useful for "us." Of course, this applied primarily to the very principle of isolation no matter how it was expressed—through bans, curses, or fears. After all, even now, when stone and other obstacles which are not far from us (actually they are ours rather than anyone else's) are coming down with the thunder reverberating all over Europe, voices are heard which maintain that we will lose our own individuality once the wall of implacability is removed. The French, the Japanese, the Germans, the Spaniards, and all others have found their way to the civilization of the world through incredible cataclysms without losing their individuality, but we are definitely going to get lost and lose our individuality because we can only live on the principle of "a complete opposite..."

What should we save behind the great wall from a bright light and the gaze of strangers? Two banners of different colors fly over the ranks of contemporary "defenders of the principles." A blinding-red banner contains the slogans of truly proletarian socialism cleansed of inequality and other distortions. The other banner, of a considerably darker color, mentions the interests of the great country, soil, and even blood. This "purple" combination appears surprising only at first sight. Since the time of Stalinism, radical-utopian phraseology has turned into camouflage for great-power authoritarianism, servile humiliation, and the very national conservatism the fruit of which we now have to reap.

There is no need to enumerate the arguments of the adherents and opponents of preserving the great wall and everything that goes with it. "Socio-logical" arguments, a certain "logic" of a social movement, is at work here rather than logical arguments. This is the case with all other disputes which are not academic but rather socio-practical or, let us call it sociohistorical, in nature.

The results of public opinion surveys indicate some of the parameters of the force which currently adheres to the arguments of a conservative variety. Here are the data for recent months.

Approximately one-half of those polled in urban and rural areas (an all-union sample) support appeals for "a

firm order." (To be sure, once an "extra"—"as under Stalin" is added to the text of the question not more than one-tenth agree with this).

More than one-half of those polled in the cities (60 percent) believe that shortages should be combated with ration cards rather than by increasing prices. As can be seen, the hope for an "iron fist" in both politics and economics is quite obvious. However, to what degree is a "conservative" response attributable to some firm convictions, and to what degree to the real difficulties brought by the mounting economic and social chaos?

Besides, according to the data of the same polls, the people who so obviously "vote" in favor of a ration-card system state right away, literally without taking their eyes off the questionnaire, their agreement with transferring the land to the peasants, leasing enterprises, collective and—oh horrors!—60 percent are prepared to acknowledge private property as quite normal.

We should add to this that political shifts in mass consciousness run ahead of changes in the economic views of a society. As early as last fall, the slogans which were the most radical for our parliament easily captured more than a half of the vote in the mass audience polled.

This paradox is simple. Strict lines delineating the spheres of influence of different points of view in mass consciousness have never existed, particularly in the times of rifts as abrupt as the one we are now experiencing. "Maximum" (approximately 50-percent) indicators of popularity of relatively conservative views do not at all describe the scale of some conservative "nucleus." They represent no more than the limits of the spread of the conservative syndrome. (According to approximate calculations by Ye.S. Petrenko, the attributes of "active conservatives" may be found in approximately 13 percent of the adult population).

Thus far, we have been discussing the attributes which belong to the complex of comforting illusions. If we look at the data on phobias it will turn out that a relatively small percentage of those polled find the origins of our difficulties in the designs of "enemies" (six percent), but a quite sizable percentage (close to one-third) find that the accomplishments of Japan, the United States, and so forth set an example for our country. At least one barrier, that of fear, is crumbling.

The conservative syndrome has spread unevenly in various social milieus: It is more apparent at the top levels of the social pyramid than at the lower levels, [more apparent] among the older people and the less educated. However, in Moscow it is more apparent than in other large cities (perhaps, the capital city is the focus for all the currents and extremes in the social arena), in parliamentary assemblies more than in our society at large, and so on.

Undoubtedly, conservatism has large reserves in our society, and they are being augmented with every passing day by those who are disappointed in the swift success of

perestroyka, those fed up with difficulties and hypocrisy, those who fear the radicalism of changes. I deliberately omit the consideration of the most acute of our collisions—the ethnic, federative one—which furnishes much material and stimuli for the conservative currents (of both the great-power variety and the opposite): This topic is too complex to be touched on in passing.

However, does the influx of such mixed replenishment strengthen the potential of conservatism? Most likely, this makes its internal instability increase. Continuous and increasingly frequent outbursts and “discharges” which are quite radical in their form and to a great degree conservative in their ways of thinking testify to this.

Of course, the explosions of painful tension are most easily seen in the matters of ethnic identification.

They are followed by the still more serious outbursts of populism which may be considered to be one of the most significant social forces since the spring of last year. It became clear at this time that its simple and sharp slogans turned out to be capable of awakening and setting in motion a politically inert mass whose numbers are in the millions. Populism is dualistic. It directs the rage of the people at a close and visible enemy—bureaucracy, corruption, mafia, and the shadow economy. It fails to see, or even interferes with seeing, that the bureaucracy is not a growth on the tree of our statehood but rather its trunk, a load-bearing element. In denouncing the notorious shadow economy with its trade and other mafias, sometimes with statistical data in hand, populism fails to notice that the very shadow in which all of these charms exist is cast by the state economy. While exposing the wrongful incomes of shady operators, be they real or imagined, populism turns a blind eye to the enormity of inefficient exploitation of man and nature by the state. This is why populism may both lead the masses awakening to political involvement to the democratic movement and draw them away from this movement, directing the protest at particular individuals, privileges, and so on. The conservative and restrictive tendencies of the populist movement are continuously sustained by various sources, and in recent months they have been promoted quite deliberately. Of course, in this sphere the renewed, “proletarianized” conservatism of the apparatus stands out which attempts to gain influence in at least some mass-populist movements in order to bring together the conservative aspirations of the top with the conservative narrow-mindedness of the grass roots.

Is there an opportunity for the conservative syndrome to turn into an organized force? Specifically, currently, in the course of the election campaign, attempts are being made to create something of a political union of the nomenklatura-patriotic-populist kind. I do not think that, say, a “party” or a “united front” of forces with a conservative orientation is possible: They are too heterogeneous, too clearly conceived in an artificial manner. The extreme simplicity of energetic slogans is the old

secret of impact of the declarations directly appealing to the feelings and passions of the masses. Sophisticated arguments are replaced (and drowned out) by the thunderously proclaimed “down with!”, “give us!”, “divide it up!”, and “do not let them!”.

However, this set of primitive slogans will hardly affect the broad masses. The civic maturity of the mass movements is increasing faster than could be expected. Besides, the long ears of the old nomenklatura so obviously stick out from under the tawdry helmets of the new fighters for justice that it is not easy for them to gain the support of the people.

Due to its instability, our present-day domestic conservatism is incapable of playing the role of a stabilizing or “middle-of-the-road” force in society, unlike its foreign “namesakes.” On the contrary, it continuously provides a background for uncontrollable explosions and destabilization.

This is why it seems to me that attempts to lean upon the conservative syndrome or to seek a compromise with it are not promising.

Concerns About Party Membership, State of Affairs

90UN0789A Moscow *EKONOMIKA I ZHIZN*
in Russian No 2, Jan 90 p 7

[Article by S. Popov, executive secretary of the “Vestnik CPSU kraykom”, under the headline “Our Political Club—Why are People Leaving the Party?: Party Membership Card...by Mail”]

[Text] We can no longer fail to keep up with the pace of events and changes, which the Party itself has initiated. This is the way M. S. Gorbachev formulated the main purport of the lesson learned by the resolutions of the recent Lithuanian Communist Party Congress. Such a courageous and impartial assessment of the situation is, in essence, an appeal for all communists to actively join in the fight for the ideals of perestroyka. But why are we lagging behind? Why have some communists and a number of Party organizations taken the openly temporizing position of passive observers? I often ask myself these difficult questions. I have talked with communists and looked at documents in search of an answer. Here is a summary of the semiannual report: in Kezhemskiy Rayon, Krasnoyarsk Kray, seven out of every ten CPSU candidate-members did not make it through the probationary period. What is the reason for this showing: the high demands placed upon prospective members or their personal passivity?

It would be naive to think that these people had taken a hasty and ill-advised step. No, they considered everything carefully. The words of one of the “refuseniks”, L. Kazimirov, chief of the Housing and Communal Services Directorate's planning department at the Kodinsk

urban settlement, are confirmation of this fact: "If the Party becomes truly Leninist, I will return to the Party..."

There is no denying that this is a glaring example of parasitic smugness, which all of us have encountered time and again both at work and in private life. Only in this case the acute social "malaise" has assumed a marked political tinge. While conforming to the political "climate", former communists and CPSU candidate-members, who were quite recently writing about their desire "to be in the front ranks...", have easily and unembarrassed changed their convictions like clothing. They celebrate the Party's successes as their own triumphs and then prefer to escape responsibility for the mistakes and shortcomings. They say, set matters straight—and I will come back...

During a six-month period, the Party commission attached to the CPSU raykom studied the personal records of almost 100 communists and submitted them to the raykom buro for consideration. One would think that this figure should have upset the members of the buro and the whole raykom and forced them to reconsider their attitude not only toward education, but also toward the selection of the future Party inductees. However, this did not occur. Just as before, nonchalant people frequently receive candidate membership cards here.

V. Nabokov, a fur farmer at the producers' cooperative farm is one of these people. In many respects, his story is typical. Vladimir Vladimirovich was ordered to fill out an application for his admittance as a CPSU candidate-member because he is a good worker and does not disturb public order. If he is asked to speak at a meeting—he speaks. If he is not given a Party assignment—he does not ask for one. Thus, the staff of the local Party organization would be increased by one more passive communist, barring any blunders. On the eve of his confirmation as a CPSU member, they forgot to notify Nabokov himself about it. A car was sent for him half an hour before the beginning of the buro meeting. Nabokov refused to go. He was asked to return his candidate membership card and submit a written statement—he returned the card and submitted the statement. This is how the story ended.

Why do some people leave the Party so easily? Where do the applications of the type, "Request expulsion, I am returning my Party membership card by mail", on the desks of the CPSU raykom buro members come from?

In my opinion, Yu. Shchegolev, secretary of the Party organization at motor vehicle transport plant No. 12 of the Boguchanghsstroy trust, has answered these questions most accurately:

—The fact is that the majority of communists have adopted a wait-and-see attitude regarding perestroyka. For instance, I do not know specifically what the Party Committee should be doing. There is an impression that perestroyka is passing us by...

The essence of what is happening in Kezhemskiy Rayon is concentrated in those words: many Party Committees continue to wait for instructions from above concerning how they should act and conduct their daily business. And meanwhile, informal organizations of various kinds are seizing the initiative. Today, their strength lies in the fact that they have a keener awareness of the problems of the rayon's inhabitants and, above all, they are waging a more aggressive, logical, and effective struggle against shortcomings.

Take for example the strained relations between the hydraulic engineers, who came here to build the Boguchany hydroelectric power plant, and the peasants, for whom the power plant has become the symbol of all problems. Informals in the person of "the Committee to Save the Angara River" are conducting meetings, gathering signatures, and forwarding petitions to higher organizations. And what about the raykom?

Eh. Shubina, chief of the CPSU raykom ideological department, calmly stated,—Nothing will come of this.

—The hydroelectric power plant will be built, people will be given new apartments, and the peasants' passions will die down by themselves,—G. Surikhina, the raykom secretary for ideology, echoed Shubina's words.

Do we not at times drive situations to the breaking point and to strikes through such complacency? Do we do this in order to then eliminate, at great spiritual and moral costs, the obstacles, which have separated people into Party members and non-Party members?

Much has already been said about the fact that under the conditions of perestroyka the place for communists is in the most complex and most responsible areas of work. The Party's strategic policy is defined in the materials of the 27th CPSU Congress and in the resolutions of the 19th All-Union Party Conference. All that remains is to choose the tactics and to act.

By the way, it is not at all necessary for the communists in Kezhemskiy Rayon to look elsewhere for examples of activity, self-assurance, and efficacy in Party organizations. They exist in their own rayon. I formed this opinion through the experience of the Party organization at roadbuilding district (DSU) No. 7. Perturbed by the abnormal situation in the collective, which in many respects affected production indices, the communists in this organization conducted a questionnaire survey among the DSU's workers and discussed the results of the survey at an open Party meeting. As a result, a decision was made to expel DSU-7's manager, who compromised the authority of the local Party organization, from the Party. It appears that this decision did not undermine, but, on the contrary, bolstered the Party organization's prestige in the eyes of all the labor collective's members. For instance, the fact that after the meeting, three young DSU workers applied for membership in the Party organization, is evidence of this.

The position of every Party worker and communist should be exactly like this—aggressive and not temporing and passive. One should not await changes, but create them with one's own hands, not admonish slovenly individuals, who have disgraced the Party, but rid one's self of them once and for all, and not be led, but

lead masses of people behind one's self—such is the requirement of the CPSU Rules and of our complicated times.

Krasnoyarskiy Kray.

RSFSR Elections Discussed

90UN0909A Moscow LITERATURNAYA ROSSIYA
in Russian No 3, 19 Jan 90 p 2

[Interview with D.A. Barabashov, co-chairman of the "Rossiya" Club of Russian voters and people's deputies of the USSR and instructor in the Socioeconomic Department of the CPSU Central Committee, by Vyacheslav Sukhnev: "Russia Before the Election"; place and date not given]

[Text] The central election commission for elections of people's deputies of the RSFSR [Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic] discussed the progress of the current election campaign at a regular meeting. In 1,068 electoral districts, 8,254 candidates were nominated, or almost 8 aspirants for each seat. Approximately 3,500 persons were registered as candidates for people's deputy. A fact that should be noted particularly is that only 3.3 percent of the candidates were deputies in the last assembly. Thus, people who had little experience in political activity were included in the pre-election campaign.

D.A. Barabashov, co-chairman of the "Rossiya" Club of voters and people's deputies of the USSR and instructor in the Socioeconomic Department of the CPSU Central Committee, replies to questions from our correspondent.

[Correspondent] So, Dmitriy Aleksandrovich, the pre-election campaign in Russia has entered the final phase. It has to be conducted by people who only yesterday were far from a political campaign and a campaign for authority. In your opinion, do guarantees exist that the RSFSR People's Deputies will actually become worthy representatives of the people, and that their lack of experience will not prevent them from defending the interests of the voters?

[Barabashov] I think that such guarantees are contained in the real potential of an ELECTION—in the multiseat system. You will recall that a year ago many now well-known USSR people's deputies just took their first steps in the political field. Consequently, experience is something that will come with time. Paraphrasing the well-known saying—deputies are not born. A person with principles will also be a deputy with principles, and he will not shun fighting for the interests of the voters. Therefore, it seems, the main task of the Russian voters is to do everything so that deputy seats are gained by decent, intelligent, and responsible people. Such people will come to the defense of the interests of the people and their moral values more quickly. But political operators, lobbyists, unprincipled careerists, and those who are anxious to please... These will begin to "repay" those for their seats who supported them in the pre-election campaign.

[Correspondent] And you do not consider your suppositions insulting to all candidates to people's deputies?

[Barabashov] In no way! My suppositions do not refer to honest people who fight for victory in elections with open, democratic methods by virtue of their own programs that respond to the hopes of a majority of the voters. But we have to look truth straight in the eye: A corrupt part of the party and administrative apparatus, operators of the "shadow" economy, and nationalistic and anti-Soviet forces will nominate their own candidates.

[Correspondent] Anti-Soviet forces in the soviets?

[Barabashov] Yes, and this is not a paradox. This is today's reality. You know that in some republics the slogan is circulating now: "For soviets without communists!" The next and quite consistent stage: "For the soviets without Soviet authority!" I must say that there are too many supporters in the country who are for such an emasculation of the essence of the soviets as organs of sovereignty of the people. I will mention at least how quickly acceptance was found among the people's deputies for the phrases "Esteemed parliament!" and "Esteemed president!" It would seem that words are just words... However, our entire history teaches that deeds invariably follow words. At the 19th party conference and at congresses of the USSR people's deputies, there was talk about strengthening the soviets, and about transferring absolute power to them. Why, at the very highest level, did talk start about a parliament and about a president? The current parliamentarianism in many countries is characterized exactly by a strengthening of executive authority, and not legislative authority, and a strengthening of the influence of the president in the decisions of the parliament.

[Correspondent] That is, parliamentarianism is a direct route to strengthening executive authority. Putting it more simply, if the parliamentary tendencies prevail in the Supreme Soviet, then in the very near future we will have to confront the strengthening of a thrice cursed administrative system. We know what will happen further under our conditions. We have already gone through it. Is that not so?

[Barabashov] Approximately so. And, therefore, it is necessary for Russian voters to draw lessons from the practice of the operation of the present USSR Supreme Soviet. People have to be elected to the RSFSR People's Deputies who know well the difference between a parliamentary republic and a republic of soviets. The strengthening of Russian sovereignty will depend on this.

[Correspondent] I agree, Dmitriy Aleksandrovich, that lessons have to be drawn. But in what way? Everything that you talked about now, in my opinion, was not discussed even in one newspaper organ. There have been discussions, and very extensive ones, about draft laws on the press, on property, on leasing, and many others that are really very important. As far as I can judge, the problem about which you talked did not appear in the pages of newspapers.

[Barabashov] Indeed, this problem did not get into the newspapers. And it is a pity! No matter how speculative and remote from practice it may seem, discussion of it would facilitate the development of public opinion with respect to the parliamentary tendencies in the USSR Supreme Soviet. But what can be done—the press was occupied with other important problems. By the way, the pre-election campaign in the republics also did not predominate among these problems. Very little information is printed about the situation in Russia also and about how the pre-election campaign is unfolding. There recently was a short commentary in PRAVDA in connection with the meeting of the Central Electoral Commission for Elections to People's Deputy of the RSFSR, and SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA published several comments from the provinces. And that is all. The only publication that thoroughly and continuously reports on the progress of the pre-election campaign in Russia is your newspaper, and I am not at all saying this because I am being interviewed by it... It is LITERATURNAYA ROSSIYA that on 29 December published the pre-election platform of a bloc of socio-patriotic movements of Russia "For a Policy of National Harmony and Russian Renewal." We will return once again to this document, but now I want to complete the answer to the question concerning the ways and forms in which the experience of a political campaign can be accumulated and lessons derived from the election campaigns. Our "Rossiya" Club was created precisely to implement the idea of joint work of voters and deputies.

[Correspondent] In what way can this be expressed?

[Barabashov] This is already being expressed in specific matters. We held a series of meetings with USSR people's deputies at which we discussed the draft laws on property, the economic independence of the Baltic republics, and certain other matters. The atmosphere of discussions in our club is always free and easy and frank, and anyone can have the floor. The attitudes toward legislative initiatives are worked out in debates, and all of the "pro's" and "con's" are weighed. This kind of a "working over" of a draft law helps the people's deputies to see its strong and weak sides better, to develop their own positions, and to select weighty arguments. At the last session of the USSR Supreme Soviet and Congress, we observed an increase in the activity of USSR people's deputies who took part in the discussions of the "Rossiya" Club. Now we have joined the pre-election campaign. With the participation of the "Rossiya" Club, the bloc of socio-patriotic movements has worked out a pre-election platform and its main slogans are: "We do not need great upheavals. We need a great Soviet Russia! Russian has always been and will continue to be a peaceful power! It will do everything so that the Soviet Union is and remains that way!"

[Correspondent] Very powerful slogans... I think that they will not leave the voters of Russia indifferent, because they contain the entire program of the campaign for the renewal of the Motherland. One thing remains unclear to me, we will speak frankly, what should the

communists be saying: Why did not the bloc of party organizations of Russia come out with a similar platform? As far as I know, the communists of Moscow and Leningrad started the election campaign with a powerful pre-election platform. However, there is no total unity in these platforms in understanding the strategy and tactics of the communists in the current stage, and one senses different approaches to the role of the party in society. Such a lack of coordination cannot give the voters an accurate impression about what communists want in the current pre-election campaign and with what specific tasks they are thinking of sending their deputies to the Supreme Soviet of Russia.

[Barabashov] You are right: The communists of the republic, who constitute more than half of all of the members of the CPSU, have not yet worked up a united pre-election platform. But time is passing. It must be said right out here: The Russian bureau of the CPSU Central Committee, which was formed recently, found itself at the tail end of events. I think that the communists of Russia need a single pre-election platform, as this was done in other republics. It is necessary to understand clearly: A campaign is going on for power. It has already begun, although there is more than a month until the voting! The voting will only sum up the results of the campaign... Representatives of the interregional groups of the USSR people's deputies joined the campaign for seats of the Russian Federation a long time ago. People's Deputy Yu. Afanasyev drove around the republic giving speeches. G. Popov, another USSR people's deputy, literally came out with an instructional speech at a meeting of the Moscow association of voters' clubs. Under the aegis of "interregional supporters," a unification is taking place of all movements under one platform, from people's fronts of oblasts to sections of the Democratic Union. Thus, a local link of the interregional group in the campaign for RSFSR people's deputy seats is being formed. Not everyone on the CPSU Central Committee was pleased that the bloc of socio-patriotic movements succeeded in coming out with its own platform. This complicated the situation for those who will develop a platform for the communists of Russia—because it will be necessary to take into account the proposals and slogans that are being put forth to the voters by the Association of the "United Council of Russia," the Association of Lovers of Russian Literature and Culture "Yedinstvo", our club "Rossiya," the All-Russian Culture Fund, the All-Russian Society for the Protection of Historical and Cultural Monuments, the OFT [United Workers' Front], Committee for the Preservation of the Volga, the Association of Russian Painters, the Russian Section of the International Fund of Slavonic Writing and Slavonic Culture, the Union of the Spiritual Revival of the Motherland, the Voluntary Society of Lovers of Books of the RSFSR, and the Fund for the Restoration of the Temple of Christ the Savior. It is no accident that I listed all of the movements that are in the bloc. I wanted to convince the readers that the pre-election platform of the bloc expresses the deep aspirations and hopes of Russians. And they could not

wait until the communists of Russia spoke out. The voters of the largest republic of the country would not forgive us.

[Correspondent] What you talked about, Dmitriy Aleksandrovich, once again persuades one of the irreversibility of perestroika. Just three to four years ago such independence of public movements would simply have been unthinkable. Though just as the existence of such movements was also unthinkable. However, you mentioned that not everyone in the CPSU Central Committee was happy with the fact that the public movements overtook the party. How was this dissatisfaction expressed?

[Barabashov] In any case, for the time being, not with what we got accustomed to calling practical conclusions...

[Correspondent] Thank God! This means that the Central Committee is demonstrating the indissoluble connection between perestroika thinking and perestroika practice. Inasmuch as there have been almost no reports about the work of the "Rossiya" Club, could you dwell on it in more detail?

[Barabashov] Of course. The "Rossiya" Club of Russian voters and USSR people's deputies was formed at the end of October of last year. Since that time, it has succeeded in conducting several discussions on draft laws, it participated in the preparation, as I have already said, of the platform of the bloc of public-patriotic movements, and it organized firm ties with interfronts in the union republics. And at the end of December we held a "Patriotism—The Fulcrum of the Peoples of Russia" evening meeting. Representatives of the mass media—newspapers and television—were invited to this evening affair. By the way, there was not even one newspaper paragraph about the meeting. If one of our "superintendents of perestroika" criticizes anyone during the day, including any member of the Politburo, then that very evening this criticism can be heard on television and over the radio. But here, there is an important evening meeting, in which well-known masters of Russian literature and culture, prominent economists, and fathers of the church, take part... No notice at all! We will hope that the television channel "Sovetskaya Rossiya", for whose opening we fought for a long time, will not overlook our club. But let us return to the evening meeting. In opening it, I said that our state was formed in this way: Rus, Russia, the Soviet Union. From Kulikovo Field to the battles of the Great Patriotic War, Russia was the pivotal factor that strengthened the state. But what will happen to us, with Russia today? We must understand this thoroughly. Today, we are being willfully misrepresented with the help of the mass media, and in the process they even refer to glasnost. While mass rehabilitation was going on, Zionism was also rehabilitated here quietly. Otherwise, how can you interpret the Zionist mobs in Moscow—not only in the capital of the USSR, but also

in the capital of Russia? Or has the UN resolution on Zionism as a form of racism of our day already been abolished?

[Correspondent] Dmitriy Aleksandrovich, I understand you. LITERATURNAYA ROSSIYA wrote about the congresses of the Zionists and about the congress of Jewish communities and organizations, where the Zionists played first fiddle. I want to say outright: Our newspaper is for the development of the most extensive initiatives of the Jewish people, as, however, it is for any other people of the Russian Federation. This refers to language, culture, education, the press... But we cannot go along with Zionism. It is an ideological movement whose animosity toward our system is recognized by many Jews as well. So the talk about Zionism is different.

[Barabashov] At that very same evening meeting of voters and people's deputies, we said that the "shadow" economy is striving to gain power, and we see how the nominations of candidates to people's deputies is taking place. In the last two months, the interregional group, I want to emphasize once more, has accomplished colossal work in rallying the so-called democrats. And the RSFSR People's Front has been organized, and also the MDAO—the Interregional Association of Democratic Associations. The "Interregionalists" and the DS [Democratic Union] have united for now. We remember that during the time of stagnation some political clichés lasted a long time, for decades. One of the current clichés is that the CPSU headed and led perestroika. Now the cliché is not working. The CPSU is slowing the perestroika processes, and it lacks dynamism in its own perestroika. This is talked about at the plenums, and it is talked about in the party. At the Central Committee Plenum, in the traditions of stagnation, without any counseling with the communists of Russia, a bureau was created... Russia should receive genuine statehood, with all of the state and social institutions befitting a great power. By creating a Communist Party of Russia, we will resolve all problems quicker. There is no other and more important task before the Russian voters than to block the way to power of the "radical-democrats." If they come to power, society will have other moral values, and another system.

[Correspondent] In that case, we should wish that the communists of Russia unite more quickly on a realistic pre-election platform and achieve a strengthening of the sovereignty of Russia! I recall how A.Ya. Degtyarev, the first deputy chief of the Ideological Department of the CPSU Central Committee, speaking on Leningrad television on New Year's eve, called the year 1990 the year of Russia. What does the "Rossiya" Club think of this?

[Barabashov] We welcome and fully support such a statement! Our position is as follows: We are not fighting for power. We are fighting against those who would like to usurp it and fill it with a new nonsocialist content. We are for the soviets really becoming soviets in the Leninist understanding.

From the Editor:

When this interview was prepared for publication, a report appeared in the press: On 15 January 1990, the Russian bureau of the CPSU Central Committee discussed and approved a text at its meeting of an Appeal to the People of Soviet Russia in connection with the forthcoming elections to republic and local organs of authority.

Candidate Nomination Discussed

90UN0979A Moscow MOSKOVSKAYA PRAVDA
in Russian 4 Jan 90 p 1

[Interview with A.V. Lukyanchikov, chief of the Moscow City executive committee for soviet work, by M. Polyatykin: "Medicine Against Euphoria"; date and place not given]

[Text] The initial stage of the election campaign has ended, a stage that turned out to be extremely contradictory and in content not at all as expected or like previous elections for USSR people's deputies.

How are the experts and the people standing there at the sources of the process assessing it? Our correspondent interviews A. Lukyanchikov, chief of the Moscow city executive committee department for soviet work.

[Correspondent] Aleksandr Vasilyevich, according to the rules of the genre I should immediately ask you an intriguing question that will interest and attract the readers. But let me begin with a very simple question that you have already answered but that readers are still asking: Why are there such discrepancies between the okrugs in terms of the number of voters, and is there some hidden design in this?

[Lukyanchikov] I shall answer, and Muscovites can decide for themselves whether or not it is so. It states in the Law on Elections that the okrugs should be about the same, but that due consideration should be given to the administrative-territorial divisions.

And so it happened that the Baumanskiy rayon, where there are about 70,000 voters, became one okrug, while in Kransogvardeyskiy rayon there are several okrugs each with 150,000 voters. If we compare the okrugs in terms of numbers then some rayons will remain without their "own" deputy in the republic soviet. One person will have to be elected to represent two or even three rayons.

People's deputies for the Moscow soviet will be elected in okrugs with from 11,000 to 19,000 voters, the average being almost 14,000 voters per deputy. Let me say that we have managed somewhat to reduce the ratio; previously the difference was five or six times greater. Although, of course, we must not delude ourselves and we must strive for approximate equality.

This also applies to the electoral okrugs for the elections to the rayon soviets. But they have already been described in great detail.

[Correspondent] Let me use an expression from the earlier arsenal of apparatus workers. "The opinion exists" that they have made a maximum effort to "clear" the road for the leaders and have overreached themselves. Things have occurred that have frozen the activity of the public at their places of residence down to zero in some places. The voters' clubs and self-management councils have not been operating. What, in your opinion, are the reasons for this?

[Lukyanchikov] You promised to move gradually to the complicated questions and now you pose one when I scarcely have gotten moving.

Let me say candidly that I expected that 1,030 contenders for seats would be entered in our data banks, but today there are three times less. It seems to me that the reasons for this are purely subjective.

Of course, with a small number of voters in okrugs, it is difficult to gather 150 people at a place of residence for the elections to the rayon soviets. In the future this figure will probably be reduced.

The public's and the candidates' underestimation of the role of the local soviets, which with the transfer of the city and rayons to cost accounting and self-financing will virtually resolve all issues, and the level of their competence will rise significantly, is having its effect, and to put it simply, it will become more interesting to work with the soviets.

Out of consideration of competition some candidates waited until the very final days before entering their nominations, trying to confuse their rivals. The election commissions have, frankly, been working poorly, removing themselves from the organization of election meetings at places of residence. Even though the law clearly sets forth their rights. It just so happened that movement has been to some degree random.

[Correspondent] We have heard about the decline in people's activity in connection with the general leaning "to the right" among USSR people's deputies and the government...

[Lukyanchikov] I would say otherwise. The general euphoria about the first democratic elections is gradually abating. After two congresses of the people's deputies and the sessions of the Supreme Soviet it has become clear that we must not expect instantaneous results and that society faces serious work to rescue the economy and stabilize the market. It is probable that under these conditions the decline in enthusiasm may continue. In short, our day-to-day lives are the best medicine against euphoria.

Obviously some time will pass before the activity of the public begins to rise. The social scientists and opinion poll centers could speak best on this subject, but we have

no figures. We have the scholars but no polls and no analysis. We can only guess what is going on in society.

I hope that in future election battles the loud promises and the populist slogans will not be used with success. Victory should be the logical result of constructive programs.

[Correspondent] And to what do you attribute the psychology, the mood, the weariness and the irritation of the voter, of which under present conditions it is quite simple to take advantage?

[Lukyanchikov] To what the elections to our highest organ of power showed. But should we not have learned something from that?

[Correspondent] If the self-management committees acquire the status of the primary wing of legislative power, perhaps deputies at the rayon level should be professionals, as some people are suggesting. In any matter the amateur level is lower than the professional level, but as a rule the public activity of the individual produces less results than results achieved within the framework of state structures.

[Lukyanchikov] But why go to extremes? Surely it is possible to find an optimal ratio of "professionals" and "amateurs"? That we have not looked for this is another matter, there was no need to. But we should.

If we regard everyone as a professional then we shall finish up with the same apparatus that we have now, and against which people complain. Only less well trained, even though perhaps more radical. But what can be built on bare radicalism? In my opinion the sensible combination that I mentioned is optimal.

And consider this factor: A deputy represents the voters, the same people who gave him his mandate. A deputy, particularly a deputy for a rayon soviet, lives among the people and is aware of all their requirements and needs. If he becomes a professional, willy-nilly, by force of circumstances, he will be separated from the territory and will no longer be representing anyone except perhaps the interests of some group in that same apparatus.

[Correspondent] As far as I know the first stage of the campaign took place with out special emotions. What would you like for the next rounds?

[Lukyanchikov] Not just for myself but for everyone involved in this event, and the voters also. I want our common efforts not to be wasted, I want us to elect the best and most worthy people to all the soviets.

[Correspondent] Well, I hope that your wish is granted. For our common good.

[Lukyanchikov] Thank you. And please convey my best wishes for the new year.

Moscow City Party Membership Decline

90UN0840A Riga SOVETSKAYA LATVIYA in Russian
10 Jan 90 p 2

[Article by L. Zakharova: "Outflow from the CPSU: What are the Reasons?"]

[Text] During the first ten months of 1989 almost 5000 muscovites left the CPSU at their own wish—several times more than during the same period the year before. As a whole, the Moscow party organization declined by approximately 10,000 persons during 1989. Some broke with it, some were excluded for one or another action, and some were taken away by death. Besides this, the number joining the CPSU declined.

These figures and facts were reported by Yuriy Pavlov, who heads the joint party card and party statistics section in the CPSU Moscow City Committee. Commenting on them, he noted: "The Moscow City organization even now, in my view, is large: It has 1,140,000 members today. I will recall that at the beginning of the 1920s, the number of communists in the whole country was much smaller and nevertheless was considered by many to be excessive for a ruling party."

Present tendencies show that, within the next few years, as before, the ranks of the CPSU, presently numbering almost 20 million, will decline. This phenomenon is being widely discussed in our press. Some are alarmed by it as being some kind of sign of a crisis that the party is living through. Others assume that this is natural and beneficial for its renewal under conditions of the restructuring that is spreading through the country at the initiative of the CPSU and that, having seized all of society, as stands to reason, could not but touch the party as well.

The situation, of course, is not without problems, but we should not dramatize it and call it a crisis, thinks Yu. Pavlov. In order to evaluate the phenomenon from all aspects and correctly, it is necessary first of all to look into the reasons for it. These are being studied seriously within the Moscow City party committee.

There are more than a few difficulties here, unfortunately. Not everyone is entirely sincere in providing the motivation behind his lack of desire to remain a communist. A majority refer to conditions of health, which allegedly do not permit them to carry on work in the party with necessary energy and in the spirit of the new conditions which life itself is presenting. Something else is often concealed behind such explanations: Many do not wish to overcome their usual passivity, which in the old days existed on a massive scale and was seemingly tolerated. Today, we can no longer reconcile ourselves to this. The party—the political vanguard of Soviet society, the initiator and organizer of perestroika—needs people who work actively, fighters for its ideas, capable to search for and implement solutions to the difficult problems that confront our country.

Some people base their intention to leave the CPSU on a sharply critical attitude toward the state of affairs in one or another party organization and within the party as a whole. Toward recurrences of administrative-command ways, bureaucratism, and other negative phenomena characteristic of the party in the past, which have been exposed by it but have not finally disappeared, right up to the present day. Many are not satisfied with the course of perestroika, with its rates and results.

It is possible to understand such an explanation, say Yu. Pavlov. It is specifically the party that set the course of perestroika, its goals and the paths for their achievement. But realization of this program is lagging in certain very important areas. People have become tired of waiting. The authority of the party is declining. We cannot, however, forget that this rests upon the authority of each of its members, that it depends upon their concrete deeds, on their personal contribution to perestroika.

Today, an atmosphere of broad glasnost has been established, one of discussion, of criticism. These striking changes for the better owe their birth specifically to the CPSU, which initiated and has led the processes of renewal within society. At the same time, the party has become the subject of severe critical analysis, examples of which it itself has not suppressed while also exposing and condemning the negative phenomena that have been inherited from the past. A multitude of problems have been disclosed, ones which have accumulated and been aggravated for decades because not only were they not solved, but they were not even revealed. Rather, they were deeply buried, aggravating one another. Coping with them turned out to be difficult and then, after a year or two, impossible. As a consequence, attacks on leading organs of the CPSU, right up to the Central Committee, have increased in frequency.

Such criticism and accusations are in many ways just. It is necessary, however, to recall: Rely on the center, but also don't slip up yourself. "Fewer glances toward the center in expectation of instructions from above,"—M.S. Gorbachev recently appealed—"more initiative and independence in the solution of any questions that arise...The traveller will manage the road himself."

Obviously, belonging to the party today imposes special obligations on each of its members. And some are trying to remain aloof from them under one pretext or another. Of course, the reasons and factors for leaving it are varied. Their study continues.

During the past three years, about 380,000 persons have been excluded and have quit the CPSU—17 percent more than during the same preceding period. A marked increase, but is this really a symptom of crisis within the party? What is going on is a normal process of its self purification, says Yu. Pavlov.

Certain participants in discussions about renewal of the CPSU are even insisting on such radical measures as purges, which have been used repeatedly from times of

old. The very first of them was carried out in 1921. Then, the number of communists in the country was reduced by almost a quarter. But the quantitative losses turned into a qualitative gain. Indeed, as V.I. Lenin wrote, "careerists and rascals inevitably strive to hang on to" the ruling party (Complete Collected Works, vol. 41, p. 30). During the past decades the party also has become obstructed by elements foreign to it, from which it can and must deliver itself. But are exceptional measures necessary today? In discussions of this question, a majority of communists reply in the negative.

Profiles of Old, New Moscow 1st Party Secretary

90UN0725A Riga ATMODA in Russian 18 Dec 89
pp 4,5

[Article by M. Sokolov: "Every Second One Is Also a Hero"]

[Text] In 1986 Yeltsin replaced Grishin as first secretary of the Moscow Gorkom; in 1987 Zaykov replaced Yeltsin, and on 21 November 1989, Prokofyev, the second secretary of the Moscow Gorkom, replaced Zaykov. "The king is dead! Long live the king!" But who was the former king and what can be expected from the present king?

Lev Nikolayevich Zaykov has returned to his familiar military-industrial complex. For a long time he headed the Leningrad Bolshevik Association, and when he departed, he left his own son as director of one of the association's plants. In 1983 Romanov, the first secretary of the Leningrad Obkom, was made Central Committee secretary for defense, and L. Zaykov took his place. In 1985, at the initiative of L. Zaykov, a comprehensive program called "Intensification-90" was developed, which was warmly approved by the Center. This program is now the talk of the town in Leningrad, for the fictitiousness of it was obvious from the very beginning, but it is first secretary Gidasov who will have to answer for it. During his two years as first secretary in Moscow Zaykov worked out, with the active participation of Yu. Prokofyev, two more programs, "Housing 2000" and "Progress 1995." It is not yet known who will answer for them.

Zaykov enjoyed the greatest influence between the fall of 1987 and the fall of 1988, when he was considered the number two man in the Secretariat after Ligachev and conducted sessions of the Secretariat in his absence. The official explanation of Zaykov's retirement is his return to defense questions in the Central Committee Secretariat because the head of the Defense Council, Gorbachev, is extremely busy with other state matters.

In information circles it is assumed, however, that it is more of an honorary retirement: they are dissatisfied with Zaykov. In contrast to the restless Yeltsin, who dispersed the Moscow raykoms, Zaykov, who learned from the bitter experience of his predecessor, preferred in general to distance himself from the raykoms; after setting things up to operate automatically, he did not

speak—either well or ill—of their work in his speeches. In this way he provided the pretext for the accusation of connivance in the disintegration of the Moscow party organization; the failure of the majority of party workers (the current first secretary, Prokofyev, was one of those who failed) in the spring elections was also laid at his doorstep.

Yuriy Anatolyevich Prokofyev is a typical party worker of the Gorbachev generation. Born in 1939, he has devoted all of his conscious life to work in the apparatus—first Komsomol work, then party, soviet, and then again party work. He is the only one of five secretaries of the Moscow Gorkom (MGK) who survived the Yeltsin decimation of the MGK apparatus; he spent the most difficult period as secretary of the Moscow Soviet ispolkom. Prokofyev ran in the Kuybyshevskiy Rayon, where he was first secretary of the raykom, and gained only 13 percent of the votes. If one considers that his opponent, Kazamarov, director of a scientific production association, was hardly a popular public figure, one can presume that Prokofyev suffered the fate of many others; the voters were voting not for his opponent, but AGAINST the MGK secretary. At a press conference, which took place on 22 November in the Moscow Gorkom of the CPSU, Zaykov said that after the election defeat Prokofyev lost heart and three times came to him for advice on whether he should retire after that. But three times Lev Nikolayevich was able to cheer him up by pointing out that there were many elections ahead for soviets at the republic and local levels and that the main thing was not winning but participating.

They consider Prokofyev to be a figure in a conservative mold, not inclined, incidentally to open maneuvers and actions. It can be assumed that in his public policy he will try to avoid extremes. The logic of promotion in the apparatus speaks in favor of such an assumption. On the other hand, many of Yu. Prokofyev's previous connections prompt watchfulness. His authorized representative in the elections was the well-known director of the "Na Doskakh" Theater, S. Kurginyan, who frequently called for a harsh, surgical resolution of the country's problems and the revival of the Great Power ideal, of asceticism and the "great leap forward." Reports by Kurginyan, who called for the use of the army and regular "Afghan" units to suppress national movements, were submitted to the Central Committee apparatus through Prokofyev. The newspaper LITERATURNAYA ROSSIYA, which takes a position of strict national radicalism, enjoys the obvious support of Prokofyev.

Prokofyev Meets With Moscow Intelligentsia

90UN0793A Moscow VECHERNYAYA MOSKVA
in Russian 29 Dec 89 p 1

[Article by K. Yurov: "Multiplying the Contribution to Perestroika"]

[Text] There was nothing prescribed or official nor was there anything solemn at the meeting yesterday in the

Men of Letters' Central House. Yuriy Anatolyevich Prokofyev, as first secretary of the Moscow Gorkom [City Party Committee], simply strode up to the microphone on the stage of the Great Hall and began to describe what was troubling him most today.

And in the hall were writers and artists of Moscow, figures of stage and screen, architects and workers of publishing houses, composers and journalists.... Voices were heard, it was true, calling for the discussion to be confined to problems of culture. But the written inquiries and verbal questions showed that those present were interested in literally all aspects, all facets of the life of the capital: from everyday concerns to the fate of historical monuments, from transport disarray to the nature of the debate at the party Central Committee plenum, from the pay of librarians and taxation policy to particular features of Moscow's cooperatives.

Mention was made of the future paths of perestroika, the role of the CPSU in the revolutionary renewal of society, the place of literature and art in spiritual and moral revival and the election platform of the city party organization. It was noted at the meeting that one-fourth of all the country's figures of culture live and work in Moscow. The city has 43 professional theaters and 17 studio theaters, 44 museums, and a large number of exhibition halls. Mention was made with concern of the serious material problems of the city's culture.

There was a confidential and candid discussion of the serious questions of the economy, social development, and cultural life. Yu.A. Prokofyev read aloud from certain notes and put them in his coat pocket: "This needs to be tackled specifically. Let us get together and think about it." Moscow's artistic intelligentsia means 100,000 people. What needs to be done to ensure that their influence is perceived by all 9 million of the capital's inhabitants? This was what was discussed.

Your VECHERNYAYA MOSKVA correspondent asked certain participants in the meeting between the capital's artistic intelligentsia and Moscow Gorkom First Secretary Yu.A. Prokofyev, a meeting which lasted more than three and one-half hours, to share their impressions.

"An interesting meeting," M.N. Poltoranin, chairman of the Moscow organization of the USSR Journalists Union, said. "The first secretary familiarized those present with the essentials of his work program. It was a good thing that the meeting with the intelligentsia was one of the first of the new gorkom first secretary's meetings with Muscovites.

"I believe that all that was said about the intelligentsia's needs was useful also. It is to our shame that a librarian with secondary education is paid only R80 a month, and his colleague with higher education, only R100. It is said that perestroika has up to now given most to the intelligentsia—has brought it spiritual emancipation. But materially it has given the cultural workers nothing. I would like to take the Moscow City Council of Trade Unions, particularly organizations of the Culture

Workers Union, to task—they are doing nothing to defend the interests of the intelligentsia. But it needs not only moral but also material support.”

“I am pleased,” G.P. Dmitriyev, chairman of the board of the Moscow organization of the USSR Composers Union, observed, “that the first secretary himself was the initiator of the meeting with the artistic intelligentsia. This was a very valuable thing. I hope that such meetings will become a tradition.

“The discussion enabled us all to perceive the entire range of problems that the city is experiencing and to see the sore points. Feedback is very valuable also. The answers to numerous questions and written inquiries are a useful dialogue and will help the gorkom leader understand our concerns and our expectations. I saw with satisfaction that the questions put to Yuriy Anatolyevich were not of a particular nature but reflected general concern at the state of the economy, the social situation, and the level of cultural life.

“We were all very interested in Yu.A. Prokofyev’s proposal for a meeting and thorough discussion with the representatives of each artistic union—the artists, composers, and so forth. This shows that the leadership of the city party organization does not consider the meeting a formal measure but is prepared to consent to an extension of the dialogue and close cooperation. I had a chance to exchange opinions with my colleagues. We derived much from the discussion.”

November Leningrad Party Meeting Discussed

90UN0803A Moscow *VECHERNAYA MOSKVA*
in Russian 23 Jan 90 p 2

[Article by Ye. Lysenko, deputy chief of the CPSU Central Committee Academy of Social Sciences Institute of Advanced Qualifications for Leading Cadres: “I Disagree”]

[Text] Two months have elapsed since several thousand of Leningrad’s communists went to a meeting to support the platform to hasten radical economic and political reform approved at a joint plenum of the party city and oblast committees, but passions about it have still not calmed. In various publications, diametrically opposed comments have been published about it, and an instructive and edifying speech by USSR People’s Deputy A. Sobchak addressed to the meeting’s participants and to B.V. Gidasov, first secretary of the Leningrad Obkom [Obiast Party Committee] and Gorkom [City Party Committee], was carried on the Leningrad television channel. A negative opinion on the meeting was also expressed in Nelli Marinich’s article “Hostile Winds Are Blowing” published in *VECHERNAYA MOSKVA* on 29 November 1989, with which I disagree. In particular, she raises the issue of those attending the meeting: “Who was it that succumbed to the sentiments of a certain number of Leningraders who are supporters of Nina Andreyeva?” I consider that this disparages Leningraders.

Why, then, as she writes, was Nelli Marinich uncomfortable with what she saw at that meeting? A fresh wind, the stormy wind of truth about the distortions in perestroika, and the hearts of those who, taking advantage of democracy and monopolizing pluralism, have decided to make political, and not just political, capital and cash in on political popularity and pick their way through to power, not by hook or by crook but by driving straight through, have started to palpitate.

And in fact an alarm bell did sound off over Leningrad Square: “We shall allow no one to push us from the path of socialism!” Here it was a question not of a return to deformed socialism but of continuing along the path chosen way back in October 1917, and of the renewed and democratic socialism that is now being created.

At the meeting they hit the grabbers and the moneybags as they deserved, not the real cooperative people, and it was a question of that small proportion of cooperative people who without working have accumulated millions in capital and are ready to go to any lengths, even using them in a struggle for power.

The demands made by those attending the meeting to bring order and discipline in its broad sense were justified. And for the nth time an appeal was made to the terrifying myth of the “iron hand,” which is equated with Stalinism, or the protective thesis—“this is against democracy.” But in civilized practice, democracy and discipline constitute a dialectic unity.

The author was also put on her guard by the criticism at the meeting directed at the Politburo. It is easy to reproach a meeting about its own lack of initiative. But the essential nature of the demands lay elsewhere, and it was primarily a question of the adoption in fact of ill-considered decisions and half-measures. The meeting resolution appealed to the central party organs, demanding that an expanded plenum of the CPSU Central Committee be held, with accountability reports from the members of the Politburo and an assessment of the political situation in the party and country.

The author was embarrassed by the slogan “Communist of the Supreme Soviet what is the color of your party card?” I was too. This is not the best model of political standards but I am not embarrassed but rather utterly terrified by the passiveness of a considerable proportion of the communist deputies in the USSR Supreme Soviet and the apoliticalness of members of the CPSU in the various independence associations and their skeptical attitude toward the party unity for which Lenin always fought. And how not to agree with the firm call issued by the meeting: “Communists and nonparty people of Leningrad, close your ranks for the renewal of socialism! History will not forgive us for apathy and inactivity. Our banner has been and still is red, and on it will be written ‘Lenin, the October, Socialism!’” If this does not please the author or the people’s fronts, the interregional group

of deputies, or the association of voters, then the question arises: On which side of the barricades do these people stand?

I can also understand the alarm about the press that was expressed at the meeting. If it was said that some newspapers and journals and television programs have virtually become a weapon of information terror, then those who said it did not transgress the truth. Where is the creative, organizational role of the press? Why are we not showing the complicated processes of perestroika? Have we forgotten about the working people, the people of authority, the people in the party rayon committees and the primary party organizations? I think that it is time to repent the lack of objectivity and deception of the people, and the malicious gloating and the erosion of the values of the people.

The author was dissatisfied with the categorical statements made by the communists against plans to restore the bourgeois order in our country, and to revive private ownership and renew man's exploitation of man. I do not think that this rejects approaches to diversity of ownership. People are startled by the calls thrust forward by private farmers for "dispensation" of the kolkhozes, and for a free market (which is regulated even in the capitalist world). What USSR People's Deputy Yu.D. Chernichenko is proposing—to distribute the land—is a Utopia: No one will take it, no one wants to go into "slavery."

And finally, why are some workers in the mass media so critical precisely of this meeting that was conducted by the communists of Leningrad? What should embarrass them is the antisocialist, anti-Soviet, pro-fascist slogans and the open attacks against the party, their own people, and their history!!!

The party is the first and only force in the world to initiate perestroika, and it is the guarantee of perestroika and will lead to its triumph.

From the Editor

In our view the author is trying to impart to the meeting of which he writes more "perestroikalike" features than there in fact were. For example, it was not a question of "renewed and democratic socialism," and even less of "diversity of ownership," as he claims. On the contrary, they were speaking against any transformations in the economy, and against the laws on ownership, leasing, and land. There is more: Reading the letter one senses that even though everyone is now in favor of perestroika, nevertheless everyone also understands its essential nature, and many interpret it in their own way, and sometimes this is a small, almost cosmetic repair job to the current edifice.

However, we intend to deal in more detail about the letters of readers **who disagree** in future issues of **VECHERNAYA MOSKVA** by publishing a review of the numerous comments.

And finally, it is hardly possible to be triumphantly proud about absolutely everything in the history of the party, as this author does, who admires even the fact that "the party is the first and only force in the world to initiate perestroika." It is clear to every unprejudiced person that it would have been much better for all of society if in its time the party had gone down the road devised by Lenin. Then there would have been no need for perestroika....

Leningrad's Fateyev on Party Conference

90UN0790C Leningrad *LENINGRADSKAYA PRAVDA*
in Russian 5 Jan 90 p 1

[Report on interview with Anatoliy Mikhaylovich Fateyev, CPSU Leningrad Obkom second secretary and bureau member, by Yu. Nikolayev: "In the CPSU Leningrad Obkom and Gorkom"; place and date not given]

[Text] The CPSU Leningrad oblast committee [obkom] bureau and city committee [gorkom] have passed a resolution which, with the aim of involving the communists of Leningrad more actively in the preparations for the 28th CPSU Congress, deems the following necessary:

1. To initiate preparations for a conference of the Leningrad party organization.
2. The question of schedules and procedure for holding the conference should be reviewed at a joint plenum of the party Leningrad obkom and gorkom after the CPSU Central Committee January 1990 Plenum.
3. It is deemed advisable that proposals on procedure for holding the conference, the conference agenda, and the procedure for democratic election of delegates to it, as delegates to the 28th CPSU Congress, should be submitted by the primary party organizations in Leningrad City and Oblast.

The proposals submitted will be generalized in the commissions of the oblast and Leningrad City party committees and submitted to the joint plenum of the CPSU Leningrad Obkom and Gorkom. A working group will be set up to conduct a preliminary study of them. The CPSU gorkoms and rayon committees [raykoms] are assigned the task of submitting proposals on the make-up of the group.

We give the floor to A.M. Fateyev, CPSU Leningrad bureau member and second secretary.

[Nikolayev] Anatoliy Mikhaylovich, the CPSU Leningrad Obkom Bureau and Gorkom have passed a resolution on the start of preparations for a conference of the Leningrad party organization. Because of the actual proposals contained in it, which will certainly arouse the interest both of communists in the city and oblast and probably all Leningraders, could you comment in greater detail on some of the proposals in this document?

[Fateyev] I agree with you, and first I would like to note the special importance of the decision that has been

taken both on the organizational and the political plane. The resolution passed by the Leningrad Obkom Bureau and Gorkom serves merely to legitimate the work that has already been started to prepare for the conference. The positions of the CPSU obkom and gorkom on this matter have already been stated.

A number of party committees, in particular the party committee at the Leningrad State University, have also defined their own approaches and submitted proposals. It is important when starting the work to prepare for the conference to insure that it is constructive and business-like. At the conference it will be necessary to produce a solid, well and deeply considered package of proposals on the most diverse issues concerning the life and activity of the Leningrad party organization. This position was supported, for example, at a meeting of the Club for Business Meetings of Party Workers in the Leningrad Higher Party School by the secretaries of party committees with the rights of raykoms. This work is of particular importance in connection with the upcoming CPSU congress. Communists in the oblast and city must do it without slackening their attention to the preparations for the elections to local and republic soviets of people's deputies, implementation of the platform of the Leningrad party organization under current conditions, and overcoming negative trends in the economy and the social sphere.

[Nikolayev] Anatoliy Mikhaylovich, you just said that the CPSU oblast and city committees have already started work on preparations for the next party conference. Could you comment a little more broadly on the course of these preparations and describe the aims and tasks of this current period?

[Fateyev] We have but one aim—to try to involve as many communists as possible in active debate of the draft documents for the upcoming 28th CPSU Congress, in particular the CPSU Central Committee political platform and the CPSU Rules. And our conference should be the main component of that process.

To the point, a great number of proposals on possible changes and amendments to the party rules have been submitted during the period of the accountability reports and elections to the primary party organizations, and also during the shaping of the platform for the Leningrad party organization under current conditions. Both of these important factors in the life of Leningrad's communists may also be regarded as the initial stages of the preparations for the oblast party conference. During this time thousands and thousands of opinions and ideas from communists have been studied, and indeed the analysis continues. First and foremost on questions pertaining to the extension of independence for the primary party organizations, principles for the election of leading party organs, forming the apparatus, and other problems relating to the democratization of internal party life.

One important means of feedback for communists and nonparty people are the organs of the mass media, which have noticeably increased their own analytical and organizing role. They have become an accessible and open forum for many valuable proposals concerning activation of the activity of the party organizations. In the preparations for the conference we are trying to make extensive use of the important channel of studying public opinion and conducting sociological studies.

The ability of our party organizations to reflect and represent the diverse interests of the workers and in fact strive for a situation in which realization of those interests becomes a main direction in the restructuring of the party. The structures existing in the party are poorly adapted to resolving this task. It is necessary to create a different mechanism for links with the masses—business meeting clubs, associations, discussion groups—and to find ways to engage in informal dealings with people. This must and should also be the subject of discussion at the upcoming party conference.

The timetables and procedure for holding the conference should, in my opinion, be best considered at a joint plenum of the Leningrad Obkom and Gorkom immediately following the CPSU Central Committee January (1990) Plenum. And it will probably be proper and correct for proposals on procedure for holding the conference, and for the conference agenda, and for a democratic procedure for the election of delegates to it, and also for the 28th CPSU Congress, to be submitted by the primary party organizations of Leningrad City and Oblast themselves.

If we can only bring into play the potential of the party organization, now multiplied many times over and representing a ramified and functioning political infrastructure, we cannot be deflected from a political course that correctly reflects the sentiments of rank-and-file communists.

The proposals submitted will be generalized in the commissions before the joint plenum of the CPSU Leningrad Obkom and Gorkom. And for the purpose of conducting a preliminary study of these proposals a working group will be set up whose members will be recommended by the CPSU city and rayon committees.

Involving active and enthusiastic communists from the primary party organizations during the preparations for important decisions by plenums, bureaus, and conference is becoming a fine tradition for us. Suffice it to recall the major contribution made by such working groups in shaping the main provisions of the platform of Leningrad's communists under current conditions. And since a broad social spectrum of the Leningrad party organizations will be represented in these groups, from the communist worker to the engineer to the secretary of the large party committee, them by being aware of their opinions and the opinion of the collectives that they

represent on any given issue, we shall obtain a good picture of the political views and attitudes existing in society.

In short, it can be said that the main function of the working group will be by gaining impetus from the knowledge of life and the state of affairs in the primary party organizations to gather together and systematize everything of value that the communists of Leningrad say, and to initiate debate on the draft documents for the upcoming 28th CPSU Congress, including the CPSU political platform and CPSU Rules, and to prepare for the conference of the Leningrad party organization. We have a great deal of serious work to do. And in order to carry it out successfully we must consolidate all the efforts of Leningrad's communists.

Leningrad Secretary Gidaspov Interviewed

90UN0849A Minsk SOVETSKAYA BELORUSSIYA
in Russian 4 Jan 90 p 2

[Interview with Leningrad party leader B.V. Gidaspov by unknown correspondent: "Whose Side Are You On, Secretary Gidaspov?"; date and place not given]

[Text] The personality of B.V. Gidaspov, first secretary of the Leningrad Obkom [oblast party committee] and Gorkom [city party committee], corresponding member of the USSR Academy of Sciences and in the recent past leader of the first consortium in our country, is of interest to many people. The recent meetings in Leningrad with his participation and the reports on their thrust and the speeches made at them by the first secretary compelled everyone to work out his own position toward the information—so contradictory and incomprehensible were the reports. At the Congress nonparty composer R.K. Shchedrin described the mass meeting in Leningrad, which was shown on television, as being aimed at applying the brakes to revolutionary restructuring and accused B. Gidaspov of... a breach of party ethics.

"Whose side are you on, Gidaspov?" both deputies and journalists have asked. There is, certainly, no one better than he himself to answer this question.

"I am not 'right' and not 'left.' And do not rank me with the partocrats," Boris Veniaminovich said, answering the main question.

[Question] What is your attitude toward the fact that, following the mass meetings in Leningrad, you have come to enjoy fame as a conservative or ultra-radical? And toward the slogans we have seen on the screen?

[Gidaspov] A very calm one. Are you, in putting your question, trying to suggest my answer? I would ask that you not attach the label to the whole press. What went out over the air was a reporter's viewpoint. This was not a direct relay. Excuse me, you are wrong, it was an out-and-out montage. And the slogans.... I do not know who brought them. Tickets to the square were not on

sale, the slogans were not inspected. There have always been mass meeting excesses—as a territorial deputy I have attended a great number of election meetings and listened to such strong language, up to and including insults.... Later a person would come up to me: Excuse me, I became over-excited. We should not react sharply to these things. If you wish to know, Leningrad sociologists whom I am in the habit of consulting predicted, one way and another, the kind of reaction the first mass meeting would evoke and which correspondent would write what—they even gave their names. Public opinion has been created not by the press but by individuals expressing group interests. Well, let them. Is it not interesting that, for example, according to press estimates, 40,000 persons came to our second meeting, but Ministry of Internal Affairs officials counted only 4,000. Leningrad's communists have their own platform—a document on their role in perestroika has been published. The Politburo and Central Committee of the party and many obkoms agree with it. Our steps aimed at accelerating perestroika are supported by Leningrad's intelligentsia, the workers, informals—everyone....

Are we in the CPSU not all different? Some profess some ideas, others ideas that are a little different. The People's Front also has a nucleus and a right wing and a left wing, the "Democratic Union" has right and left movements. And we summoned these people to the meeting, they stood next to each other and spoke variously, but they were discussing common problems: They are concerned about the future of Leningrad, the future of perestroika. Our goal is to unite all progressive forces, all who may now help the country extricate itself from the impasse.

There is also a second, associated task: To bring the communists, not just apparatchiks but also workers and employees, onto the streets and squares, closer to people, where there is harsh criticism, where you may not only get the door slammed in your face but may also be "trampled under foot" if you get lost.

[Question] And are they going out? Being "cooked" in the crowd? And not complaining?

[Gidaspov] Naturally. When we go eyeball to eyeball with the people, it can be seen right away which party official is worth anything. At first the invitations to attend the mass meeting frightened off many people. Not only the apparatchiks, incidentally. Also those who had until recently been conducting mass meetings in isolation. The "DU" [Democratic Union], say, would assemble and conduct propaganda among one another for Russia. "Pamyat" would struggle might and main against Zionism, although they would in fact be doing battle for themselves, they are egotists of the first water. And so we summon them to a meeting. They become aware of resistance, they become indignant. So be it, let them get used to it. Otherwise they will become partocrats.... This is what I tell the leaders of the People's Front—how many functionaries who have no jobs and

who are involving themselves in political struggle have emerged among you. They take offense if I call them functionaries....

[Question] What is your attitude toward the United Workers Front?

[Gidaspov] A normal one, as toward one of the 2,017 public organizations in Leningrad and the oblast, with which we are ready to cooperate on a constructive basis and to conduct a dialogue.

[Question] Is your method of working with the informals more one of consolidation than confrontation?

[Gidaspov] Of course. You understand the danger for Moscow, for Leningrad and then for the whole country if the People's Front conducts a mass meeting in one place, the communists in another, the anarcho-syndicalists in yet another? Slogans and a revolutionary mood are maturing with each. And then they suddenly fall out and come to blows—can you imagine what would happen?

[Question] Perhaps the basis for a consolidation of forces has yet to mature?

[Gidaspov] We need to seek ways toward that now, only now and precisely now. Later it will be too late. And, incidentally, the leaders of the public movements are prepared for dialogue. When they see that the first secretary is not afraid and goes and talks with both monarchists and the "Friends of Father Makhno"—how many different associations have multiplied here—and expresses his viewpoint, listens to theirs and enters into dialogue, they treat this with respect.

[Question] With what meaning do you invest today the "party work" concept?

[Gidaspov] I understand it this way: There are behind me seven million fellow citizens. They have to be clothed, shod and fed. They must have conditions for the free development of the personality.

[Question] You are substituting for the soviets. Why are you, and not the mayor of the city, thinking about this?

[Gidaspov] Because Article 6 of the constitution is still in effect. Real power lies with the CPSU.

[Question] What, incidentally, is your attitude toward the debate in the Congress on Article 6 of the constitution?

[Gidaspov] As a communist, I am opposed to this article. The platform of Leningrad's communists clearly records: We are opposed to the declarative assertion of the CPSU's leading role. But as a USSR people's deputy, I was opposed to discussion of this article at the Second Congress—there is Article 2, on the political system in the USSR. To what extent will we try to change the USSR Constitution article by article?

[Question] Your attitude toward the introduction of private property, as some economists propose....

[Gidaspov] I am not against it, if the conditions for this have ripened.... We in Leningrad Oblast have created 28 individual farms. We had difficulty persuading these people. And that's it, there are no more who want this. Now if a million peasants conceived a desire to purchase the land, there would then, understandably, be grounds for discussion.

[Question] At the mass meetings in Leningrad you spoke of socialist ideals and the party's role in perestroika. Do not these appeals contradict the "All Power to the Soviets" slogan proclaimed by the 19th party conference and the First Congress of People's Deputies?

[Gidaspov] No, they do not. In order that the soviets might take power, they need to be strengthened and made independent. In the city and oblast soviet executive committees here the apparatus is dozens of times larger than that of the Smolnyy (there are 225 of us for all of Leningrad and the oblast), but it is incapable of doing what we do in the party authorities. When the soviets have the same system of knowledgeability and communications with the work force and the same internal discipline for which we are currently being abused (it harms matters in some respects, but helps also), the soviets will then certainly be capable of really taking over power.

[Question] Is it possible that the Leningrad party organization will be defeated at the coming elections?

[Gidaspov] I would not put the question that way. People, not an organizations, take part in elections. The elections are a kind of touchstone, against whom the individual's strength is tested. From those whom the people elect we will form both the soviet and party authorities.

Prokofyev Comments on Readers' Letters

90UN0808A Moscow MOSKOVSKAYA PRAVDA
in Russian 21 Jan 90 p 3

[Interview with Yuriy Prokofyev, first secretary of the Moscow City Party Committee, by V. Yevseyev concerning readers' letters to the editorial office: "January, Moscow—Against the Background of Hot Issues"; place and date not given]

[Text] How to Elect Delegates to the 27th Party Congress?

[Yevseyev] Yuriy Anatolyevich, in the editorial mailbag we may notice the high and low tide of sorts in the interest of readers in particular topics, for example, party activities. The first increase in the number of letters on this issue occurred at the beginning of an all-city discussion. It peaked again when MOSKOVSKAYA PRAVDA carried a questionnaire of the MVPSh [Moscow Higher Party School]. As you know, at the time we received 18,000 responses to it...

[Prokofyev] Indeed, analyzing them helped us at the time to get a better idea of the opinion of various groups of Muscovites on the most current issues.

[Yevseyev] Recently, the number of letters on party issues has again increased perceptibly...

[Prokofyev] I believe I will not be mistaken if I suggest that many of the letters are associated with Article 6 of the USSR Constitution?

[Yevseyev] You are right, but, perhaps, there is no need for you to comment on these letters any longer because the position of the CPSU Moscow Gorkom [City Party Committee] on this issue has been set forth quite definitively in its political theses for the elections.

[Prokofyev] A plenum of the gorkom has come out in favor of revising Article 6. Personally, I am convinced that the authority of the party should rest on a political foundation rather than a legislative provision. As far as I know, most of the communists of Moscow subscribe to this point of view.

[Yevseyev] ...as well as an overwhelming majority of those writing to the editorial office. However, there is one more issue on the position of the gorkom which is of no less concern to our readers. This is the forthcoming election of delegates to the party congress. Here are the letters from I. Vasilyev, retired colonel and party member; V. Prokhorov, nonparty member and engineer; housewife M. Terekhova... One cannot enumerate all of them. I have cited these names only in order to show that this apparently strictly intra-party issue concerns the most diverse categories of Muscovites. Once again, most of them are of the same mind: Elections to the congress should be direct, secret, and competitive.

[Prokofyev] The gorkom, most of the raykoms [rayon party committees] and primary party organizations are of the same opinion. There are virtually no differences of opinion on this matter. They are only debating, so to say, the technology of holding such elections. Many variants have been proposed. I am not going to discuss all of them in detail. They have been covered in sufficient detail in the press, including your newspaper. I will only note that carrying out some of the variants does not run counter to the CPSU Statute in effect whereas other variants call for it to be changed. Personally, I believe that the statute, the law of our party life, cannot be violated, as well as any law. If it has become obsolete it should be changed but not violated. Nonetheless, I see no insurmountable obstacles in the way of electing delegates to the congress under any of the variants proposed by communists, all the more so because there have been historical precedents when the issue of electing delegates to the congress was ultimately resolved in Moscow at the level of rayon party organizations. I mean elections to the 16th and 22d Congresses of the party. I believe that a Central Committee plenum may give such a permission currently as well. Actually, participants in the recently held conference of the secretaries of primary party organizations of the city approached the forthcoming plenum of the

Central Committee with this very decision—to give the local party organizations the right to determine themselves the procedures for forming the body of delegates.

[Yevseyev] Therefore, it may so happen that in different rayons of Moscow delegates to the congress will be elected differently?

[Prokofyev] Yes. We believe that the communists themselves should determine procedures for the election. The main point is for every party member to be given a real opportunity to influence [the election of] those who will come to the congress. The elections should be direct, secret, and on a competitive basis. After all, this is indeed a most vital issue. The composition of the future Central Committee will correspond to the composition of the delegates to the congress. The policy of the entire party will largely correspond to the composition of the Central Committee. Therefore, we cannot afford a mistake currently.

[Yevseyev] Will the same principle apply to the organization of the election of delegates to the city party conference?

[Prokofyev] Certainly. However, these elections will be easier to organize because more than 250 party organizations are entitled to elect delegates to the party conference directly by virtue of their numerical strength whereas others can do so in party districts.

[Yevseyev] Previously, ranking functionaries became the delegates of congresses and conferences virtually automatically. The direct, secret, and competitive elections of all delegates with the participation of all communists may deprive many of them of the delegate credentials and thus of the prospects for keeping their leadership positions...

[Prokofyev] Well, this is going to be a real test for the authority of the party functionaries. Conditions should be equal for everyone. One cannot participate in the same competition and run on a shorter track.

Who Is Going To Be the Master of New Rayon Newspapers in Moscow?

[Yevseyev] Judging by the letters coming to the editorial office, their own rayon newspapers which have recently appeared in a number of rayons of the capital city have caused much interest on the part of the residents of our city. V. Soltanovskiy has sent to the editorial office a detailed analysis of the issues of the Kirovskiy Rayon newspaper and asked: What should the rayon press publications be, who should they belong to, whose views should they reflect?

[Prokofyev] Let us begin with the main point. On the one hand, as I see it, it is beyond doubt that the existence of the rayon newspapers is necessary in a city such as Moscow where the populations of some rayons almost rival that of entire oblasts. On the other hand, unfortunately, we still do not have a press law which would regulate the publication of such newspapers by various

social formations and societies. In embarking on their publication, we were guided by only one document, a recent resolution of the CPSU Central Committee which gave us the right to resolve the issues of opening and closing rayon newspapers on our own. This is why the answer to the question about the "master" of these publications is unequivocal—the raykoms and the executive committees of rayon soviets.

Nonetheless, there are absolutely no grounds for regarding them as strictly official publications. We do not by any means restrict them and force on them our recommendations. All rayons are looking for their own ways. Actually, this can be seen from the diverse nature, style, and image of the rayon newspapers themselves.

[Yevseyev] Pardon me, Yuriy Anatolyevich, but the reader Yu. Bozhko believes that the Moscow "rayon newspapers" have one more, chief "master"—the ruble. He means the fact that most of these publications operate on a commercial basis.

[Prokofyev] This is so for now. This fact also has two aspects. Cost recoupment is the first aspect, and, of course, it is good because nobody has funds to spare. Decisions and authorizations may be there, but there are no printing facilities and no paper. This is why in each rayon they have to cope with it as best they can. This is why the frequency of publication of the newspapers varies. In some places, they are weekly, in some places biweekly, but in most rayons they are published just once a month. In a word, in keeping with the opportunities they have... The editorial offices are forced to sell the newspapers at higher prices in order to enhance such opportunities and to fight for literally every reader and buyer. This is the second aspect of cost recoupment which, in all honesty, bothers us. In their pursuit of commercial advantages, some rayon newspapers strive to attract readers in any manner and stoop to populism and sensationalism.

[Yevseyev] However, any editorial office dreams of sensations...

[Prokofyev] Perhaps. However, I believe that it is improper for a small and also infrequently published newspaper to begin reprinting someone else's sensations from the central press. This is not what the rayon newspapers were set up for.

[Yevseyev] What were they set up for?

[Prokofyev] As I see it, offering economic, ecological, commercial, and housing information—all kinds of rayon-specific information—is their primary task. It should be the information which may only be found in a rayon newspaper, and the absence of which largely prevents a person from feeling that he is a master of the rayon. Of course, rayon problems should also be discussed. Unfortunately, there is no dearth of those. I am sure that the residents of a rayon have something to say about this. There is no need to duplicate the central press. This is my opinion. However, I repeat again that

the gorkom does not intend to force its opinion on the editorial offices of rayon newspapers. They are searching for their identity, and I hope they find it. In any event, it is good that their own publications have appeared in 26 out of 33 city rayons.

What Lies Ahead on the Cultural Front?

[Yevseyev] Many readers are interested in the issues of the cultural potential of the capital city. What are the prospects for the development of the facilities and financial resources of the arts—construction and equipment of theater and concert halls, exhibition space, museums, and libraries? Physician A. Sheykin, construction worker A. Gorin, and labor veteran B. Ioffe have asked such questions. The Muscovite I. Chekletsov suggests: "It would be worthwhile for the CPSU Moscow Gorkom to think over the issue of using the auditoriums in the buildings of the CPSU Central Committee Academy of Social Sciences, the Moscow State Institute of International Relations, the Higher School of Trade Union Movement, the Academy of the National Economy, and other "prestigious" offices for the needs of the Muscovites in the evenings and on weekends for concerts, lectures, and so on.

[Prokofyev] I will respond right away to the second part of the question concerning the use of the auditoriums during the evening hours. I took interest in that when I still worked for the Moscow City Soviet. In general, we are used to using this for that, and that for something else again... However, this does not always work out. The "prestige" of these offices is not the point. It is just that the design peculiarities of these auditoriums do not make it possible to have concerts of any consequence or theater productions in them—the stage is small, there is no auxiliary space... As far as educational work in these auditoriums is concerned, this is, of course, possible. However, I doubt that lectures in auditoriums that big will draw a large enough audience. Even the big cinemas which we have are now, as a rule, half empty.

[Yevseyev] What if we expand the question, Yuriy Anatolyevich? In many of the city microrayons, there is just nothing to do in the evening and on weekends. At the same time, various offices, schools, and PTU's [vocational technical schools] have gymnasiums and auditoriums, even if not very good ones, where one could play volleyball, ping-pong, or hold a meeting of some kind... However, in the evening the schools, PTU's, and offices are closed. I talked to the director of a PTU which, incidentally, is located in a beautiful building which has everything necessary for instruction and recreation. He said: I could let in the guys in the evening, let them dance and engage in sports. However, if they break a window or, God forbid, have a fight in the school I will be in hot water. If they act like hooligans in the street nobody calls me to account...

[Prokofyev] No gorkom or Moscow City Soviet will ever be able to influence such a director. He will always find a thousand excuses in order not to cause problems for

himself. However, the public and the self-management committees are quite capable of solving these problems. New deputies of the rayon soviets should also be so instructed. Indeed, all we need to do is review in a businesslike manner what we have and how it is used.

These, however, are issues of, so to say, a tactical nature whereas there also are strategic problems of the cultural facilities of our city. They accumulated over many decades when the notorious "residual principle" applied to culture.

As a result, currently the situation in Moscow is such that, for example, we have many fewer theater seats per 1,000 population than the standards envisage, and fewer than we had before the revolution. Since the war, just a few theaters have been built in the city. Overall, only 12 theaters were built for this specific purpose; the rest are located in adapted space. Measures are now being taken with a view to improving the situation. A program for remodeling the theaters of Moscow until the year 2000 has been prepared, and several hundred million rubles have been allocated for this. The renovation of many museums and libraries the condition of which is likewise lamentable has been planned and is under way already.

I would like to mention the deadlines for the completion of this work. The Muscovites should become the controllers of our construction organizations. In May of this year, the main building of the Tretyakov Gallery should be commissioned, and all work should be ultimately completed in 1991. This year, they are promising to complete the remodeling of the Historical Museum which has not been properly repaired in the 100 years of its existence. This year, the Bryusov and Darwin Museums should be commissioned. For next year, the commissioning of all facilities at the "Tsaritsyno" museum complex, a sadly delayed construction project, is planned. The completion of the entire set of projects in the imeni Pushkin Museum of Fine Arts is scheduled for 1995.

I know that the Muscovites are concerned about the situation of the Lenin Library. The USSR Council of Ministers resolved to renovate it in 1990 through 1994. To this end, 97 million foreign-currency rubles have been allocated. The Historical Library, the imeni Nekrasov, imeni Gaydar, and imeni Gogol Libraries, the imeni Svetlov Youth Library, and 206 rayon libraries will be either renovated or repaired. This will occur between 1990 and 1995. Thirty-one libraries will be moved to new premises, including the imeni Turgenev Library and Reading Room in 1992.

Now let us talk about the most popular art. At one time, the infatuation with megalomania brought about that almost all cinemas (actually, as well as stadiums and palaces of culture) were huge, with 1,000 to 1,200 seats. The architects simply discounted small cinemas, small athletic facilities, and cozy clubs. As a result, the overall number of seats in the cinemas is supposedly sufficient,

but there is another problem: Many of them are half-empty, as I have already said. Cinema may be the most popular of the arts, but some movies will not attract 1,000 viewers at a time. If there were two smaller cinemas with different movies instead of one giant one they could fill up. Currently, this is the direction which we follow.

The creation of theatrical cultural centers is a new development in our city. They are working on such centers in the imeni Yermolova Theater and the Studio Theater "On the Boards." In addition to the auditorium, they will have halls for lectures, reception rooms, cafes. Actually, the Taganka Theater is the prototype. In this theater, one may not only see a performance but may also sit down and have a conversation in the cafe which is frequented by the actors and friends of the theater.

[Yevseyev] However, Yuriy Anatolyevich, you would agree that it is not that easy to become a friend of the Taganka Theater. Will there be an opportunity for "simple mortals" to sit down and talk over a cup of coffee or, pardon me, a mug of beer in a small, home-like cafe-club? In foreign countries, there is one on each block. Is something similar planned here?

[Prokofyev] Not yet. The reason is simple—we are not that rich. There are more important problems.

[Yevseyev] This will hardly call for big outlays...

[Prokofyev] It appears so at first sight. People will not frequent a plain basement. Cafe-clubs are "penny" projects. They call for the ingenuity of architects and designers. This costs a lot. I repeat that for now we do not have the funds. First of all, we would like to build an athletic and therapeutic facility in all large microrayons. To our mind, this is a priority task. Once we accomplish this we can take up the cafe-clubs. It is another matter if, say, the councils of local self-government take up the house clubs. They may remodel for these purposes the so-called hard-to-rent apartments—on the ground floor, in noisy locations, and so on. We will support such an initiative.

[Yevseyev] Staying on the topic of culture, I cannot but touch on one more issue which is of acute concern to many people: Will the commercialization of art, and of the cinema in particular, which is under way bring about the disappearance of high artistic criteria and adverse influence on the morality of the young people which is poor to begin with? This is what educators L. Rummyantseva and V. Deyeva, instructor of the rayon administration for people's education A. Kozlov, librarian Ye. Kotova, and other readers have mentioned in their letters.

[Prokofyev] Recently, a meeting with representatives of the creative arts intellectuals of the city was held. They asked the same question. They asked what my attitude is. So, what is it? I am against the spiritual upbringing of people on a commercial basis. However, please understand that I am not an art historian, and I am not going

to determine what is good and what is bad in art, what can and cannot be done. Meanwhile, it seemed to me that this is exactly what they expected of me: We in the gorkom are aware of how serious the situation is and we are preparing a resolution banning so and so—in this vein... The situation is alarming indeed, but it cannot be changed by bans and instructions. This is up to the culture and art personalities themselves. However, some of them do not have time for that because they are too busy settling accounts within their guild. Others are silent, apparently out of fear of being branded conservatives. As a result, along with interesting and new things which have arrived in our art recently, patent and base kitsch in bright packages is finding its way to the readers and viewers. In the process, the young people who have no experience with the nuances of art history are the main consumers of this kitsch. If only they would help the young people figure out what stands for what, help by explanations rather than bans! However, those wishing to become modern-day Peredvizhniki are not around. It is a pity! There has never been a task more important than the spiritual upbringing of the younger generation, and now it is so more than ever.

Why Do Children Suffer Due to a Transition to Economic Accountability?

[Yevseyev] There are many letters in the mail concerning the issues of schools. Many of them refer to poor facilities. The schools are in poor repair, they are poorly heated, and they do not have funds for carrying out the plans entailed by the education reform. These are not new issues. However, in the opinion of readers, the situation has deteriorated following the transition to economic accountability at enterprises: Former sponsors have begun billing the schools for every trifle. After all, a school educates the children of the same employees of a plant who now believe that helping it is too costly. In particular, this is what the employees of the Leninskiy Rayon Administration of People's Education refer to. Teacher S. Khoze, parents I. Matyukhina, I. Bestuzhev, A. Redkina, and others write about this.

[Prokofyev] Indeed, in the environment of enterprises switching to economic accountability, they help the schools less with upgrading their instruction and building facilities. Here is an example. Two years ago, the enterprises allocated 2 million rubles [R] for major and current repairs of schools whereas in 1989 only R1 million was allocated. At the same time, there have been cases when enterprises continued to help the schools in a major way due to the persistence of party rayon committees and rayon executive committees (in Cheremushkinskiy, Moskvoretskiy, Krasnopresnenskiy, Perovski, and other rayons).

[Yevseyev] In other words, relations of economic accountability are in need of being corrected by the leadership through administrative-command methods?

[Prokofyev] We still have to resort to such methods if this benefits the cause. Of course, one can get sarcastic

on account of this recurrence of the past. However, in a number of cases "administrative pressure" is the only opportunity to solve a problem for now. Other methods should have been available. The shortcomings of economic accountability should have been taken care of by economic accountability itself. We are now switching to the cost-accounting methods of building city and rayon budgets. Planned contributions to them from the budgets of industrial enterprises will finance people's education, health care, and provision of amenities in the rayon—in a word, all the social spheres the services of which the employees of these enterprises use.

In a broader context, we certainly owe much to our school students. The availability of school student slots in the city is slightly over 100 per 1,000 population, the standard being 125. Despite having accomplished much in the past four years, we will only be able to solve this problem completely by 1995. I will give you one more statistic. This year, a sum which corresponds to the actual needs, R46 million, was allocated for major repairs in schools for the first time.

Will "a Ration-Card System" Be Introduced in Moscow?

[Yevseyev] In recent days, the editorial office has received many questions associated with recent changes made in the organization of trade in foodstuffs and manufactured goods in short supply in the Baltic area and in Leningrad. Muscovites are interested to know whether similar restrictions will be introduced here.

[Prokofyev] Indeed, the situation is very complicated. Several days ago, I talked to B.V. Gidasov, first secretary of the Leningrad Obkom and Gorkom. He explained that the measure which they have resorted to in Leningrad—the sale of goods in short supply upon producing a document certifying residence in the city or in the oblast—is a forced measure. The point is that all of the Baltic area has switched to this system, and the residents of adjacent oblasts who used to go there to shop have started coming to Leningrad. Even the residents of the Baltic republics themselves, for example, Estonia, where they increased prices for many goods and simultaneously increased wages, have become much more frequent guests in the shops of Leningrad. This is why Leningrad has been forced to respond in kind.

In Moscow, we will try to do without introducing some restrictive system for selling goods. However, a chain reaction in response to events may force us to take such measures.

[Yevseyev] Will these also be sales by virtue of passports or invitations?

[Prokofyev] Perhaps not. We do not view this as the best system. As we see it, it may give rise to a wave of abuse and speculation. At the same time, the city authorities should take care of protecting the citizens. Currently, the Moscow City Soviet is studying most carefully an opportunity to introduce a system of foodstuffs orders for all

Muscovites which would guarantee the receipt of the necessary amount of meat products by all of them.

[Yevseyev] Thank you for the interview, Yuriy Anatolyevich. Of course, in our conversation we have only been able to touch on some of the issues that our readers have raised in their letters. However, in keeping with our agreement, will we have an opportunity to carry on this conversation during the February meeting devoted to the letters from the readers of MOSKOVSKAYA PRAVDA?

[Prokofyev] Of course. See you in February.

Leningrad: Candidate Nomination Complete

90UN0792A Leningrad LENINGRADSKAYA PRAVDA
in Russian 6 Jan 90 p 1

[Statements by V.I. Shitarev, secretary of the Executive Committee of the Leningrad City Soviet, and Yu.S. Vasilyev, chairman of the Leningrad City Election Commission: "Leningrad Has Named Its Candidates"]

[Text] The first, most significant stage of the election campaign—nomination of the candidate deputies of the Russian and local soviets—has come to an end. The candidates have been named at meetings of labor collectives, mass organizations, and places of residence.

What are the results of nominations in Leningrad? This is what V. Koshvanets, head of the Department of Party and Soviet Development, was told in response to this question.

V.I. Shitarev, secretary of the Executive Committee of the Leningrad City Soviet:

The nomination has proceeded openly everywhere. All labor collectives, all voters knew that any number of candidate deputies could be placed on the ballot.

In reviewing the results of the nomination, I would like to refer to the results of the nomination to the republic soviet first: 313 candidates are competing for 34 seats on it, out of which 38 are candidates in three national-territorial districts. This is about 10 people per deputy mandate on average.

We should note that the labor collectives have nominated 217 people, or 69 percent of the total; the mass organizations have nominated 78 people, or 24.9 percent. Meetings of voters at the place of residence have nominated 14 people. This amounts to only 0.4 percent. Of the candidates nominated, only one person has been a deputy in the past term.

Two hundred and thirty CPSU members and candidate members, or 73 percent, have been nominated.

The fact that there are only 24 workers, or 7.6 percent of the total, among those nominated gives rise to concern. There are few women among the candidates, only 18, or 5.7 percent.

These data show that it is mainly representatives of the intelligentsia and the management apparatus and servicemen who are running for the deputy mandates.

As far as the rayon soviets are concerned, a total of 6,167 contenders for deputy mandates have been nominated. The labor collectives have nominated 4,910 people, the mass organizations 1,105, and the meetings at places of residence 148 candidates. Those who have not been deputies before number 5,575. Some 1,533 women have been nominated, as well as 1,145 workers. There are 3,979 CPSU members among those nominated.

The number of districts in which three or more candidates have been nominated comes to 1,050.

Among the candidates nominated, 583 people are under 30. Some 229 party functionaries and 85 soviet functionaries have been nominated.

In the cities of Lomonosov, Zelenogorsk, and Pavlovsk which have now been granted an independent status and report directly to the Leningrad Soviet, 448 candidates have been nominated overall; 407 people have been nominated by the labor collectives, 31 by the mass organizations, and 10 by the meetings of voters at places of residence; 407 persons have not been deputies in the past. One hundred and sixty-nine women and 79 workers have been nominated to these soviets. Of the candidates, 225 are CPSU members. Only eight candidates are under 30.

Some 463 candidates have been nominated to the settlement soviets. Three hundred and eighty-two people have been nominated by the labor collectives and only nine persons by the mass organizations. The meetings of voters at places of residence have nominated 68 people. Of the candidates, 386 have not been deputies in the past term. Those nominated include 168 women and 160 workers. Some 178 communists have been nominated; 81 nominees are under 30. In 96 districts, three or more candidate people's deputies have been nominated.

As the above data suggest, from now on the voters will not just perform the act of voting but will have an opportunity for great selection. A stubborn struggle for the mandate of deputy is in store for the candidate deputies. We would like to hope that the most authoritative and worthy ones will win.

Yu.S. Vasilyev, chairman of the Leningrad City Election Commission, rector of the imeni M.I. Kalinin Leningrad Pedagogical Institute:

I will be brief. Many contenders for the new term of the Leningrad City Soviet of People's Deputies have been nominated. According to preliminary data, at present 2,867 candidate deputies, or an average of seven people per district, are prepared to compete for 400 deputy mandates.

The labor collectives have nominated 2,326 candidates, the mass organizations 505, and 132 have been nominated at places of residence. There are 287 women and

265 workers among the candidates nominated. There are 1,572 party members among the candidate deputies, as well as 136 people under 30, and 42 members of the VLKSM [All-Union Leninist Youth Communist League].

In other words, it will not be easy to become a deputy of the Leningrad City Soviet in March.

Report Previews Leningrad Elections

90UN0790B Leningrad LENINGRADSKAYA PRAVDA
in Russian 10 Jan 90 p 1

[Article by V. Koshvanets: "Has the Voter Grown Tired? A Press Conference in the Leningrad Soviet Executive Committee"]

[Text] As I set out yesterday for a press conference in the Leningrad Soviet executive committee [ispolkom] I recalled the winter and spring of last year. At that time not a day passed without an impressive pile of letters from voters pouring onto my desk, all complaining about various kinds of violations during the course of the election campaign. A subsequent check showed that they were real, but during those same months virtually half of the telephone calls received were about imagined violations.

And now, a new election campaign is in full swing, and the results of the first stage of that campaign—the nomination of candidates for the posts of people's deputies in the Russian and local soviets—will be the subject of the press conference. So, as I set out for the press conference I recalled just some of the letters and telephone calls on the subject of the elections. Some people had asked for an interpretation of a given article in the Election Law, some had rushed in to talk about a candidate nominated at a meeting. And this, perhaps, was the entire election "heat" that had been generated.

What is this? Did the voters grow tired last spring? Were they disillusioned that after two congresses of the USSR people's deputies they were unable to stabilize the economic situation in the country? Or is it thanks to the significantly democratized election laws that this time everything is going smoothly?

Let me say immediately that the press conference provided no clear answer to this question, even though the journalists present raised it repeatedly as they addressed first V.I. Shitarev, secretary of the Leningrad Soviet ispolkom, and then the representatives from the okrug territorial and national-territorial election commissions for the election of Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic [RSFSR] people's deputies who were assisting him.

Probably, they told us, the period for the nomination of candidates has passed relatively calmly, and this was explained by the tiredness of the voters, and by their disillusionment, and the relative perfection of the election law, and other factors that need additional analysis.

The letters are not so numerous as during the election campaign. However, we can be sure that if we wait a little we shall see what the elections will bring. But meanwhile let me present in what might be called an independent home analysis of the subject "Have the voters grown tired?" some facts and figures that were cited at the press conference.

As our newspaper has already reported, for the 34 single-mandate territorial and national-territorial okrugs for the RSFSR Supreme Soviet, 313 candidates have been nominated, about 9.2 persons per seat. And here are some of the details. Only one of the 313 candidates has been nominated as a first-time candidate. Some 73 percent of contenders are CPSU members and candidate members and only 1.5 percent—five people—are members of the Komsomol. Workers make up 7.6 percent of the candidates for the Russian Soviet, and women 5.7 percent. Party workers make up 5.5 percent, soviet workers 1.7 percent, and trade union workers two percent.

Along with the labor collectives, the politicized public formations, first and foremost the Leningrad People's Front, showed a quite high degree of activeness during the nominations. Representatives from these formations were nominated as candidates in 31 of the 34 okrugs.

Representatives of sociopolitical formations have been nominated as candidates for posts in the Leningrad Soviet in 250 okrugs.

If it was a question of the Leningrad Soviet, we might consider the following figures. There are today 2,867 contenders for the 400 mandates (7.2 persons per mandate), and 71 percent of them have not previously been members of the Leningrad Soviet or reserve deputies. CPSU members and candidate members make up 54.6 percent of those nominated, workers 9.2 percent, and women 10 percent.

And finally some figures on the results of nominations in the rayon soviets of Leningrad. A total of 6,176 people have been nominated for the 2,810 okrugs, about 2.5 persons per seat. Just one person has been nominated for the post of deputy in 803 okrugs, and just two in 957. There are 3,979 party members and candidate members, 1,145 workers, 1,533 women, and 583 people aged under 30.

These, then, are the figures for analysis. And finally, the worst figures are for nominations to the soviets at all levels from places of residence. Even for the rayon soviets only 148 people were nominated. This is perhaps yet another piece of information in considering the question "Have the voters grown tired?" The information is the more current since the voting in March will take place precisely at our places of residence.

Sokolov Closing Remarks at Party Plenum

90UN0730C Minsk SOVETSKAYA BELORUSSIYA
in Russian 31 Dec 89 pp 2-3

[Unattributed report on closing remarks by Ye. Sokolov, first secretary of the Belorussian CP Central Committee, to the Central Committee's 16th Plenum in Minsk on 27 December: "Seizing the Political Initiative"]

[Excerpts] As reported, a Belorussian CP Central Committee plenum, which examined the draft platform of the Belorussian Communist Party for the elections of people's deputies of the Belorussian SSR and the local soviets of the republic, was held on 27 December. The debate on Ye. Sokolov's report was initiated by A.A. Zelenovskiy, first secretary of the Brest Obkom [Oblast Party Committee]. [passage omitted]

The closing remarks at the plenum were delivered by Ye. Sokolov, first secretary of the Belorussian CP Central Committee. He said:

Comrades! Many useful proposals and observations were expressed and a number of the questions troubling our people was raised in the course of the discussion of the draft platform of the Belorussian Communist Party, which was active, concerned, and held in a constructive spirit. And it is entirely natural that an important place in the discussion was occupied by problems of removal of the consequences of the accident at the Chernobyl AES [Nuclear Electric Power Station].

What do I want to say? The Chernobyl tragedy is our common pain. Each obkom [oblast party committee], gorkom [city party committee], and raykom [rayon party committee] secretary, each soviet and business leader, and each labor outfit must proceed from this. No local problems in any city or rayon, at an enterprise or on a kolkhoz [collective farm], or in an establishment should be even the slightest obstacle en route to the implementation of the official program which has been drawn up in the republic and the urgent measures which were recently determined by the Belorussian CP Central Committee and the republic Council of Ministers.

It is planned next year to assimilate R700 million of capital investments in the affected areas. The task is entirely within our capabilities. And we must necessarily do everything to cope with it successfully and to justify the hopes of those who are awaiting resettlement in safe areas and who still, unfortunately, go to bed and get up in the morning with the thought: What will happen to me and my children and grandchildren tomorrow?

We have recalled our construction workers from Pskov, Bryansk, and Tyumen Oblasts. And those who were helping Armenia eliminate the consequences of the earthquake have, in the main, returned also. We are being helped and will be helped even more actively by the whole country. The more so in that none of us can or has the right to ease up. The seriousness of the problem

and the nobility of the assignment which we have set demand the maximum exertion in work in this area.

Particular urgency, Ye. Sokolov went on to say, is now attached to a strengthening of discipline—labor, production, plan, and state. Those who are directly linking successes of perestroyka and an acceleration of the country's socioeconomic development with increased organization and order are right. I would merely like to emphasize that the level of discipline depends to a decisive extent on those present in this hall.

The bitter experience of Lithuania teaches us to what a slackening of discipline leads. A split in the republic party organization has essentially occurred here. The work of the CPSU Central Committee plenum just ended was in fact a search for a way in which to help the Lithuanian people and the honest communists of the republic to emerge from the most difficult situation in which they have found themselves.

I believe that the CPSU Central Committee plenum adopted the correct decision.

At the same time, on the other hand, I would like to emphasize once again that the Lithuanian comrades have struck a blow at the party in a crucial period of perestroyka and are attempting to strike at the federation also. To quote the statements of certain "Sajudis" leaders, who are USSR people's deputies, incidentally:

"...An independent Lithuanian Communist Party could, having gained strength, most painlessly and in the shortest time reach the desired goal—recreation of an independent Lithuanian state";

"...We should not be breathing life into socialism but talking about the fact that these laws need to be smashed, and it is essential to smash the whole so-called Soviet system so that it is razed to the ground here utterly...";

"...Let us leave our neighbors to rummage around in the works of Lenin—let them in the bubbling cauldron convert scum and sediment into future gold and the convertible ruble in the second decade of the 21st century...."

No comment needed, I believe.

Of course, by no means everyone in Lithuania shares such statements. Many Lithuanian comrades believe that it will be far from sweet for Lithuania if it leaves the USSR, more, that this could lead to economic collapse. It would only take a suspension of economic relations. Mikhail Sergeyevich adduced figures in his report as to what, and in what volume, is supplied to Lithuania by the other union republics.

One Lithuanian comrade who spoke at the CPSU Central Committee plenum also adduced the following fact. Lithuania is three times smaller than Belorussia, but for land-improvement operations both republics obtained an equal amount of money. The comrade drew from this fact the following conclusion: There were forces in

Lithuania which believed that the union helped it stand on its own two feet and that it is not now needed.

Is there hope of a positive solution of this problem? Yes. As the speeches at the CPSU Central Committee plenum of the Lithuanian comrades showed, there are in the republic party organization sufficient healthy forces for this, at least, there are more of them than of those who are completely deluded. We are sure that all will be put in its proper place there. I believe that the traditional friendship and cooperation between our republics and between our party organizations will in a certain time be restored. We will do everything within our power for this.

The next question. Some participants in the plenum are inquiring why it is that the proposal pertaining to the formation of production okrugs has not been adopted? We have studied this proposal closely and believe that it deserves attention. But there was not time to study it thoroughly. Nor did the republic have the specialists who might have provided specific recommendations in this connection. We therefore were of the opinion that elections should not be held per production okrugs. As far as the future is concerned, the probability that future elections will be conducted per production okrugs also cannot be precluded.

Regarding Article 6 of the USSR Constitution. As you know, there was a very big discussion on this article in the USSR Supreme Soviet. There was also an exchange of opinions at the second congress of people's deputies. You know what decision the congress adopted—not to discuss and not to examine this article at this time. Precisely, at this time. Why? This would have been a mistake. I will say more: It would have been a stab in the back of the force which is consolidating the people and which is leading them along the path of perestroika.

Specifying the wording of Article 6 is undoubtedly necessary, but not by way of fevered speculation around it but in the context of a revision of the whole USSR Constitution and in the light of the overall concept of the political arrangement of society. Let us proceed from this also when explaining our attitude toward this problem.

About the intelligentsia. I have already said repeatedly and I reiterate here that we put a very high value on the contribution to perestroika of the scholars, writers, artists, composers, and figures of stage and screen. Their assertiveness has increased as of late. And it may be said without any exaggeration that the republic's scientific and artistic intelligentsia will help the Belorussian CP Central Committee and the Belorussian SSR Supreme Soviet and Council of Ministers in the solution of many problems.

I am in favor of party, soviet, and economic-planning officials and the leaders of all levels strengthening the alliance of the intelligentsia and the working people. This means progress, this means the success of the solution of problems large and small.

I would like to support the comrades who have said that it is essential now that we search all together for constructive ways of solving complex problems and make more practicable proposals in order that we may make the maximum use of them for the good of our common cause.

About the Komsomol [All-Union Leninist Communist Youth League]. We need here, in my opinion, to comprehend everything in a very responsible and balanced manner, not dart from side to side, and to organize our work such as to ensure that the Komsomol remain an active, dependable, and equal partner of the party organizations and act with them, holding to firm Marxist-Leninist standpoints.

There have been proposals for a change in the procedure of the election of delegates to the coming congress: that this be effected directly from the primary party organizations. I have to say one thing: There are CPSU Rules, by which we are currently guided. If they are changed prior to the congress, the procedure for the election of delegates will change also in accordance with this. We must always remember that, when joining the CPSU, each of us promised to abide strictly by the party rules.

Some speakers expressed the opinion that the primary party organizations were beginning to lose the initiative and that they lack the opportunities to influence the higher party authorities and the congress. The question arises: Why? Any primary party organization may submit its proposals for examination by any party body. Whether these proposals will be supported and approved or not is another matter. And we simply cannot agree with the fact that the primary party organization has, for example, the right of veto in respect to decisions of the congress or a conference.

Comrades are inquiring about the combination of the offices of first secretary of a party committee and the chairman of a soviet. I have already said at a Belorussian CP Central Committee plenum and subsequently at a session of the Belorussian SSR Supreme Soviet that we had made the final decision on not combining these offices.

Concern was heard in certain speeches as to what kind of appraisal we should be making of the events and processes which are occurring in the country, in the republic, in a rayon, in a labor outfit. It would be a very good thing, I believe, were we to self-critically evaluate primarily our own work and its conformity to the goals and tasks of perestroika. It should be remembered that its fate will be decided not by the pungency of expressions but by an in-depth analysis of what has been achieved, a responsible evaluation of oneself, one's work comrade, and one's outfit, and practical work for the good of the people.

Ye. Sokolov also answered other questions from participants in the Belorussian CP Central Committee plenum.

Belorussian Decree on Children's Health

90UN0908A Minsk SOVETSKAYA BELORUSSIYA
in Russian 11 Jan 90 p 1

[Resolution of the Belorussian CP Central Committee and the Belorussian SSR Council of Ministers: "On Measures To Improve Health Maintenance for Children in the Belorussian SSR"]

[Text] The Belorussian CP Central Committee and Belorussian SSR Council of Ministers resolves as follows:

1. In order to improve the material-technical base for pediatric treatment and prophylactic centers in Minsk city, to transfer gratis the administrative building of the Fourth Main Administration on at 17 Engels Street, and the Belorussian SSR Council of Ministers building at 36 Zakharov Street, to the Minsk Gorispolkom [city soviet executive committee] public health administration to house pediatric treatment and prophylactic establishments.
2. In order to organize health maintenance for children with parents living in areas subjected to radioactive contamination as a result of the accident at the Chernobyl Nuclear Power Station, to transfer gratis to the Belorussian Ministry of Health the "Belorossiia" sanatorium in Druskininak city and the "Borovoye" sanatorium on Lake Naroch, both belonging to the Fourth Main Administration.
3. During the first quarter of 1990 the Belorussian SSR Ministry of Health, the oblispolkoms [oblast executive committees] and the Minsk Gorispolkom will review questions relating to accelerated construction of pediatric hospitals and polyclinics during the 13th Five-Year Plan.
4. The Belorussian SSR Ministry of Health will make provision for the construction during the 13th Five-Year Plan of treatment centers to treat children suffering from endocrine diseases and infantile cerebral paralysis.
5. To approve the proposal submitted by the Belorussian SSR Ministry of Health to expand the pediatric hematological center that is part of the No 1 Clinical Hospital by making the pediatric infectious disease department of that hospital a pediatric infectious disease hospital.
6. During the first quarter of 1990 the Minsk Gorispolkom and the Belorussian SSR Ministry of Health will effect the staged repair and reconstruction of the building housing the No 1 Clinical Hospital.
7. The Belorussian SSR Gosplan [State Committee for Material and technical Supply] and the Belorussian SSR Gosplan [State Planning Committee] will, upon application from the Belorussian SSR Ministry of Health, allocate construction materials and plumbing articles needed to carry out repairs on the pediatric departments at the No 1 Clinical Hospital.
8. The Belorussian SSR Ministry of the Timber Industry shall jointly with the Belorussian SSR Gosplan and the Belorussian SSR Ministry of Health resolve the question of re-profiling one of the Belorussian SSR Ministry of the Timber Industry enterprises during 1990-1991 to produce furniture for treatment and prophylactic centers.
9. The Belorussian SSR Gosplan will resolve the question of allocating for the Belorussian SSR Ministry of Health funds for furniture, proceeding from its requirements of R7 million annually.
10. The Belorussian SSR Ministry of Health will take steps to supply pediatric treatment centers with drugs and disposable syringes and fluid transfusion systems.
11. The Belorussian SSR Ministry of Health "Farmatsiya" Production and Trade Association will supply the pediatric hematological center with the necessary drugs. A replacement reserve stock of drugs will be created for them.
12. The Belorussian SSR Ministry of Trade, the Belorussian SSR State Agroindustrial Committee, and the Minsk Gorispolkom will provide pediatric treatment centers with the necessary range of foodstuffs, giving due consideration to year-round supplies of fresh vegetables and fruits.
13. During the first quarter of 1990 the Belorussian SSR Council of Ministers will conduct a check on the organization of food at pediatric departments of the No 1 Clinical Hospital.
15. The Belorussian SSR Ministry of Trade will allocate from its commodity stocks furniture, equipment, and articles for the pediatric departments of the No 1 Clinical Hospital.
15. The Belorussian SSR Gosplan will jointly with the Belorussian SSR Ministry of Health and the Minsk Gorispolkom seek funding for and the purchase of the necessary medical equipment for the pediatric treatment and prophylactic centers.
16. Within 10 days the Belorussian SSR Ministry of Health will work with the USSR Ministry of Health on questions pertaining to the preferential delivery of medical equipment for the pediatric hematological center.
17. To agree with the proposal submitted by the Belorussian SSR Ministry of Health to switch the start of construction of a republic hematological center from 1993 to 1991.

To take under advisement the fact that the Belorussian SSR Ministry of Health together with the All-Union Scientific Research Institute for Microbiological Production Facilities has been doing work on the question of issuing working documentation for the construction of the clinical premises for this center during the second half of this year before development work on the center as a whole has been completed.

18. The collegium of the Belorussian SSR Ministry of Health will by 1 May 1990 report to the Belorussian CP Central Committee and the Belorussian SSR Council of Ministers on the implementation of the assignments issued by this resolution.

Ye. Sokolov,
Belorussian CP Central Committee secretary.
M. Kovalev,
Belorussian SSR Council of Ministers chairman.

New Rayon Created in Mogilev Oblast

90UN0733C Minsk SOVETSKAYA BELORUSSIYA
in Russian 31 Dec 89 p 4

[Ukase issued by the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the Belorussian SSR in Minsk on 29 December 1989]

[Text] The Belorussian SSR Presidium of the Supreme Soviet resolves:

To form Dribinskiy rayon of the Mogilev Oblast centered on the village of Dribin, including within the rayon: Korovchinskiy, Pervomaitskiy, Ryasnenskiy, and Temnolesskiy village soviets of the Goretskiy rayon and the Chernevskiy village soviet of the Shklovskiy rayon.

N. Dementey, chairman,
Belorussian SSR Supreme Soviet Presidium;
L. Syroyegina, secretary,
Belorussian SSR Supreme Soviet Presidium.
Minsk, 29 December 1989.

New Estonian Ministerial Post Described

90UN0712A Tallinn SOVETSKAYA ESTONIYA
in Russian 29 Dec 89 p 3

[Interview with Tiit Yarve, Estonian SSR minister of state, by Estonian Telegraph Agency reporters F. Kaazik and A. Ploompuu, date and place not specified: "Minister of State: 'New Form Also Requires New Content'"; first paragraph is source introduction]

[Text] On 27 December the Estonian SSR Supreme Soviet approved an ukase of the Estonian SSR Supreme Soviet Presidium concerning the appointment of Tiit Yarve as Estonian SSR minister of state. He was the first to earn the deputies' approval, undertaking a new official post in our republic's government as it undergoes renewal. He is well-known, which is confirmed by the fact that during the traditional familiarization process, no cross-fire of questions and answers was required. However, for the broader community, the work which lies behind the title (an unusual one for us) of minister of state is unfamiliar. An ETA [Estonian Telegraph Agency] reporter turned to T. Yarve for an explanation:

[Yarve] Step by step Estonia is moving along the path toward the independent resolution of its own affairs—toward independence and financial autonomy [khozraschet]. But the new form also requires new content. Thus the position of minister of state did not emerge, as they say, from a vacuum, but out of consideration for the

experience of other countries and the Estonian republic. Finally, it was decided to rename the Administration of Affairs of the Estonian SSR Council of Ministers as the State Office, and its director as the minister of state.

But this is not just a matter of changing a sign. It is true that previous questions will remain in our sphere of competence, but other work and concerns will be added as well. For example, we are now forming our own center for development. The first real result, and one which you can touch with your hands, is in the hall of sessions: the new apparatus for voting works better than the equipment created by the renowned Philips Company for the Moscow Palace of Congresses. Personal computers are being installed for government advisers. In principle we must march in step with the times or even ahead of them.

[ETA] In the lobby it has been said that in the future all information of state-wide interest will be concentrated in the hands of the State Office.

[Yarve] Yes, that is in fact what was decided at a session of the government. For example, in the near future the post of statistician, which is being created instead of the Committee on Statistics, will lie within the jurisdiction of the minister of state. Let us add here the Estonian Telegraph Agency and the Estonian State Archives; I am certain that the list is not definitive and that in the course of implementing IME [Self-Managing Estonia] others will be included here. I would add that the discussion is not about departmental or personal ambitions, but rather about the need for united leadership at the governmental level of important information issues for Estonia. Exactly the same can be said about the selection and training of personnel. At present, a renewal of the staff in the State Office is being carried out; new, highly-qualified specialists are being added. In the interests of the entire republic and the future of IME, it is now necessary to create an optimal system for finding and training capable people. For this reason the plans call for the formation in the very near future of a department for the selection and training of personnel who will make up the structure of the State Office. I consider this to be an extremely strategic direction—if we are able to recruit the most capable specialists for the leadership of the republic, then we will be able to create a brain trust to meet the demands of the times.

[ETA] In the current complex political and economic situation the people are simply thirsting for every bit of information. More and more is being written about the activities of the government; nonetheless, one still hears people expressing the opinion that information could be even more thorough and more detailed. As minister of state what kind of opportunities do you see for the further publicizing the work?

[Yarve] Even in the most democratic society it is simply not possible technically to disseminate all official information in the daily newspapers because people also need other news. For this reason the question of creating an

independent publication is now under discussion: provisionally we would call it the Government Bulletin, and it would print the appropriate information for those who are interested in it. As for what has been done up to now, we already have several people concerned with questions of the press and sociological research who claim that people think information dissemination has improved. But, it goes without saying that there is no area which could not use improvement, and we are striving for that.

[ETA] In accordance with a government decision, a group of experts on public opinion and social analysis was formed under the prime minister. I would like to use the occasion to ask you to talk about its activities in more detail.

[Yarve] This group includes the best-known sociologists, philosophers and public opinion researchers from Tallinn and Tartu. The goal is to avoid mistakes when solving important social questions, to see things in their entirety. We will make the maximum effort possible to ensure that the government is informed in good time about the opinion of the people.

[ETA] Clearly, it would be incorrect to think that the tasks of the minister of state include only the signing of papers and other office work.

Of course, I consider it especially important to create close ties with all our leaders in the cities and villages. Everything is still not completely in order in all places; the organs of self-government are only taking their first steps. Excessive centralism has brought the whole state only losses; we are trying to avoid them in our republic. We shall work to achieve full democracy in our work and constructive cooperation with everyone who is truly interested in the realization of IME.

Estonian Deputies' Speeches at 2nd Congress of Deputies

Yarovoy on Constitutional Oversight Committee

90UN0711A Tallinn SOVETSKAYA ESTONIYA
in Russian 27 Dec 89 p 3

[Speech by Deputy V.I. Yarovoy, director of the Dvigatel State Union Plant imeni V.I. Lenin, city of Tallinn (Tallinskiy-Lasnamyaeskiy National-Territorial Election Okrug), to the 2nd Congress of People's Deputies]

[Text] Respected Comrade Deputies, respected Chairman! You, of course, recall how stormy the discussion was on whether or not to include on the Congress agenda the question of creating the USSR Constitutional Oversight Committee. For my constituents and consequently for me the need to create this committee is indisputable, if only because the constitutional conflict between the Union state and the Union republics is deepening in our country.

I recall the USSR Supreme Soviet decree of 10 November 1989, signed by Comrade Gorbachev,

chairman of the USSR Supreme Soviet, concerning the non-conformity between certain legislative acts of the Union republics, on the one hand, and the USSR Constitution on the other. The document names four Union republics, including the Estonian SSR, which are advised to bring those legislative acts indicated in the memorandum of the USSR Ministry of Justice into conformity with the USSR Basic Law.

It is logical to presume that the organs of state power in that same Estonia must have reacted to the decision of the USSR Supreme Soviet Presidium. However, this has not happened. And it could not happen since the republic's leadership, roused by the People's Front and its satellites, is consciously proceeding down a path of violating the foundations of Soviet legislation. The law-making fever, which has seized the local statesmen, has led to a situation in which the republic today is half way to confederation in relation to the Union of SSR's. And this kind of law-making activity, if one may say so, continues. The Law Concerning Elections to the Supreme Soviet of the Estonian Soviet Socialist Republic, which contains a 10-year residency requirement, has been adopted. Coming up is a draft law concerning the nationality rights of citizens of the Estonian SSR, which stipulates an oath of faithfulness to the Estonian republic and loyalty to the local authorities. A draft Concept of the Protection of Law and Order in Estonia has been published; it arises for some reason from the combined concept of the financial autonomy of the Estonian SSR, with the prospect of creating Estonia as an independent state with its own state police, as part of the Ministry of Internal Affairs system, and with municipal police, which would include constables... The republic's Supreme Soviet has already adopted a Decree Concerning the Organization of Military Service of Estonian SSR Citizens, which stipulates the existence of all military territorial units and border troops, as well as the reorganization of military registration offices and civil defense services; it also calls for the higher military-political construction academy to be re-oriented, and the Tallinn Militia School to be made subordinate to the republic. A draft law is being prepared on the establishment of alternative compulsory labor service in the Estonian SSR. And the republic's parliament has in essence vetoed the USSR Law Concerning the USSR State Budget, which was adopted a month and a half ago by the country's Supreme Soviet.

Clearly there are enough examples for it finally to become clear to everyone that the activities of the Estonian legislators are consciously aimed at undermining the Soviet federation. The question arises: what is the position of the Union leadership and of Mikhail Sergeyevich in particular, whose name the party and state figures of the republic use to cover themselves? How can the reassurances of the party and state figures concerning their intention to strengthen our federation and build a law-based state be combined with those processes which are taking place in certain Union republics? I am sure that today millions of Soviet citizens are

waiting for the answer to these questions. And especially those who have found themselves in the position of refugee-emigrants in their own country. In any country the constitution of the given state defends such citizens. And in this hall there are people's deputies who would like to deprive us of this protection, proposing even to revoke the Brezhnev constitution before adopting a new basic law.

I want to remind these deputies that on 1 December 1988 at an extraordinary 12th session of the 11th USSR Supreme Soviet, a law was adopted concerning changes and amendments to the Constitution (Basic Law) of the USSR. During this process Article 173 was left unchanged. It says: "The Constitution of the USSR possesses the highest juridical power. All laws and other acts of state organs are promulgated on the basis of and in accordance with the USSR Constitution."

Respected Mikhail Sergeyevich! My electors are waiting for an answer from you personally to the questions which have been posed, for they now feel themselves to be hostages, thrown at the will of fate; they feel themselves to be people who are unnecessary to the Union of SSR's. The impression is created that the holders of separatist ideas are purposely identifying the national republic only with the indigenous nationality, ignoring the multinationality nature of our republics. This kind of identification would be in order if Estonia were a single-nationality state. In that case the demand to exercise a nation's right to self-determination, extending even as far as separation, would be fair, if it is the people themselves who want it and not just newly-emerged politicians rushing to power. Even in that case, however, a referendum of all the people is necessary. But with us the civil and political rights of the non-indigenous nationality are being denied completely, and this means discrimination even in the area of education. And that, after all, is a violation not only of the country's Constitution, but also of the international legal norms, adopted by all civilized states.

I will name some of them: the International Pact Concerning Economic, Social and Cultural Rights of 16 December 1966, which went into effect in the Soviet Union on 3 January 1976; the International Pact Concerning Civil and Political Rights of 16 December 1966, which went into effect on 23 March 1976; the European Convention on the Defense of Human Rights and Basic Freedoms of 4 November 1950 and the Convention on the Struggle against Discrimination in the Area of Education of 14 December 1960, which went into effect in the Soviet Union on 1 November 1962, and other acts of international law.

Now, comrades, answer the question: what other organ aside from the USSR Committee on Constitutional Oversight, can fulfill the task of protecting the Soviet constitutional system? Those who are fighting against the creation of this committee are those who are not taking into account the foundations of Union legislation. Various arguments and conclusions are cited here

against the formation of a constitutional organ. But the true reason was not given, and that is that the committee which is being created will become a serious barrier to the galloping law-making in certain Union republics.

We are often told that one must not fetter initiative at the grass roots or restrain the pace of perestroika. And this is correct, if no thought is given to where this initiative is headed and what kind of perestroika is being discussed. However, one would have to be blind not to see the anti-Soviet, anti-socialist orientation in the processes taking place in the Baltic republics. Of course, one can close one's eyes to this once again as we did at the 1st Congress. One can accuse me and hundreds of thousands of citizens of panicking, of painting too black a picture. And finally, at the cost of constant concessions and compromises, the resolution of the problems can be postponed for some time. But the hour is not far off when even a Constitutional Oversight Committee will not be in a position to resolve the deep contradictions which have emerged between the Union and the Union and republic legislation.

Those people who are to work out a new constitution will have to confront even greater difficulties; it will have to satisfy the most exhaustive demands of the national republics; it will have to take into account their specific features, and the main point is that, according to the logic of the Baltic legislators, it will have to be in accordance with their basic laws. In this way, we may find ourselves in a dead end, from which it is unusually difficult to escape. For this reason I again and again call upon all the people's deputies to rise above national arrogance for the sake of preserving our Union and to vote for the creation of a constitutional defense organ.

And now with regard to the actual draft of the Law Concerning Constitutional Oversight in the USSR. In the draft proposed for discussion the main inadequacy we see is that the Committee, in essence, is given no rights except the right to provide a conclusion concerning the conformity or non-conformity between the Constitution and the USSR laws adopted by the Congress of People's Deputies, and to make a written presentation. As for the Union and autonomous republics, the Committee's rights again amount to only drawing the appropriate conclusion and presenting it for consideration by the Congress, which by a two-thirds vote can reject the presentation made by the country's leading specialists in the area of politics and law.

In our view, the Committee must be invested with real rights, that is the main point. The goals, tasks and rights of the committee must be clearly defined. The mechanisms to ensure productive activity must be worked out.

One can agree with limiting the rights of the committee to the functions of oversight, resolution of disputes, as well as the coordination of constitutional norms and legislative acts of the Union and the Union republics. However, in this case we need a legislative act, which clearly delimits the jurisdictional areas of the Union and

the Union republics. And in order for the Committee to begin normal functioning this Congress should adopt a declaration to confirm that the Basic Law—the USSR Constitution—has priority over all legal acts.

A Constitutional Court of the USSR could become the highest organ of legal regulation in the country; it would be invested with the right to veto, suspend or repeal all legislative acts which do not conform to the norms of international law and the USSR constitution.

We do not see any other way of preserving, developing and strengthening our Soviet federated state. It is time to put an end to the chaos, anarchy, immorality and lawlessness in the country.

Comrade deputies! Elections to the Estonian SSR took place recently; a law was adopted which has been mentioned more than once already. We are grateful to the USSR Supreme Soviet Presidium for twice expressing its concern over the illegality of this law, which cannot function within the territory of the Estonian SSR. As the Ministry of Justice memorandum said, the Presidium of the republic's Supreme Soviet *de facto* and *de jure* failed to fulfill the instructions of the USSR Supreme Soviet; it has ignored what I was talking about in my speech.

For this reason, on behalf of the group of deputies who represent a certain part of the Estonian delegation, and on behalf of those electors who did not participate in the elections for the local Estonian SSR soviets, I submit this question to the Congress of People's Deputies, and I wish to recall once more that the USSR Supreme Soviet Presidium has twice taken a decision concerning the illegality of this act within the territory of the Estonian SSR. I propose the adoption of a decree of the 2nd Congress of People's Deputies concerning the violations of the Constitution (Basic Law) of the Union of SSR's in certain Union republics.

After considering the practice which has taken root in certain Union republics of violating the Constitution (Basic Law), as well as international legal norms, a practice which leads to subversion of the bases of the Soviet federation, which hinders the building of a law-based state and the fulfillment by the Soviet Union of international obligations, I propose that the 2nd Congress of USSR People's Deputies resolve:

First. To suspend the operation of the legislative acts within the territories of the Union republics named in the 10 November 1989 Decree of the USSR Supreme Soviet Presidium and in the presentation of the Ministry of Justice on this question.

Second. To consider invalid the elections to the local soviets of people's deputies held in the Estonian SSR on 10 Dec 1989. To instruct the Presidium of the Estonian SSR Supreme Soviet to hold new elections for the local soviets of people's deputies in accordance with the Constitution of the USSR and the Law of the USSR Concerning Changes and Addenda to the USSR Constitution on Questions of the Electoral System.

Control over fulfillment of this decree is to be entrusted to the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet and subsequently to the USSR Constitutional Oversight Committee. I recall that two days ago we voted for an amendment to Article 96 of the USSR Constitution, which says that there must be no violations on this question and people must answer accordingly for their own actions.

I would like to dwell a bit on the following: it is necessary for each person to vote on this question in accordance with his own conscience, with his duty as a deputy, and not according to a deal which is being made among the deputies from the Baltic republics, or an inter-regional deputy group. They are trying to include in their deal and their actions even the agrarian deputies, respected by everyone and present here in the hall: You, they say, support us today in the voting, and tomorrow we shall support you. I think that such actions by deputies should not take place.

I would like to suggest to Comrade Afanasyev and certain other comrades who spoke from this podium yesterday against the creation of the Constitutional Oversight Committee that if they sat in my seat as director of a plant in the city of Tallinn, then they would talk differently. And then I would look at how they spoke from this podium if a young married couple had come to them and the mother-to-be said: Vladimir Ivanovich, allow us to change apartments—I am afraid to give birth here in Estonia, I am not sure of my child's future." Another example. A veteran of the Great Patriotic War comes and wants to have a telephone installed: on the adjacent landing lives a simple Estonian worker, who is willing to have an additional telephone hooked up. On this matter I appealed as a deputy and receive a refusal. And when people, in accordance with the election requirement, cannot be elected to the highest organ of power in the republic until a decade has passed?... And when 70 people come to me because I can lodge officers' families in barracks, while they cannot settle and find decent living quarters in the republic? And I can cite many, many such examples.

And I am ashamed to look people in the eye because I do not see a solution to this problem. If the people who yesterday spoke against the creation of the committee knew about this, they would probably speak differently from this platform.

And the last point. I suggest, Mikhail Sergeyevich, that our first and second congresses of people's deputies and those sessions which have taken place here in Moscow in the period between the congresses are not worth anything if we do not resolve the main and fundamental problem. Today the fate of our Union depends on whether we, the people's deputies, those present here, correctly choose the path of future development for the country. Clearly, the time has come to consider in a fundamental way those processes which are taking place in our country; it is necessary to define clearly our policy and the goals which we see in the

framework of a renewed Soviet federation, and then all the people's deputies must carry out this policy unambiguously.

If we take the second path, along which the processes of confederation are now obviously moving (my idea is that we absolutely must not take that path), those who today are no longer among the living will not forgive us this; those who established Soviet power in 1917, those who fought in the Civil War and the Great Patriotic War will not forgive us; today's deputy candidates will not forgive us—the people's deputies—and history will not forgive us.

Kogan on Minority Rights

90UN0711B Tallinn SOVETSKAYA ESTONIYA
in Russian 27 Dec 89 p 4

[Speech by Deputy Ye.V. Kogan, head of the Labor Protection Laboratory of the Estrybprom Association, city of Tallinn (Tallinnskiy-Kalininskiy National-Territorial Election Okrug, Estonian SSR), at the 2nd Congress of USSR People's Deputies]

[Text] Respected Comrade Deputies, respected Chairman! I prepared a speech for today; however, the course of the discussion which has taken place before it was my turn to speak forces me to reject what I had prepared and express only a few comments and proposals. It was good of the deputy who supported colleagues from Estonia to speak out. He said that there is nothing so terrible, it is the same in Moscow. But with one small difference—he does not know what is happening in Estonia. No, no, he does not know. He claims that a military serviceman cannot arrive in Moscow and get a residence permit. But it is proposed that in Estonia, a military serviceman who has completed his service shall not be given a permit to reside in the very apartment in which he is living at the time. You want examples? Recently the Kharyuskiy Rayispolkom considered the cases of five servicemen, not one of whom was given a residence permit. Three of them had already completed their service and were living on Estonian territory. Recently we were told about one other "remarkable" fact: officers from Paldiski (which is not far from Tallinn), who had completed their service, wanted to get registered in their own apartment in Tallinn—they were also refused. That is my small comment to the orator who spoke.

Now on the subject of the "dark forest" and the speech of Comrade Abuladze. Truly, it does resemble a dark forest. Moreover, the farther one goes in time the darker it gets. Only why then (strange as it may seem) did the speaker call on us not to leave this dark forest but to remain there a little longer? True, he was refuted by a colleague, also from Georgia, but from one of the autonomous regions. He, obviously, is afraid to lose himself completely in this dark forest.

And now my comments on the subject of creating the Committee of USSR Constitutional Oversight. It seems

to me that we are limiting the framework of its action and, in fact, we are leaving it only as what is called a signal light. I think that an amendment must be introduced to this law which will say that if any normative act which violates human rights is promulgated, the Committee of USSR Constitutional Oversight has the right to suspend it immediately. I will insist on this amendment and I request a roll call vote on this amendment. Then we will have a remarkable opportunity to look at the entire list of our democrats, who voted against the unlimited electoral right, as we recently saw, when a large number of deputies, colleagues of Comrade Abuladze, voted against the Alksnis amendment.

And lastly. Probably I am disturbed because the question definitely concerns us very seriously. He who speaks from this platform in defense of the rights of the minority, tramples boldly on these minority rights in the Baltics, and especially boldly of late; we have become used to the fact that there will be no reaction to this. And if there have been two or three acts of the USSR Supreme Soviet Presidium, well, no one there has paid any attention to them for a long time: Vaska listens and eats. And what he "eats," incidentally, are human destinies, of which there are two and a half million in the Baltics and about two million in Moldavia. And if someone looks at the Union and begins to divide it into "indigenous" and "non-indigenous" people and talk about the priorities of one group over others, we risk ending up with 60 million "second class citizens." For them the fruits of an unprecedented, democratic constitution, which we will one day create, will have no significance because, as they already state now, this constitution will not extend to them. Nonetheless, Mikhail Sergeyevich, it is unfortunate but we already have them in the Baltics—candidates who were not registered only because they did not meet the residency requirement. And after such things, these comrades here talk to us about democracy. And one other statement in the remarks of my colleagues who preceded is of great concern, and that is the statement that the Constitutional Oversight Committee will protect the obscurantists and their Constitution. I consider that this is a direct affront to the entire Congress because the Congress is the supreme power in the country and the supreme legislator. And if something in our Constitution has become obsolete, we will change it jointly at the Congress, while the Constitutional Oversight Committee will stand on guard for these changes.

But we should not break, explode or drown everything that was good in our country. And if we embark upon that course, then tomorrow not just one republic will repeat that which is being done in the Baltics because those who do not receive a rebuff grow bolder with each day. And if a recent occupant of one of these chairs, Brazauskas, on the wave of one of the "freedoms," this morning called on the Baltic communist parties to consolidate against the CPSU and Gorbachev, tomorrow he will most likely call for the Baltic peoples to unite against the USSR, and what then? And if another people's

deputy takes foreign agents for a drive around Soviet military facilities, I find that incomprehensible as well. I would sort such things out personally. And probably they should be made to answer very strictly for this. The committee is necessary.

Lauristin on Composition of Committee

*90UN0711C Tallinn SOVETSKAYA ESTONIYA
in Russian 27 Dec 89 p 4*

[Speech by M.I. Lauristin, department head at Tartu State University (Tartuskiy Territorial Election Okrug. Estonian SSR)]

[Text] Respected Chairman, respected Deputies! Allow me to make a few suggestions on procedure. This is something I wanted to say yesterday. Today, just now, we have received in written form a new version of the decree. Yesterday we discussed very thoroughly, with great contradictions and with great divergence of opinion the Law Concerning USSR Constitutional Oversight. We received a long list of candidates for membership in the committee, and all this shows that, indeed, the question which must be solved has great scope and very great importance for the development of the state structure. Our experience of parliamentary work (and I speak before you now not as a member of any group but as a member of the Supreme Soviet), this experience which we have accumulated with great difficulty in the course of these months, in my opinion, has received recognition and approval. Judging by the results of a questionnaire, it has given us great assurance that the procedure which we have established truly helps us to get to the heart of questions through the discussion in several readings and thorough study by the commissions; this is a guarantee of a correct solution, which is worthy of the trust of our electors.

It is my deep conviction that the solution which today we are faced with adopting in the given situation will not be in line with the procedural rules. And with the nomination for committee chairman going to Sergey Sergeevich Alekseyev, a man whom we all know to be a truly firm, unshakeable defender of legal relations in all actions, one would not want the first step in the formation of a new institution to go against these rules. We have in front of us a proposed amendment. On the one hand, this is a truly constructive step forward, which comes as a result of the discussions which have taken place. But, on the other hand, a completely new function is being added, one which was not discussed previously, and that is the function of a constitutional court.

And in fact, if the committee's solution is carried out as soon as it is adopted, then this means that a constitutional court is emerging among us. Yesterday we heard convincing conclusions that we are not yet ready for something like that, and this imposes a great burden of responsibility on every deputy. We received a list of candidates and based on the operational experience of the Supreme Soviet, we know how the discussion of

candidates for ministerial positions, for membership in the collegium of the Supreme Court and for public prosecutor positions was carried out. Everything was considered very carefully there.

Yesterday it was said that the committee members will not be held accountable to the republic's deputations or to electors, instead they will bear responsibility before their own honor, before the law. In this case the personal qualities of the candidates become especially important. They must be well known not only to those doing the appointing, but also to us and our electors. The procedure which was adopted in the Supreme Soviet provided an opportunity for our electors—by means of television—to evaluate the candidates and to add their own judgements, which guaranteed objectivity and a lack of bias in the choice.

On the basis of all this, I as a member of the Supreme Soviet must say that in the Supreme Soviet we held a discussion "on the first reading" but we have not yet generalized our results, and for this reason we cannot draw a sound conclusion here. I propose that our Congress provide the Supreme Soviet with instructions to work out a definitive solution, discuss candidates and approve them at the following Congress.

Latvian SSR Rayon Self-Management Draft Law

*90UN0492A Riga SOVETSKAYA LATVIYA in Russian
25 Nov 89 p 2, 3*

["Draft Law of the Latvian Soviet Socialist Republic on Rayon Self-Management"]

[Text] I. General Statutes

Article 1. Rayon self-management, as an integral part of public self-management, shall ensure the solution within a rayon of all socioeconomic questions and guarantees of the rights and freedoms of the citizens.

Article 2. Rayon self-management, together with the self-management of the cities and rural districts located in its territory, shall establish a single system of self-management within the administrative boundaries of the territory of the respective rayon.

Article 3. Rayon self-management shall be implemented by the permanent residents of a rayon through the state bodies of self-management and the territorial bodies of citizens' self-management, as well as by means of the organization of local referendums or the use of other forms of direct democracy.

Article 4. The following shall be under the jurisdiction of rayon self-management:

1) the organization of general state management in the territory of the rayon, the planning of the rayon's economic and social development and the protection of the environment;

2) the supervision of the rayon's economy, self-management and the management of material and financial resources;

3) the ensuring of the economic and social rights and interests of the rayon's residents in an area which does not come under the jurisdiction of city and rural district self-management;

4) the maintenance of public order and the rights of citizens and assistance in strengthening the state's defensive power;

5) oversight over and monitoring of the activities of city and rural district self-management.

When the jurisdiction of rayon self-management is expanded at the decision of superior bodies of state power and management, if this is associated with an increase in expenditures, these bodies of state power should simultaneously be responsible for reimbursement of these expenditures.

Article 5. State bodies of self-management in a rayon and territorial bodies of citizens' public self-management shall have the rights of a legal entity.

Bodies of rayon self-management may acquire and appropriate tangible and real property, conclude agreements both between one another and with other institutions, enterprises and organizations, including institutions of city and rural district self-management, obtain loans [ssuda], assume various obligations, and act as plaintiff or respondent in court, in arbitration and in administrative institutions.

II. State Bodies of Rayon Self-Management and Their Jurisdiction

Article 6. The following bodies shall be the state bodies of rayon self-management:

- the Rayon Soviet of People's Deputies (the Rayon Soviet);
- the Ispolkom of the Rayon Soviet of People's Deputies (the Rayispolkom);
- the Auditing Commission of the Rayon Soviet (the Rayon Auditing Commission).

Article 7. The Rayon Soviet shall be the representative body of state power, which shall unify and coordinate the entire system of self-management in a rayon.

Article 8. The Rayon Soviet shall be elected by the rayon's residents using the procedure established by the Latvian SSR Law on the Election of People's Deputies to Local Latvian SSR Soviets.

Article 9. The Rayon Soviet, directly and also through the bodies and institutions of city and rural district self-management established by it, shall supervise all the rayon's economic, social and cultural affairs, make decisions, ensure their implementation and monitor the

observance of laws. The Rayon Soviet, in implementing self-management, shall cooperate with city and rural district self-management, public organizations and labor collectives.

Article 10. A Rayon Soviet shall organize economic activities independently on the basis of cost accounting.

Economic, social and cultural activities, which touch upon the interests of all residents, shall be implemented in a rayon's territory only with the consent of the Rayon Soviet.

In the instance of a Rayon Soviet's refusal to implement projects of republic-wide importance, the matter shall be decided by the Latvian SSR Supreme Soviet.

Article 11. A Rayon Soviet's activities shall be carried out at the sessions and meetings of the permanent and temporary commissions, working groups and other bodies of the Soviet.

Article 12. The work of a Rayon Soviet shall be organized by its Presidium, headed up by the Chairman of the Soviet.

Article 13. The sessions of a Rayon Soviet shall be conducted in accordance with the work schedule approved by the Soviet.

The time and place for the convening of a session shall be determined by the Soviet's Presidium.

Article 14. Extraordinary sessions may be convened in order to decide urgent matters. The extraordinary sessions shall be convened by the Soviet's Presidium on its own initiative or at the request of one-third of the deputies or the Ispolkom no later than within a 10-day period.

Article 15. The Chairman of the Rayon Electoral Commission shall convene the first session of a newly elected Rayon Soviet no later than within a 1-month period after the elections and he shall also preside over the session until the election of the Chairman of the Rayon Soviet. The Chairman of the Rayon Soviet shall preside over subsequent sessions.

Article 16. A session of a Rayon Soviet shall be lawful if more than two-thirds of all the deputies participate in it.

Article 17. The deputies shall be informed of matters subject to discussion at a session of a Rayon Soviet and be given materials associated with them no later than 3 days prior to the session.

Article 18. At a session of a Rayon Soviet, matters shall be discussed:

- on the recommendation of the Presidium and the Chairman of the Rayon Soviet;
- on the recommendation of the Rayispolkom;

- on the recommendation of the deputies' commissions or the deputies themselves;
- on the recommendation of the state bodies of city or rural district self-management;
- in response to requests or complaints from actual persons or legal entities regarding matters which come under the jurisdiction of the Rayon Soviet;
- on the recommendation of citizens' assemblies or bodies of public self-management;
- and on the recommendation of superior institutions of state power or management.

Matters to be discussed at a session of a Rayon Soviet shall be submitted to the Chairman of the Soviet no later than 10 days prior to the session.

Article 19. Sessions of Rayon Soviets shall be conducted openly and representatives of public organizations, enterprises, institutions and the mass media and citizens may participate in their work.

Article 20. A Rayon Soviet may invite to a session persons who are not deputies.

Article 21. A session of a Rayon Soviet shall settle all matters by a majority vote of the deputies present, if no other procedure has been established in this law.

Article 22. The balloting at a session shall be conducted, as a rule, openly. Secret balloting shall be conducted on any matter, if this is requested by no less than one-tenth of the Soviet's deputies or secret balloting has been specified by this law.

Deputies who abstain from voting on any matter shall be considered to be absent and shall not be included in the overall number of deputies which determines the lawfulness of a session.

Article 23. If, during the elections of officials, none of the candidates receives an absolute majority of the votes, then a runoff election shall be held between the two candidates who received the greatest number of votes. The candidate who receives the majority of votes shall be considered to be elected.

Article 24. The work of a session of a Rayon Soviet shall be recorded and the record shall be signed by the Chairman and Secretary of the Soviet. Decisions of a session shall be signed by the Chairman of the Soviet.

During the conducting of a session of a Rayon Soviet, as well as in other instances specified by law, in order to exercise his deputy powers, a deputy shall be excused from the performance of official duties.

Article 25. A session of a Rayon Soviet may consider any matter pertaining to the territory, economy, security and well-being of the residents and the activities of self-management bodies, as well as the management of

enterprises and organizations in the rayon, and, at the same time, only at a session may the following matters be decided:

- 1) the recognition of the deputies' authority, as well as its early termination;
- 2) the election of the Chairman, his Deputy Chairman and the Secretary of a Rayon Soviet;
- 3) the election of a Soviet's permanent and temporary commissions, the confirmation of their chairmen and the confirmation of the membership of the Soviet's Presidium;
- 4) the formation of a rayon's Committee of People's Control;
- 5) the election of the Chairman of the Rayispolkom, the confirmation, on his recommendation, of the membership of the Rayispolkom, the formation with the Ispolkom of the administrative and supervisory commissions, the Juvenile Affairs Commission, the Commission for Assisting in the Protection of Historical and Cultural Monuments, the Commission to Combat Alcoholism and other commissions specified by law;
- 6) the consideration of deputies' inquiries and the adoption of decisions regarding them;
- 7) listening to the reports of the Soviet's Chairman, of the commissions elected or established by the Soviet, of the Committee of People's Control and of the Ispolkom;
- 8) the adoption of decisions regarding the holding of a rayon referendum;
- 9) the exercising of the legislative initiative rights specified by the Latvian SSR Constitution and the submission of proposals to the Latvian SSR Supreme Soviet;
- 10) the confirmation of programs for the economic, social, cultural and ecological development of a rayon, of the standards for payments into the budget, which come from a Rayon Soviet's enterprises and organizations, and the confirmation of the rayon budget and reports on its fulfillment;
- 11) the determination of the tax and duty rates for the rayon;
- 12) the confirmation of the organizational structure for management of a rayon's economy and the formation, reorganization and elimination of a Rayon Soviet's enterprises and organizations;
- 13) the determination, in the manner specified by law, of the payment for land, labor and natural resources, the rent for premises, and the rates for payment of domestic, municipal and transportation services, if such have not been set by the bodies of city and rural district self-management within the limits of their jurisdiction;
- 14) the issuing of binding rules on matters specified in Article 26 of this law;

15) the leasing of enterprises and organizations owned by a Rayon Soviet or even their transfer from rayon subordination to republic, city or rural district subordination;

16) the adoption, jointly with bodies of city or rural district self-management, of decisions regarding the realization of projects important to the rayon and the republic in the territory of a rayon;

17) the wage scale for workers in rayon self-management institutions;

18) the formation of various public funds and the procedure for their use; the acceptance of donations and their disposition; the use of rayon assets to participate in joint enterprises, associations [tovarishchestvo] and insurance and credit institutions;

19) loans [ssuda and zayem] and other long-term obligations on behalf of a rayon;

20) participation in the establishment of foreign economic ties;

21) necessary public services and amenities and their maintenance using rayon assets, if there is no possibility of covering these expenditures using city or rural district self-management assets;

22) the reversal of decisions of a Rayon Soviet's Presidium and the Ispolkom and the orders of its chairman; the reversal of decisions of city and rural district bodies of public self-management, if they do not conform to law;

23) the reversal of decisions of bodies of city and rural district self-management on matters, the supervision of which has been entrusted to the Rayon Soviet according to this law;

A session shall decide the matters indicated in this article by two-thirds of the votes of the deputies present.

A Rayon Soviet shall not have the right to adopt decisions on expenditures and obligations which are not secured by material and financial resources.

Article 26. A Rayon Soviet shall have the right to issue binding rules, for violations of which administrative accountability shall have been provided and which should not contradict existing legislation, for the following matters:

- measures for preventing the spread of human and animal diseases;
- public order in instances of natural calamities or other extraordinary conditions and measures for eliminating their consequences;
- the protection of unique sites of nature important to the rayon, as well as historical and cultural monuments;
- other matters specified by law.

A Rayon Soviet may transfer the rights to issue binding rules in the instances specified in this article to bodies of city and rural district self-management.

The binding rules indicated in this article shall be made known to the public at large.

The observance of the binding rules shall be ensured by the Rayispolkom and the management bodies established by it, as well as by a rayon's internal affairs bodies.

Article 27. The Chairman of a Rayon Soviet shall be elected from among the Rayon Soviet's deputies from several candidates by a secret ballot for the period of the Soviet's authority, but for no more than two terms in succession. In the event he breaches the Latvian SSR Constitution or improperly fulfills his own obligations, he may be removed by the Soviet from the position held, by means of a secret ballot on the initiative of the Presidium or that of no less than one-third of the Soviet's deputies.

The Chairman of a Rayon Soviet shall be accountable to the Soviet which has elected him.

The Chairman of a Soviet shall:

- 1) represent the Rayon Soviet in relations with state and public organizations;
- 2) supervise the work of the Rayon Soviet and its Presidium, conduct the meetings of a Soviet's session, direct the daily procedure for the Soviet's work and sign decisions, records and other documents of the Soviet;
- 3) report to the Soviet on his own activities.

Article 28. A Rayon Soviet, on the recommendation of its Chairman, by means of a secret or open ballot, shall elect from among the deputies, a Deputy Chairman, who, on the instructions of the Chairman, shall direct one of the directions of the Soviet's work and shall act for the Chairman during his absence.

Article 29. In order to decide organizational matters of a Rayon Soviet's activities, a Presidium of the Soviet shall be established, which shall be directed by the Soviet's Chairman or his Deputy, who shall be excused from their primary work. The chairmen of the permanent commissions shall also be members of the Presidium and, on the decision of the Soviet, other deputies may be included.

The Presidium of a Rayon Soviet shall:

- convene and prepare the sessions of a Soviet and inform residents about the Soviet's work;
- coordinate the work of the Soviet's permanent and temporary commissions and working groups;
- render assistance to the deputies in the exercise of their authority and provide them necessary information;

- exercise the powers granted to it by the Latvian SSR Law on the Election of People's Deputies to Local Latvian SSR Soviets regarding the preparations for elections, as well as the recall of deputies;
- on the decision of the Soviet, organize local referendums and public discussion of draft decisions of the Soviet and other important matters;
- organize the implementation and monitoring of the implementation of the Soviet's decisions and the voters' mandates.

Article 30. The Chairman of a Soviet shall convene and conduct the meetings of the Presidium of a Rayon Soviet of People's Deputies. Deputies who are not members of a Presidium may participate in a meeting without the right to vote. A Presidium's decisions shall be adopted by a majority of the votes of the Presidium's members and they shall be signed by the Soviet's Chairman. The Chairman of the Ispolkom or his Deputy, as well as the Chairman of the Committee of People's Control, shall participate in the meetings of a Presidium.

Article 31. The activities of a City Soviet, its Chairman and Presidium shall be maintained by the staff of the Soviet's Presidium using the assets of the local budget. The work of the staff of a Soviet's Presidium shall be supervised by the Soviet's Chairman or his Deputy, who shall be excused from their primary duties.

The procedure for payment for the work of a Soviet's Chairman and his Deputy, the members of the Presidium, the deputies and other persons involved in carrying out the instructions of a Soviet and its Presidium, the structure and staffs, as well as the procedure for payment for the work of the staff workers of a Presidium, shall be established by a Rayon Soviet in conformity with the legislation of the Latvian SSR.

Article 32. A Rayon Soviet shall elect from among the deputies the permanent commissions for examining and preparing matters which come under the jurisdiction of the Soviet, as well as for the implementation of the Soviet's decisions or the monitoring of their implementation. In addition to the deputies, specialists may be elected to membership in the permanent commissions (second version, Specialists shall be enlisted to work in the permanent commissions and shall participate in meetings of the commissions without the right to vote). The permanent commissions shall be accountable to the Soviet which elected them.

The Chairman, Secretary and members of the Rayispolkom may not be elected to membership in the permanent commissions.

A meeting of the permanent commissions shall be lawful if no less than half of all a commission's members participates in it. A permanent commission shall adopt decisions and produce findings which shall be signed by the commission's chairman. The decisions shall be subject to review by the Rayispolkom and other institutions,

enterprises organizations which are obligated to present a response to them within an established period of time.

Article 33. When necessary, a Rayon Soviet shall form temporary commissions and working groups for the preparation and examination of specific matters and for rendering assistance in the implementation of the decisions of the Soviet and superior bodies of state power.

A Rayon Soviet Deputy shall supervise temporary commissions and working groups.

Article 34. Persons enlisted to work in a Rayon Soviet's permanent and temporary commissions and working groups may be paid remuneration from the rayon budget.

Article 35. The executive and administrative body of a Rayon Soviet shall be the Ispolkom, which shall be formed by the Rayon Soviet. At the first session after the elections, a Rayon Soviet shall elect the Chairman of the Ispolkom and, on his recommendation, confirm the members and Secretary of the Ispolkom. The number of members of the Ispolkom shall be determined by the Soviet on the recommendation of the Chairman of the Ispolkom.

The deputies of a Soviet, who have been confirmed as the Secretary and members of the Ispolkom, shall be obligated to relinquish their deputy authority.

Article 36. A Rayispolkom shall be guided in its own activities by the Constitution and laws of the Latvian SSR, the decisions of the Latvian SSR Council of Ministers, as well as by this law, and shall organize the implementation of the Rayon Soviet's decisions.

An Ispolkom shall have the right to submit in writing objections to decisions of a Rayon Soviet, the implementation of which has been entrusted to the Ispolkom, within a 1-week period from the date of a decision's adoption.

A Rayon Soviet shall be obligated to examine objections and a decision shall remain unchanged, if two-thirds of the deputies present have voted for it.

A Rayispolkom shall:

1) in the area of the organization of state management:

—organize departments, administrations and other operating bodies within the limits of the budget established by the Rayon Soviet;

—implement the laws and decisions of the government and inform the rayon's residents about them;

—implement on instructions of the Rayon Soviet, within the limits specified by this article, state monitoring of the activities of city and rural district self-management bodies,

2) in the areas of planning, finances, the budget and the possession of property of the Rayon Soviet:

- work out and present to the Soviet for confirmation programs for economic and social development and the rayon's budget and prepare reports about their fulfillment;
 - organize the collection of taxes, duties and non-budgetary funds as prescribed by law;
 - establish within a rayon enterprises and organizations to manage the rayon's property;
 - in the interests of the rayon, conclude economic agreements with enterprises and organizations, as well as with citizens, using the procedure and within the limits established by the Rayon Soviet and use its property and financial resources, if the contractual sum does not exceed 10 percent of the rayon's budget;
 - exercise the rights granted by law of a superior body with respect to the rayon's enterprises and organizations;
 - approve projects and title lists for the construction, repair and expansion of sites of the rayon economy as prescribed by law;
- 3) in the areas of the protection of nature and the proper use of natural resources:
- exercise control over the proper use of environmental protection and natural resources;
 - prepare resolutions regarding prohibiting construction or renovation of projects for which there is an unfavorable environmental impact study report;
 - halt the economic activities or construction of projects when there have been gross violations of the legislation on protecting nature and submit suitable proposals to the Soviet and competent state bodies;
 - work out rayon programs for protecting nature, organize environmental impact studies, the construction and renovation of projects for protecting nature and, when necessary, establish non-budgetary funds for protecting the environment and for its proper use;
 - prepare proposals for the Rayon Soviet regarding the introduction of differentiated payment for natural resources for enterprises (associations [obyedineniya]) and cooperative organizations which pollute the air and water and do not ensure comprehensive reprocessing of widely used minerals and the proper use of waste materials;
 - within the limits established by jurisdictional law, grant and deny the right to use natural resources and resolve disputes between users of these resources;
- 4) in the area of ensuring the social and economic rights of citizens:
- keep track of productive forces and regulate their distribution in the rayon's territory, as well as ensure their proper use, and organize job placement for citizens;
 - coordinate the work of the general education and vocational-technical schools in their recruitment of students;
 - plan the contingent of workers for public education, culture, health care, social welfare and other needed workers and ensure the correct distribution, use and enhancement of the skills of these personnel;
 - establish the days and hours of operation of enterprises and organizations associated with serving the populace of the entire rayon;
 - manage the work of public education, as well as the work on preschool and extracurricular education of children, and see to the enhancement of the material resources of rayon public education institutions;
 - decide matters of adoption and protect the rights of minors;
 - work out and implement a rayon cultural policy, supervise the work of cultural and educational institutions, ensure the enhancement of their material and financial resources and organize cultural measures on a rayon-wide scale;
 - assist in the preservation of the folk traditions of its own district;
 - exercise state management and state monitoring of the protection and use of historical and cultural monuments;
 - manage health care in the rayon and health care institutions of rayon subordination and ensure the enhancement of their material and technical resources and the organization of medical assistance to the public;
 - monitor the work of health care institutions subordinate to superior bodies;
 - implement state medical inspection in the rayon's territory;
 - as prescribed by law, perform the functions of trusteeship and guardianship bodies;
 - manage the work on physical culture and sport in the rayon;
 - handle the development of mass recreation areas, their equipping and the provision of public services and amenities;
 - manage the work of social welfare and handle the timely and correct granting and payment of state pensions and allowances, as well as the granting of benefits and privileges specified by law to citizens;

- examine matters associated with the placement of citizens into social welfare institutions and monitor the work of social welfare institutions in the territory of the rayon;
 - 5) in the areas of public utilities, domestic services, commerce and communications:
 - monitor the activities of housing and public utility institutions, the state of the housing fund, enterprises and public utility structures and the correctness of their operation and handle the centralized providing of fuel to residents;
 - involve the rayon's enterprises, institutions and organizations in the providing of public services and amenities and the construction of roads;
 - manage the rayon's public transport enterprises and organizations;
 - monitor the activities of transport enterprises and organizations subordinate to superior bodies with regards to providing services to the rayon's residents;
 - monitor the activities of communications enterprises and organizations with regards to providing services to the rayon's residents and facilitate the development of telephone and postal communications, the installation of radio facilities and television and also the repair and protection of communications lines;
 - manage commerce and public dining in the rayon's territory, as well as the providing of foodstuffs to the rayon's residents;
 - monitor the observance of commerce prices and rules;
 - handle the providing of the necessary power resources for the rayon;
 - 6) with regards to the maintenance of Socialist law, public order and the protection of citizens' rights:
 - ensure the observance of the citizens' rights and freedoms, guaranteed by the Latvian SSR Constitution, and their legitimate interests and protect them from unlawful infringements;
 - examine citizens' suggestions, statements and complaints, monitor their examination by all enterprises, institutions and organizations located in the rayon's territory and listen to the reports of their heads on these matters;
 - ensure the observance of the laws which guarantee freedom to citizens: of conscience, speech, the press, assembly, street processions, demonstrations and other political and personal civil rights;
 - handle the granting to the populace of access to legal information and their legal instruction, as well as the rendering of skilled legal aid to citizens;
 - monitor the observance of the Latvian SSR's laws and the acts of superior bodies of state power and management, the maintenance of state and public order and the legality of the activities of city and rural district self-management bodies;
 - coordinate the work of all state and public bodies for the prevention of breaches of law, supervise the work of the corresponding officials of the internal affairs bodies and other bodies responsible for combating breaches of law;
 - within the limits of its own jurisdiction, reverse the orders and instructions of subordinate management bodies, as well as the orders and instructions of the heads of the rayon's enterprises, institutions and organizations; reverse decisions contradictory to law of general assemblies (assemblies of authorized representatives) of kolkhoz members, assemblies of authorized representatives of interfarm agricultural enterprises (organizations) or their soviets, boards, consumers societies and other cooperative organizations;
 - halt the execution of orders and instructions of the heads of superior enterprises and organizations regarding matters of land use, the protection of nature, construction, housing and public utilities, the use of labor resources and the production of local construction materials, the protection and use of historical and cultural monuments, and the rendering of social, domestic and other services to the populace, if these orders and instructions contradict the law, and report this to the Rayon Soviet and the appropriate superior bodies;
 - supervise the work of the rayon's civil registration institutions and state archives;
 - in instances of natural calamities and catastrophes, adopt measures to save the lives of people, preserve material values and maintain Socialist law and order;
 - monitor the observance of the laws regarding religious cults.
 - 7) in the area of defense:
 - ensure the observance of the Law on Universal Military Service by all officials and citizens, as well as by enterprises, institutions and organizations;
 - supervise civil defense in the rayon's territory.
- A Soviet's Rayispolkom shall exercise supervision over and monitoring of the activities of the administrative and supervisory commissions, the Juvenile Affairs Commission, the Commission for Assisting in the Protection of Historical and Cultural Monuments, the Commission for Combating Alcoholism, and other commissions provided for by law and formed by the Rayon Soviet under the Ispolkom.

A Soviet's Rayispolkom shall be accountable to the Soviet and shall render a report to it no less often than once a year.

Within the limits of its own jurisdiction, a Rayispolkom shall submit proposals to the Latvian SSR Council of Ministers.

Article 37. Meetings of a Rayispolkom shall be held as need be; meetings shall be convened and conducted by the Chairman of the Ispolkom or his Deputy.

Meetings shall be lawful if no less than two-thirds of an Ispolkom's members participate in them.

An Ispolkom shall decide all matters by means of voting, by a majority of the votes of those present. The voting shall be conducted openly, but, at the request of at least one Ispolkom member, a secret ballot shall be conducted.

Article 38. A record shall be kept at all Ispolkom meetings. The record shall be signed by the chairman of the meeting (the Chairman or his Deputy) and the Secretary.

Article 39. Interested parties may submit complaints about Ispolkom decisions to a Rayon Soviet or other body using the procedure established by law.

Article 40. The Chairman of a Rayispolkom shall organize and supervise the Ispolkom's work, represent the interests of the Ispolkom without special authorization in court, in arbitration and in other institutions and organizations, grant powers of attorney, sign agreements and other legal documents, open and close accounts in banking institutions, dispose of the Ispolkom's assets, hire and fire the Ispolkom's staff workers and perform other activities allowed by law to the head of an institution.

Article 41. In order to exercise control over the budget, the annual reports, the estimate of rayon self-management's income and expenditures and the economic activities of the Ispolkom, its bodies and officials, a Rayon Soviet shall elect from among the deputies an Auditing Commission as a permanent self-management body for the period of its own authority. The Soviet shall determine the number of commission members, but no fewer than three, including the Chairman. The Chairman of the Auditing Commission shall be elected by the Rayon Soviet.

Article 42. An Auditing Commission may conduct an audit of the activities of rayon self-management bodies and officials at any time at its own discretion, but no less often than once a year. Audits should also be conducted at the request of the Rayon Soviet, the Chairman of the Soviet, the Chairman of the Ispolkom, as well as at the request of no less than one-fifth of the deputies.

Article 43. An Auditing Commission shall inform the Rayon Soviet about its own activities and submit proposals for improving public self-management.

III. The Material Resources of Rayon Self-Management

Article 44. The material resources of rayon self-management shall be the state property transferred to the possession of, for the use of and at the disposal of a Rayon Soviet, as well as financial resources derived from budget assets and non-budgetary assets of a Rayon Soviet and assets drawn on the basis of voluntary participation from enterprises, organizations and citizens, as well as from bank credits.

The rights of rayon self-management to use land, water, minerals, forests and other natural resources shall be established by this law and other Latvian SSR laws.

Article 45. The fixed production capital of a rayon's enterprises and organizations and other property necessary for ensuring the rayon's social and economic development shall belong to the Rayon Soviet.

Article 46. The ownership of a Rayon Soviet shall be established:

- by means of the transfer to the Rayon Soviet of state-owned projects using the procedure established by law;
- by means of the establishment of new owned projects as a result of expanded reproduction;
- on the basis of property transactions, as well as other means specified by law.

Article 47. In exercising the right of ownership, a Rayon Soviet shall:

- establish organizations and enterprises, to which property shall be operationally transferred;
- transfer property on leasing terms or using some other procedure established by law to city and rural district self-management bodies, labor collectives, public organizations, cooperatives, leasing organizations, and associations [tovarishchestva], as well as to citizens to be used to satisfy the needs of the rayon's economy.

Article 48. A Rayon Soviet shall have priority in the acquisition of buildings from enterprises, institutions and organizations subordinate to superior bodies, structures and other projects which are located in the rayon's territory and may be used for the needs of the rayon's economy.

Article 49. A Rayon Soviet shall independently work out and approve its own budget, draw up the rayon's consolidated budget and submit it to the Latvian SSR Ministry of Finances for inclusion in the State Budget. A Rayon Soviet, in accordance with the Latvian SSR Law on Budget Rights, shall be guaranteed that superior bodies of power and management will not interfere in its budget process.

Article 50. The revenue of a rayon budget shall be derived from the deductions provided for by law from

state taxes and revenue based on stable standards, local taxes and other revenue, which are paid by associations [obyedineiya], enterprises, organizations and the populace, as well as, when need be, from bank credits and loans [ssuda] or the assets of superior bodies' budgets, obtained on conditions of recoverability and reimbursability. Revenue not received in the budget shall not be compensated from a superior body's budget.

Article 51. A Rayon Soviet, at its own discretion, shall use revenue additionally received in a budget, as well as the amount of revenue which exceeds expenditures, derived at the start of the budget year as a result of an increase in revenue or savings in expenditures, including the assets of unused capital investments. It shall receive from the budget of a higher unit the amount derived as a result of the implementation of decisions adopted by superior bodies of power and management, which have caused a decrease in revenue or an increase in expenditures for the rayon budget. A Rayon Soviet shall have the right to receive assets from the budget of a superior unit in the form of a grant or subsidy, determined as an absolute amount and for a particular purpose. Grants and subsidies shall not be reviewed and shall be handed out regardless of the results of the performance of the rayon budget.

Article 52. Cash fulfillment of the budget shall be carried out by banking institutions. The rayon budget's assets shall be kept in state banking institutions or in self-management banking institutions. A Rayon Soviet shall have the right to invest its own temporarily available assets in arrangements of an economic nature or to issue loans [ssuda] using these assets.

Article 53. The following taxes and non-tax payments shall be allotted and paid completely to a rayon budget:

- 1) the fee for fixed production capital and fixed working capital and tax from the profits of a rayon's economic enterprises and organizations;
- 2) payments to the budget of interfarm organizations, if a Rayon Soviet participated in the establishment of these organizations;
- 3) revenue from forests;
- 4) revenue from cash and prize lotteries;
- 5) tax from entertainment arrangements of rayon importance;
- 6) fines imposed by an Ispolkom's commissions and authorized officials of a rayon;
- 7) sums from creditor and depositor liabilities of enterprises, organizations and institutions, for which the period for filing claims has expired;
- 8) revenue from the sale and leasing of a rayon's property;

9) the recovery of assets received and not used by institutions and organizations in the preceding year;

10) fines exacted from enterprises and organizations for receiving profits (revenue) by a groundless increase in prices (tariffs) for products, work and services;

11) sums from savings derived from a reduction in prices for equipment and materials;

12) subsidies and loans [ssuda] obtained from a superior body's budget;

13) other revenue subject to inclusion in a rayon budget in accordance with Latvian SSR laws and decisions of a Rayon Soviet which have been adopted within the limits of its jurisdiction.

Article 54. Included in a rayon's budget, in accordance with the standards established by the Latvian SSR Supreme Soviet, shall be the following deductions from the sums of state taxes and revenue, in addition to the deductions provided for cities and rural districts:

- 1) from the overall sum of the turnover tax;
- 2) from the turnover tax in relation to the volume of retail goods turnover of state and cooperative trade;
- 3) from the income tax from the populace;
- 4) from the tax on the profits of enterprises and organizations subordinate to superior bodies;
- 5) revenue in the amount of 25 percent from the sale of domestic state premium bonds.

The amounts of the deductions shall be determined according to the types of revenue in relation to a rayon's expenditures and the involved revenue.

Article 55. If, through the use of the maximum rates permitted by law for local taxes and duties, there is no possibility of balancing a budget and implementing the programs developed by a Rayon Soviet, the Rayon Soviet shall have the right to raise local taxes and duties up to 20 percent.

A Rayon Soviet shall decide matters regarding the introduction, repeal and amounts of local taxes and duties specified by law.

Article 56. Rayon self-management expenditures associated with a Rayon Soviet's performance of its functions shall be financed from the assets of the rayon budget.

In addition to sums provided for the direct needs of rayon self-management, a reserve fund for the Ispolkom, in the amount of up to two percent of the volume of expenditures, may be formed in the budget.

Above the expenditures provided for in a budget, using the leftover assets of the rayon budget, ready working cash should be available for covering temporary cash-flow shortages. Its amounts shall be approved by the Rayon Soviet. Ready working cash, over the course of

the year, may be used to cover temporary cash-flow shortages and should be recovered in the same year up to the amounts specified during the approval of the budget.

Sums necessary for repayment of loans, debts and interest on them shall absolutely be included in the budget.

Article 57. A Rayon Soviet shall determine independently the policies, amounts and procedure for using budget assets.

Within the limits of its own assets, a Rayon Soviet may finance on a contract basis and stimulate measures, aimed at helping enterprises fulfill local orders, which are associated with increasing the output of foodstuffs and other goods, the development of services rendered to the public and also the construction and renovation of projects for the social and production infrastructure.

Article 58. A Rayon Soviet, within the limits of the rayon budget, shall have the right:

- 1) to increase expenditures, above the state-established norms, for maintaining institutions, which are financed from the budget, and also to establish additional payments to the salaries of the workers of these institutions;
- 2) to introduce, using the budget, as well as, in the specified procedure, the voluntarily donated assets of associations [obyedineniya], enterprises and organizations, additional benefits and allowances for rendering assistance to families with children, to the aged and disabled for the purposes of their social protection, to citizens suffering from natural calamities and other low-income citizens;
- 3) to render financial assistance to public self-management bodies on the conditions of the recovery of the assets, as well as gratuitously;
- 4) to generate funds for incentives for self-management workers and deputies.

Article 59. Budget revenue and expenditures should be subdivided by divisions, sections, paragraphs and articles.

Article 60. A Rayispolkom may expend budget assets only for needs planned for in the budget and provided for in the corresponding divisions, sections, paragraphs and articles of the budget.

Article 61. The procedure for the transfer and use of budget assets from one subdivision for other needs shall be established by the Rayon Soviet.

The Rayon Soviet shall decide on the use of revenue obtained additionally during the process of the execution of the budget, as well as available leftover budget assets generated at the beginning of the year.

Article 62. The Rayispolkom shall provide an accounting of all revenue and expenditures of a budget and shall compile a report on the execution of the budget.

The procedure for submitting reports to superior management bodies has been established by the Regulations on Accounting Reports and Balances.

Article 63. A Rayon Soviet may form non-budgetary funds for financing measures of rayon importance through:

- 1) the voluntary contributions of enterprises, organizations, kolkhozes, cooperatives and the populace;
- 2) the sale of bonds of rayon importance;
- 3) special purpose cash and prize lotteries;
- 4) sums of revenue received by the Rayon Soviet during the implementation of a set of measures for solving economic and social problems;
- 5) other payments specified by the Rayon Soviet.

Article 64. Non-budgetary assets shall be retained in separate special accounts opened in banking institutions. These assets shall not be subject to withdrawal, rather, they shall be used to implement measures of the Rayon Soviet in accordance with plans approved by it.

In order to retain its own assets, as well as those of city and rural district self-management, a Rayon Soviet may form its own credit institutions.

Article 65. A Rayon Soviet shall approve the standards for deductions from the state taxes and revenue, provided for by law, to city and rural district budgets for 5 years, and shall also monitor the observance of the tax laws in subordinate soviets of people's deputies.

IV. Public Self-Management of Citizens in a Rayon

Article 66. The populace of a rayon shall implement public self-management of citizens, convening conferences of residents for discussion of the most important matters in the rayon's affairs.

Conferences may be convened on the initiative of a Rayon Soviet, as well as on the initiative of public organizations, city or rural district self-management bodies or on the initiative of residents.

Article 67. A Rayon Soviet and the management bodies and institutions established by it should examine the proposals of conferences of residents and adopt the necessary measures for their implementation.

Residents shall be informed about the adopted measures.

Article 68. Local referendums may be organized to decide important matters of self-management.

The procedure for holding a referendum shall be determined by law.

[signed] The Chairman of the Presidium of the Latvian SSR Supreme Soviet and the Secretary of the Presidium of the Latvian SSR Supreme Soviet.

Comments and suggestions regarding the draft law should be sent to the following address: 226170, Riga, Ulitsa Lenina, 36, The Latvian SSR Council of Ministers, The Commission for Elaboration of Draft Laws on Local Self-Management

Lithuanian Party Plenum on Gorbachev Visit

90UN0863B Vilnius SOVETSKAYA LITVA in Russian
19 Jan 90 p 2

[Report on debate at the Second Plenum of the Lithuanian CP Central Committee on the report on the results of the visit to Lithuania by M.S. Gorbachev, general secretary of the CPSU Central Committee and chairman of the USSR Supreme Soviet]

[Text] Mindaugas Stakvilyavichyus, first secretary of the Shyaulay Gorkom [city party committee], called attention to the fact that many people were refuting M.S. Gorbachev in connection with the counterbalancing of professors, allegedly, to the working man. It cannot be ruled out that he used the word "professors" in quotation marks, noticing something very interesting here: There are various professors and various scholars. We are respectful toward those who worked on the idea of a revival of Lithuania and who prepared new party regulations and contributed to the formation of the new Communist Party. But there are also other professors, with inordinate ambitions, who truly take Lithuania's cause keenly to heart and who stirred it up for revival, but who have broken away from the masses. M.S. Gorbachev was evidently referring to them. We should beware of those who speak at length on independence, which is necessary right now, but do not know how to effect this.

Following the meeting with M.S. Gorbachev, I learned one thing—this year will be decisive in Lithuania and, probably, in the Soviet Union also. As far as I understood it, he was in favor of our understanding, as we arrange our own affairs in Lithuania, that the entire great mechanism was in need of treatment. And that improvement was not yet in sight but that it was necessary to aspire to somehow master this process. Lithuania's communists should therefore influence the life of the CPSU and the whole country. It is difficult to achieve anything in isolation.

Continuing M. Stakvilyavichyus' idea, Arunas Zhebryunas, producer of the Lithuanian Film Studio, said that the counterbalance of the workers to the intelligentsia had been manifested particularly graphically at M.S. Gorbachev's meeting with the work force of the Vilnius Fuel Equipment Plant Association. Incidentally, this undertone has been heard repeatedly throughout the party's history. It came to us from Stalin's system. Why does this put me on my guard? Because this is a struggle against thinking.

Dwelling on the struggle against national thinking, A. Zhebryunas observed that our conquerors, having taken away our freedom, always offered us a bright tomorrow

and prohibited reflection on this matter, demanding merely obedience. You will see a bright tomorrow, and let that suffice. The ideology to which the CPSU currently adheres is based on metaphysics, and its program has become a kind of religion. True, it has been upgraded somewhat today, but the essence of this perverted religion has remained the same. The managerial apparatus may be dismantled bit by bit, but the religion here remains untouched. The success of the Lithuanian CP Program, which our people have supported, is that it has been gelded of this entire mystification and metaphysics. This is where the noncorrespondence between the Lithuanian Communist Party and the CPSU lies.

An earthquake is a terrible misfortune. Drought and starvation are dreadful disasters also. But the greatest misfortune is when national self-awareness is gradually destroyed, and the people demand freedom and aspire to national self-awareness. It is in the course of realizing these aspirations that the internationalism of the USSR peoples should be displayed, A. Zhebryunas said in conclusion.

Valentinas Sventitskas, secretary of the republic Writers Union Board, spoke about the fact that it is important now to arm ourselves with arguments for further discussion with the leaders of the CPSU Central Committee. It would be injudicious to emphasize the legal aspects while evaluating the circumstances of Lithuania's incorporation into the USSR. We should emphasize something else—the actual historical conditions and the "voluntary" request for Lithuania's acceptance into the USSR, which could be compared with the "sincere confessions" in Stalin's jails.

An active part in elaborating the law on the republics' separation from the USSR should be played by specialists of our republic also since it is essential to realistically appreciate the motives for settling material accounts. It is essential to present the unpaid bill for the mass deportations and the extermination of the inhabitants of Lithuania on ideological grounds. For those to whom this argument appears to be merely a moral one we could present the bill for Lithuania's losses in economic terms.

No force can rescind the decisions of the 20th Lithuanian CP Congress. After all, the congress, the Central Committee and its Bureau and the first secretary, an elected person, simply had to adopt the decision demanded by the majority of communists. At the same time we need to understand M.S. Gorbachev also—he also acted in deference to the opinion of the majority of the members of the CPSU, and he lacks the authority to do otherwise. The leaders of the Lithuanian Communist Party, who have become equal partners, could be invited to CPSU forums as guests. It is essential that the proposals, ideas and arguments of Lithuania's communists be expressed at the 28th CPSU Congress since we are bound by the path that we have trod together and by close aims.

Romas Pakalnis, director of the Lithuanian SSR Academy of Sciences Botany Institute, attempted to answer the questions: why must the Lithuanian Communist Party operate independently? Why should Lithuania be independent altogether? All peoples of the Soviet Union unanimously aspire to a nonrepetition of the genocide. However, there is a real threat from another danger—the destruction of the whole environment by the activity of people themselves. The economy is technically and technologically backward, and economic losses constitute more than R300 million [rubles] a year, and are growing constantly. Therefore, only a policy which guarantees the Lithuanian people and the other national minorities living here conditions for historical continuity is acceptable. Otherwise there is no point in even talking about politics.

R. Pakalnis emphasized that it was essential that the Lithuanian Communist Party adopt political decisions enabling the people, the republic and all inhabitants of Lithuania to decide their own fate. This means simultaneously the economy, the development of society and preservation of the environment. And all laws of society's development should not be built on faith, as we are constantly being urged. The main thing is people's will and their resolve. Finally, the role of the professors in policy and the word of science have been appreciated.

The visit of Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev was evaluated by screen actress Niyole Ozhelitte. She said that all of Lithuania had benefited. There was clear talk of independence and statehood, and not of sovereignty within the Soviet Union. M.S. Gorbachev's visit was the start of negotiations on the restoration of Lithuania's statehood. The Lithuanian CP Program records that the aim of the communists is the restoration of the Lithuanian state. The main argument of the people is that we feel ourselves to be unfree. The thirst for freedom is the highest degree of man's development, from physical to spiritual self-perception.

The actress went on to observe: M.S. Gorbachev emphasized that the mechanism for secession from the Soviet Union is very complex. It can easily be understood that in this case it will be necessary to give up all that one has and even what one will not make throughout one's life. In the speaker's opinion, it is necessary to emphasize the present occupation status of the Baltic area, Lithuania included.

The secretary is right, N. Ozhelitte believes, to speak of our shining and free faces. Freedom is an inward condition. However, it needs to be officially structured. Taking freedom away is no longer possible.

In the opinion of Vyacheslav Koryagin, worker at the Alitus Cotton Works, the general secretary came to us with a prejudiced and outdated directive concerning the political situation in our republic.

Two opinions were preponderant at the meeting with the artistic intelligentsia, V. Koryagin said. We stuck to our beliefs, the general secretary, to his. I believe that we

need to be very responsible in appealing to the opinion of the people since we all know how the people reacted to the death of Stalin—people wept. Society now has an entirely different view of these events. In order to avoid such mistakes in the future the Referendum Act could be a substantial argument. I believe that in time not only the intelligentsia but also all citizens of Lithuania will have an opportunity to express their position. What it will be, we have no doubt. The general secretary should know this also.

In conclusion the speaker described the visit of CPSU Central Committee members V. Kuptsov and I. Karimov to the Alitus Cotton Works.

They saw the workers' position, V. Koryagin observed. After the meeting, I. Karimov stressed that there are things to be learned from us and that Lithuania would remain for them a friendly republic with which economic relations would not be severed.

Vytautas Kaminskas, director of the "Informatika" Research Center of the Vytautas the Great Kaunas University, said that thought should be given also to the circumstances by virtue of which M.S. Gorbachev tried in one way or another to persuade us how mistaken the path toward independence is. The speaker recalled the attempts of local opponents to evaluate in a distorted light the political situation in the republic, saying that Lithuanians had all of a sudden contemplated the creation of an ethnically pure state. Whoever has the least knowledge of the history of Lithuania knows that in various periods of its existence different nations have gotten along and accommodated one another very well. However, some people have recently been trying to inform the union audience of the reverse. Such thoughts as that the Lithuanian CP Program is essentially nationalist are being expressed also. This is maintained, for example, by a veteran in the newspaper RABOCHAYA TRIBUNA (the former SOTSIALISTICHESKAYA INDUSTRIYA). It would therefore be expedient to publish the program and statute of the independent Lithuanian Communist Party in Russian in the union press. In the opinion of Vytautas Laurinavichyus, secretary of the primary party organization of Shilutskiy Rayon's "Saugos" Sovkhoz [state farm], it is very important prior to the forthcoming CPSU Central Committee Plenum to ascertain, if only approximately, how many members of the independent Lithuanian Communist Party there are. Such an argument will really be necessary. It will also be necessary to say at this plenum that so far no representative of the Lithuanian Communist Party in the CPSU Central Committee has had a decisive say and that there can be no talk of common decisions.

The mechanism for the republics' secession from the USSR is being spoken of with the idea that we would not be able to pay off our debts as long as we live. Consequently, convincing counterarguments are needed.

M.S. Gorbachev expressed the opinion that the working people of Lithuania are not themselves capable of

speaking in support of the Lithuanian Communist Party and the independence of the republic and that they are blindly reiterating opinions which have been foisted on them by some people. But this is wrong. Our workers are saying what they think.

And our position concerning the fate of the CPSU? Many people believe that we are poking our noses into what is not our business. But what kind of neighbors we have is not a matter of indifference to us. For this reason I support the proposal that all documents of the 20th Lithuanian CP Congress, even if not entirely acceptable to Moscow, be made public for all the country's communists. It is essential to mold the opinion that the CPSU should be other than it is currently. It should be an alliance of republic communist parties in which the most urgent questions are decided on a parity basis.

I do not agree with the unduly critical remarks leveled at M.S. Gorbachev, Lyudas **Truska**, head of a department of the Vilnius Pedagogical Institute, said. He gave mankind perestroika and glasnost, and we are a part of mankind. Had it not been for perestroika, there would have been no revival of the Lithuanian nation. It is he who is defending us against imperial forces. I make so bold as to maintain that if perestroika fails, so will Gorbachev, and we will be crushed.

We are for the total independence of Lithuania not as a part of the USSR. To our opponents' reproach that a year ago we were speaking differently, but are now chasing votes at the elections I would reply: This was required by political wisdom and realities, whose purpose is to protect Lithuania against attack. Maneuvering in politics is inevitable.

The calls for us to provide arguments for our right to independence which have been heard here today are surprising. In my view, the very formulation of the question is amoral. Mankind's entire history is a struggle of peoples for independence, and no one has sought arguments but has fought. In a situation where there is an insistent demand for arguments I would permit myself to observe that independence affords a small people guarantees of survival as a nation, preservation of their identity, and safeguards dignity. Independence affords an opportunity for the rational development of the economy and culture, and, it seems to me, we should not be deliberating as to the kind of independence—bourgeois or socialist—this will be. This is outdated thinking, we are for an independence which is based on rational economics.

Close ties to both the CPSU and Russia are essential to us, we cannot do without these. If we are to pursue merely the market and votes at the elections, we should now be fiercely demonstrating disagreement with Moscow. But if we are to proceed from strategic goals and Lithuania's interests, we need both compromise and close contacts. Although for centuries Lithuania and Russia warred more than they traded or cooperated, a sound basis for friendly relations was laid, nonetheless.

This basis was laid by Lenin and the founders of the Lithuanian Republic, having signed the 1920 peace treaty. The Soviet Union was the sole big state to support Lithuania in all unexpected diplomatic changes involving Vilnius and the Klaypeda District.

Currently neither Germany nor Poland are laying claim to a revision of borders. But who can guarantee that there will not be a change of attitude and that the question of Vilnius or Klaypeda will not arise once again? I make so bold as to maintain that Russia would be our ally. We should not forget this, not to mention the economic relations, without which we could not cope.

A written note from Bronislovas Genzyalis, member of the Lithuanian CP Central Committee Buro, was read out at the plenum: "Of what party is Comrade Eysmuntas a member? It would seem that he and his associates are part of the leadership of the other party. If so, on what basis are they participating in our plenum?" In his reply **Edvardas Eysmuntas**, chairman of the Lithuanian SSR KGB, explained that he, like other members of the government, had been invited to the plenum. The KGB, he said, is not impeding the processes occurring in Lithuania. What the opinion of individual communists of the committee is and which path they choose, is their personal business. We are not influencing their opinions and sentiments. Some communists working in the KGB, incidentally, have advocated an independent Lithuanian Communist Party. We serve not the party, **E. Eysmuntas** observed, we defend the existing constitutional system in the republic. In time, possibly, the state security authorities will be depoliticized.

Romualdas Sakalauskas, deputy director of the Mazheykyay Petroleum Products and Fuel Supply Enterprise, observed that there was little reflection in M.S. Gorbachev's speeches of the thoughts of our speakers. I do not believe, he said, that Comrade Gorbachev failed to understand or misheard them. He understood, but only what he wanted. The speeches of the leader of the CPSU laid emphasis on the mechanism for secession from the USSR. But it will hardly be acceptable to us. In the speaker's opinion, whereas previously we drove in a single team, now, having switched to our own horse, it is superfluous to argue whether to leave us or to assign this horse to us and give it over.

The mechanism for secession from the USSR will contain two aspects: economic and political. It should be emphasized primarily that we must assume the right to self-determination ourselves in order to preclude the possibility of forces outside the republic prohibiting us from seceding and, consequently, having the right to cancel it. On the other hand, is it not time to prepare an alternative secession mechanism ourselves?

M.S. Gorbachev spoke about a law associated with realization of the right of our republics to self-determination, **Alfonsas Matsaytis**, first secretary of the

Lithuanian Communist Youth League Central Committee, said. I believe that we should react very cautiously since it is unclear what kind of law this will be, although we should participate in its preparation. A commission for the restoration of independence has been formed under the auspices of the Lithuanian SSR Supreme Soviet, and it should be preparing its proposals even now: how, in what stages and what we will propose to the USSR Supreme Soviet. The speaker called attention to the fact that other republics cannot decide for us whether or not we can secede from the Soviet Union, we entered on various terms. The republics which really joined the USSR voluntarily would be able to avail themselves of the law also. We should not be worrying too much about the upcoming CPSU Central Committee Plenum, he said. Of course, negotiations between the parties are inevitable. The question of our participation in the congress will no doubt arise at the plenum. It also should be decided by the CPSU Central Committee plenum, although we should not thrust ourselves forward particularly here. If such an invitation arrives, we will confer and decide what to do.

Rimantas **Purtulis**, director of the Panevezhis "Ekranas" Plant, emphasized that all the guests confused party matters and economic relations. They particularly emphasized that there were in Lithuania many products, a termination of the supplies of which would infringe the interests of the Soviet Union. We, possibly, should be even more alarmed at this since we also obtain monopoly products and raw material from the union republics. However, we believe in common sense and economic relations.

In the course of preparing the mechanism of secession from the USSR we need to prepare another mechanism also—how not to disrupt the evolved economic relations, the speaker said. The basis thereof could be the principles of the concept of our republic's economic independence supplemented by more precise guidelines and decisions.

The accusation has been made to us that the Lithuanian CP Statute and Program is similar to the corresponding documents of the social democrats. But is this bad? After all, the moral code of the builder of communism was similar to the Ten Commandments, but no one saw anything wrong with this. Here also it would be better to analyze than to accuse.

R. Purtulis recalled the meeting of V. Grigoryev, member of the CPSU Central Committee and first secretary of the Vitebsk Oblast Party Committee, with the workers. When it came to the question of why there were few workers at the 20th Lithuanian CP Congress, people explained that there were no workers in the American parliament but that they lived far better than we who do have workers in parliament. To V. Grigoryev's suggestion that we not be in haste, one worker responded: "I have been a communist for 15 years, and it has been explained to me all the while that the

communist should be out in front and should be impatient, but you, like Kashpirovskiy, say over and over: Be calm, be calm. Perhaps I should then be boring out parts slowly-slowly, in no hurry?"

The problem of the restoration of Lithuania's independence was analyzed in his speech by Romualdas **Ozolas**, deputy chief editor of the "Mintis" Publishing House.

Not the domestic law of the USSR but international law should be realized in respect of us, he observed. And for this reason the creation of a mechanism of secession from the USSR is a personal problem of M.S. Gorbachev or that part of the Soviet Union which remains following the secession of Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia. Our job is simple: Figure out how much the Soviet Union owes Lithuania and present Moscow with this bill. The sooner, the better. Our job is to draw up, not here but in the Supreme Soviet, a program for the restoration of the state and to submit it for discussion and then present it at the second Helsinki conference and in international organizations. The proclamation of independence is the minimum, after which all other goals of the state may be achieved. Talk about the gradual restoration of independence and its suffusion with content is pointless since it utterly confuses matters from the political viewpoint and carries us into an area of pseudo-problems.

M.S. Gorbachev is essentially well-disposed toward us, but he cannot dissociate himself from certain interests of a large unitary state. His activity here confirmed that we are being driven out faster than we ourselves would care to leave. We are not so imprudent as to select for the declaration of independence and as the right moment for the restoration of the state the most inauspicious time for ourselves. The mechanism not only of self-government but also self-defense, up to and including the proclamation of independence tonight or tomorrow if we are provoked into this, must be prepared immediately.

In my view, the CPSU, as a party alien to Lithuania, is even now actively seizing power. A session of the Vilnyuskiy Rayon Soviet is being held today in Nemenchine, and Lithuanians continue to be removed there. In any event, attempts are being made to remove people who recognize the platform of the Lithuanian Communist Party. Let the CPSU live in Lithuania in accordance with its laws, this is its business. But no one has the right to create conditions for this party to be able to operate as an anti-state party in respect of the Lithuanian state.

Yanina **Gagilene**, first secretary of Vilnius' Leninskiy Raykom [rayon party committee], presented arguments as to why the independence of the Lithuanian Communist Party was necessary.

The first reason is the present principles for CPSU activity which are built on democratic centralism. They are absolutely unacceptable to Lithuania, for in all decisions they are guided by the opinion of the majority.

Lithuania in the Union, as also the Lithuanian Communist Party within the CPSU, is a minority, and for this reason our interests will never be taken into consideration.

Second, the CPSU is now a party of the like-minded, and for this reason dogmatism is inevitable. People have begun to unite in the Lithuanian Communist Party for the sake of the main goal, and not in accordance with a monolith of like-mindedness. This goal is set forth in our program documents—Lithuania's independence and the restoration of statehood.

The CPSU is now plunged in crisis. It has no program of strategic activity. They did not know what to do at the first stage of perestroika, and their own program of perestroika is not known. Resolutions of CPSU Central Committee plenums adopted in the past two years have not been fulfilled. This was confirmed by V.A. Medvedev also. They have not been fulfilled since they are not based on real life and opinion from below, from the republics. But members of the Central Committee of our Lithuanian Communist Party were elected according to the proposal of the primary party organizations. This is a Central Committee elected democratically. We know that when the present CPSU Central Committee is elected, it can in no event represent the opinion of all communists.

Ya. Gagilene supported the opinion that the Lithuanian Communist Party (on the CPSU Platform) cannot be equated with all the other movements and parties since the aims of all movements and parties largely coincide with the aims of the Lithuanian Communist Party. Only this party is opposed to Lithuania's independence. In conclusion the speaker proposed that the decision of the 20th Congress be evaluated not by the present CPSU Central Committee but by the 28th Congress, a debate throughout the party having been announced as a preliminary.

Stasis Apinis, secretary of the Kedaynskiy Raykom, spoke about the mood of people in the rayon. All supported the decisions of the 20th Lithuanian CP Congress, but the CPSU Central Committee Plenum was held, and doubters appeared. Following the mass meetings, our people were "for!" Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev comes, doubts once again. The mood is changing like cassettes on a tape recorder. This is understandable and natural, the situation in the republic is complex.

In order to achieve its important goals, the party must create a rearguard. People are not ready for this everywhere, simply cannot rid themselves of a feeling of fear and are hesitating. Only by going among people, into the work force, may victory be won.

The speaker called on all whom the party committees invite to visit and meet with people to respond.

In the opinion of Povilas Vasilyauskas, deputy chairman of the executive committee of the Klaypeda City Soviet of People's Deputies, in speaking about the restoration

of the state legally incorrect use is made of the concept of the people's right to self-determination. Lithuania's situation is such that the right to restoration of the state ensues not from aspects of the right of the people to self-determination but from the principle of justice. From this standpoint how and why this will be realized could be substantiated entirely differently. In addition, relations with the Soviet Union also will undoubtedly be based not on a USSR law on the mechanism for secession but on an interstate treaty.

Vytautas Statulyavichyus, vice president of the Lithuanian Academy of Sciences, recalled that at meetings Academician Ye. Velikhov had constantly requested the specification of our strategic political decisions. We are currently speaking about policy everywhere, but it is time to speak more specifically. Even the republic's most authoritative specialists have different answers to the question. Theorems for existence and for how we can and must live are being proved in mathematical terms, but no one knows how to travel this road. For members of the Lithuanian CP Central Committee these are becoming the main problems. The time for specific action has come.

In his closing remarks Algirdas Brazauskas, first secretary of the Lithuanian CP Central Committee, observed that the discussion had been interesting, candid, and creative. There had been a variety of opinions also. We will obviously have to further discuss our road to independence and will have much explaining to do to people in various audiences. The main thing is that we ourselves must think constructively, as Comrade L. Truska said here. Our discussion today has touched on a considerably wider range of issues, and we will need to carefully analyze what was said here today and prepare ourselves for meetings with the public. Today's discussion will evidently be useful also for the future candidates for deputy since the questions which were raised are of concern to all of Lithuania, all people, the whole electorate.

Doubt was expressed at the plenum as to whether it is necessary, Article 6 of the constitution having been annulled, to invite to plenums representatives of the government who are not members of the Central Committee. A. Brazauskas expressed the opinion that members of the government who are communists should know what is being said at the plenums and be guided by their resolutions. It is therefore logical to invite communist members of the government to our meetings.

I believe, A. Brazauskas said, that the problem of depoliticization of the law enforcement authorities should naturally be resolved in a democratic law-based state and in a multiparty system. However, this cannot be done at once. The time will come, it is flying quickly.

Brazauskas Evaluates Gorbachev Visit

90UN0863A Vilnius SOVETSKAYA LITVA in Russian
19 Jan 90 p 1

[Article by Algirdas Brazauskas, first secretary of the Lithuanian CP Central Committee: "Results of the visit of M.S. Gorbachev, general secretary of the CPSU Central Committee and chairman of the USSR Supreme Soviet, to Lithuania"; at the Second Plenum of the Lithuanian CP Central Committee]

[Text] Dear Comrades!

Throughout last week Lithuania lived with impressions of the visit to the republic of Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev. Not only of M.S. Gorbachev, but of two members of the Politburo and a group of members of the Central Committee and USSR people's deputies. The main purpose was to familiarize themselves with political life in Lithuania, with the mood of the people and with the sentiments of the communists. The trip was made within the framework of the resolution of the CPSU Central Committee Plenum of 25-26 December. This was a very important event in our life, which I emphasized at all the meetings. This was the first occasion that a general secretary of the Central Committee has visited Lithuania. I would like to share my thoughts about the visit and invite you also to have your say and to consult on a number of urgent questions, which will also influence our further, primarily party, activity.

This trip was made because the December Plenum failed to adopt the optimum decision in the situation where the party organization of a republic had held a congress and adopted its own program, statute, and other documents. This was the first time such a thing had happened in the country. What was this—a consequence of manifestly perceptible perestroika and its components not only in the economic and social but also in the political spheres, a chance occurrence in our life or the conscious step and desire of a group or groups of people, as some people attempted to evaluate this step of ours at the plenum? More than 50 persons spoke at the plenum, the diversity of opinion was very wide and the majority of speakers at the plenum condemned our congress. In any event, they failed to understand why it was held. It was therefore decided that a group of members of the Central Committee would go to Lithuania and familiarize itself thoroughly and in detail with the situation in our republic.

The question, of course, is still open. A CPSU Central Committee plenum, at which decisions in respect of us are to be adopted, will be held on 29 January.

I do not believe that the purpose of the trip was merely familiarization with our party life and recognition of the intra-party processes occurring in Lithuania. The range of interests and questions has widened considerably, and together with party affairs, and at times in circumvention of them, the discussion was conducted in the broader aspect of the process of perestroika occurring in

Lithuania and other matters pertinent both for our republic and for the USSR as a whole.

What typified the high-ranking guests' visit last week? We should emphasize their desire to grasp the situation and understand the processes occurring in Lithuania. The program of the visit encompassed the republic's entire political and social spectrum.

The second feature was the most candid exposition of opinions in the speeches of M.S. Gorbachev, V.A. Medvedev, Yu.D. Maslyukov, and others. And, further, glasnost. The results of this visit and our entire business have been extensively covered in the union press and on Central Television for the Soviet Union and practically for the world, in any event, for that part of it which has an interest in the results of perestroika in the USSR and in a small Baltic republic.

I wish to emphasize that M.S. Gorbachev demonstrated an appreciably new attitude toward the affairs of the republic and the union as a whole and also toward intra-party affairs. I believe that the Central Committee members and other participants in our plenum will express their opinion of this visit today. It raised many questions and problems, which are for us highly material in the implementation of our party program and participation in the future elections. We also must formulate our opinion and rethink the steps which we are now taking for it is essential that we switch from the propaganda and declaration of common goals to specific action and speak about the realization of these goals and the ways to achieve them.

Inasmuch as I took part in many of the meetings, mainly with M.S. Gorbachev, and before this, with V.A. Medvedev also, at the beginning of the week, I had the impression that the proof of the soundness of our actions and party decisions was not being sufficiently well argued. The emotional factor was predominant in the speeches of members of the Central Committee and the communist rank and file and the leaders of individual organizations. Yet our debate at the congress and also our speeches in Moscow, where our concerns had been discussed on several occasions both in the Politburo and at the plenum meeting with M.S. Gorbachev, were cogent. I believe that specific arguments are essential for our discussions, and that they, these meetings, are also possible in the future. Each of us, confident of the soundness of our line and our actions, each of us, the Central Committee member primarily, must perceive and formulate in himself arguments of the utmost specificity. The time and situation are now such when everyone needs to be precise and candid.

Why do we need an independent Lithuanian Communist Party, what is its role in our social and political life, what role is outlined for it in the future and how will we adhere to our program and statute and all that is associated with the existence of our independent Lithuanian Communist Party and its future outlook? You can see what is happening all around. It is not just Romania and

other the socialist states that are experiencing political cataclysms and national catastrophes. You will certainly have noticed that spontaneous plenums have been taking place and sharp criticism of party leaders has been expressed recently in certain oblasts of the Russian Federation and in the Ukraine. There are serious grounds for this, evidently. These are events of an entirely different nature than those occurring today in Lithuania. I believe that I have sufficient grounds and material and arguments to show that our way is correct and in this situation the optimum way, perhaps, for the Communist Party's preservation of the level of its authority. I want the participants in the plenum to express their opinion.

You will surely have noticed that at the meeting with representatives of the intelligentsia in the Press Center and subsequently at the final meeting in this hall, M.S. Gorbachev spoke in detail about independence and sovereignty. He was not made aware of this, it seems to me, as much from our speeches as from the whole atmosphere and the slogans and placards, of which there were so many over the length of his route, in Shyaulay particularly. Very many people were out on the streets, and there were unprecedented meetings. He sensed the spirit, the mood and drew conclusions concerning Lithuania's withdrawal from the USSR in private conversation also and paid much attention to this in his official speeches. I wish to call your attention to this fact, this tremendous problem, and to hear the opinion of members of the Central Committee. It is a question of, I would say, an entirely new subject, which has immediately been seized on by the foreign media also—the mechanism of withdrawal from the USSR. What does this mean? It means that the right to self-determination provided for in the old constitution was not in practice legalized in the corresponding union legislation. No one discussed this mechanism. Yet all the republics, Lithuania included, have in these decades, some more, possibly others less, become integrated in the life of the state—in the economic, social, political, foreign policy, defense, and other spheres. The mechanism of withdrawal is, of course, highly problematical, and we members of the Central Committee of the independent Lithuanian Communist Party need to have our opinions on this issue. What kind of mechanism should this be, what should it look like? As you know, M.S. Gorbachev said that a version, a part, of this law pertaining to the economic sphere is virtually ready and will in the very near future be submitted for discussion by commissions and committees of the Supreme Soviet. It would be no bad thing to hear an opinion as to how we should participate or not participate in building this mechanism. Reality is such that a step by one republic toward withdrawal from the USSR or the definition of new relations on a treaty basis are just one of subsequent actions. But how should this step be legalized and by what laws or system of laws brought into concordance with the republics and their supreme soviets?

And one further question to which I would like to call your attention. The opinion that both the idea of our

independent Lithuanian Communist Party and its realization are the work of some one grouplet or group of people, mainly representatives of the intelligentsia, professors is the word that has often been used, has taken shape. Professors are members of our Central Committee, and there are many of them here in the hall. Therefore we need to address this issue also and make everything clear. We understand that the Communist Party is a party of people united by a single idea and common ideals. Workers and peasants today constitute the majority of the Communist Party. But, nonetheless, an intellectual basis is essential to the party also. The public, the intelligentsia, the Academy of Sciences, its institutes and the university participated very actively, of course, in the creation of our program, statute, and other documents. I see many of the authors in this hall. For this reason some people have acquired the impression that all these guidelines were born in professors' studies and formulated in isolation from the interests of the working people. We have to agree that in the last six months there has been wide-ranging debate in the work force also, I refer to worker outfits at plants, but that it has been broader and more heated in collectives of intellectuals. Therefore we members and secretaries of the Central Committee must in our future party activity give considerably more time to worker and peasant outfits for if such an opinion has taken shape, it needs to be assuaged, and the miscalculation removed.

I, evidently, will attend the CPSU Central Committee Plenum. The atmosphere in which these issues are being discussed is currently inauspicious for us. As you realize, there are objective reasons for this also. The Central Committee was formed in 1986, at the 27th Congress, but life throughout the Soviet Union is very dynamic. Many first secretaries both in the republics and in the oblasts have been replaced in this time. The plenums are attended also by the military—commanders of districts and the navy and political department chiefs who are not Central Committee members. It is sometimes difficult to explain anything in such an atmosphere. I therefore call on members of our Central Committee to help in once more convincingly expounding the arguments for 29 January.

And, further. It seems to me that the preparation of the draft new documents on the national scale is being dragged out because the apparatus, as we call it, still plays a big part, it being this latter which prepares the main documents. Few progressive members of the Central Committee participate in their preparation. So we said, this not being perceived in a positive light, possibly: The center is behind time with proposals pertaining to the reorganization of the CPSU. The mood of the party at the top and their opinions concerning the development of party activity differ noticeably from the sentiments of the bulk of the party. It was much requested of us, and by Comrade Gorbachev also, that we present our proposals regarding the kind of CPSU we should have. We have attempted to prepare one further version and have discussed it in the Bureau at the start of the year,

and now we also ask for suggestions. These suggestions are the exposition of our experience. You will surely all agree with me that that we cannot alter our decisions for they were adopted at the congress; we are talking about suggestions. I believe that these should be specific proposals for the 28th Congress. Our experience may also serve for others, possibly. Both we and other speakers at the CPSU Central Committee Plenum noted that we are late holding the 28th Congress, which is scheduled for this October.

The events in the country, the events in the Transcaucasus, and in the Baltic area also, in Lithuania specifically, are putting M.S. Gorbachev in a difficult position. And a great deal hangs on his name. Perestroika in the country—its positive and negative aspects—is also connected with what is happening in our republic, and we should consider this a positive phenomenon. It is the free expression of people, the free expression of the nation and the wishes of the communists, but the corresponding conditions enabling us to convene a congress and adopt our documents and to declare the Lithuanian Communist Party independent were necessary for this also. For this reason our proposals will, in my view, serve both M.S. Gorbachev and all who support radical restructuring in the party system. This is, possibly, the sole way, and the most rational way, what is more, to preserve the authority of the CPSU. The unitary structure of the CPSU has, of course, no future. Which we have said. New models, new organizational models are needed. One such model, and it is being discussed out loud, is an alliance of the country's communist parties. It merits attention, evidently, and it could be discussed in more detail, and, possibly, proposed as a perfectly specific option.

So, my esteemed friends, I have shared with you thoughts about the visit of the large group of high-ranking guests and a historic week for Lithuania. We have received very many letters and comments, positive and supportive of us, in the main, from certain oblasts of the Russian Federation and other republics. People are following events and speaking about the visit not only in the Soviet Union but in many countries of the world. This increases our responsibility and plunges our republic into the maelstrom of major events which have been occurring in the world lately. These events in our republic have, I would say, had a nuance of cultured behavior, although hostile forces and our opposition attempted with the help of placards to upset both M.S. Gorbachev and all of us, and me particularly. The behavior of some of them was not entirely proper, although we had appealed to the Lithuanian public to give M.S. Gorbachev a cordial welcome. His style of stopping in the street and talking with people was displayed with us also, and people surrounded him wherever he stopped. The conversations were benevolent, although at times pointed and categorical. This depended on the group of people with whom he met on this or that route in the republic and in Vilnius or Shyaulayay.

I thank you for your attention and invite you to reflect on this subject.

Algirdas Brazauskas also answered questions from the participants in the plenum.

Berezov on Gorbachev Visit, Party Split

*90UN0816C Vilnius SOVETSKAYA LITVA in Russian
11 Jan 90 p 3*

[Article by Boris Zaks: "Guided by Reason, Not Emotion"]

[Text] The press center at the republic Union of Journalists is like an upturned hornets' nest: buzzing and humming and chirring. There is warbling in many languages on the long-distance telephone lines... Moscow... Tokyo... Kaliningrad... Egypt... Canada... Tallinn... Kuwait... Australia... the Netherlands... About a hundred foreign journalists from newspapers, radio, and television have arrived, and the corps of correspondents from the all-union and republic mass media, not counting the Lithuanians themselves, is comprised of almost 50 journalists. Well, it is an extraordinary event for Lithuania. Almost 10 years ago Mikhail Sergeyevich was a guest in Lithuania. Now he has arrived in another capacity—general secretary of the CPSU Central Committee and chairman of the USSR Supreme Soviet. And the excuse, or rather the reason, for this visit is, as is known, a weighty one—to familiarize himself on the spot with the course of perestroika and the situation in the republic that has taken shape as the result of the decisions of the 20th Lithuanian CP Congress.

And so the visit is evoking particular interest. Foreign colleagues, who include many working acquaintances from the press center of the 20th Lithuanian CP Congress, were saying that the publications that they represent have published materials on the forum of the republic's communists on their front pages, giving them extensive coverage. Even more significance is attached to M.S. Gorbachev's visit, not only within the country but also (to judge from the great influx of the printed and "electronic" journalistic corps) throughout the world. And each press conference preceding the "event of the week" takes place with "sold out" notices. There was scarcely room for everyone in the hall when journalists met with V. Berezov, Lithuanian CP Central Committee second secretary, and E. Vilkas, Lithuanian CP Central Committee Buro member, which was reported in our newspaper yesterday. And this is understandable: Who, if not they, will have the information and brief us in greater detail about the program for M.S. Gorbachev's visit. Unfortunately, for various reasons, the final touches are still being made to the program. For example, V. Berezov says there was an insistent demand that the General Secretary visit the "Zhalgiris" Plant in Vilnius. But is this advisable when the collective has only just met with a group of CPSU Central Committee representatives led by V.A. Medvedev, CPSU Central Committee Politburo member and Central Committee

secretary? There were many such "amendments" that had to be made to the program for the visit because of this and similar circumstances. M.S. Gorbachev's meetings with the communists and workers of Lithuania are taking place at enterprises and farms in the republic, and there is a thorough discussion of the questions that arise at a meeting of the party aktiv. Everyone who has met Mikhail Sergeyevich, E. Vilkas noted, is aware of his goodwill and amiable disposition. I think that with his help it will be possible to explain all matters for the continuation of the CPSU Central Committee plenum. After his meetings in Lithuania the General Secretary will be able to find the necessary arguments and resist pressure.

Incidentally, with regard to the continuation of the CPSU Central Committee plenum, we should also remember those who took part in the meetings and other mass measures planned by Sajudis during M.S. Gorbachev's visit. V. Berezov said that on this issue he, along with Lithuanian CP Central Committee Secretary Yu. Paletskis, talked with the Sajudis leadership. This report, as it were, prompted the foreign journalists and sent the press conference off in a new direction. Although perhaps not unexpectedly, for matters relating to the mutual relations of the Lithuanian Communist Paraty and Sajudis could not be avoided after the congress. And both V. Berezov and E. Vilkas answered thoroughly and candidly. V. Berezov explained the considerable coincidence of the party program and the Sajudis program by the fact that they both express the aspirations of most of Lithuania's inhabitants. Formally, E. Vilkas added, Sajudis enjoys great real power, but at the same time it is the party that exercises more influence among the people. At the same time this in no way signifies total unity. Sajudis supports not the Communist Party but particular representatives of the Communist Party. And with respect to the Lithuanian CP, Sajudis remains in opposition as before. It is therefore incorrect to raise the question of the consolidation of the Communist Party and Sajudis as a strategy for the election campaign...

Consolidation... Split... Compromise... Is the last-named possible between an independent Lithuanian Communist Party and the Lithuanian Communist Party (on the CPSU platform)? Will not the withdrawal of the Lithuanian Communist Party from the CPSU be a vote of no confidence in the party, or in perestroika? It will be neither, V. Berezov firmly responded. As Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev noted at one time, having initiated perestroika the party sometimes impedes its own perestroika and lags behind. The desire for more independence is palpable in other republics also. I do not think that the decision reached by the communists of Lithuania is a brake on perestroika, the Lithuanian CP Central Committee second secretary said. What we need for its successful advance, and we are ready for this, is cooperation among all healthy forces in society. However, we not not have the proper contacts with the

Lithuanian CP Central Committee (on the CPSU platform), and I am not about to predict its fate or talk about its function, V. Berezov said.

The following question was also heard at the press conference: Who of those at the plenum who supported the position of the Lithuanian CP Congress are newcomers to the republic? V. Berezov stated candidly that there were no such statements. But there were members of the Central Committee who proposed that decisions not be adopted hurriedly, closing the path to compromises. They are also to be found in the CPSU Central Committee group that is now in Lithuania. I attended one of the meetings between Academician Ye. Velikhov and Lithuanian scholars, E. Vilkas added. He understood a great deal, but that does not mean that he supports us in everything. Impressions are made and we are learning about the positions of others present at the Central Committee plenum. We hope for a well-balanced view in the assessments of the upcoming plenum, and that knowledge and understanding and good sense will prevail over emotion.

The interest of journalists was also roused by V. Berezov's report that the Lithuanian CP Central Committee Buro has already examined a sketch of the new party card. The new form of the document will be given to Lithuanian Communist Party members shortly.

There were many questions. It seemed that some of them did not touch on the "main event of the week." But they were all about topical matters in the republic's life today. Lithuania awaits the upcoming visit of CPSU Central Committee General Secretary M.S. Gorbachev. It waits and hopes.

Lithuanian Party Secretary on Action Program

90UN0863C Vilnius SOVETSKAYA LITVA in Russian
19 Jan 90 pp 2, 3

[Report by Kyastutis Glavyatskas, secretary of the Lithuanian CP Central Committee: "Lithuanian Communist Party Priority Action Program"; at the Second Plenum of the Lithuanian CP Central Committee]

[Text] We are living on the eve of big changes. Economic independence is becoming a reality. It is oriented toward man and the system of his interests and motives. Lithuanian industriousness must be buttressed by world experience and an ability to control economic associations and socioeconomic processes. We are already on the frontier of new, decisive tests. It is important, therefore, not to feel confused. No, we are not confused, we have only just understood where and what we are.

The Lithuanian people are demanding directly and via the public movements that measures be adopted which are geared to the stabilization of the living standard and the satisfaction of social requirements. And, truly, in Lithuania the average monthly income of every third member of the family of a worker or employee and every fifth member of the family of a kolkhoz [collective farm]

member after deduction of the compulsory payments (taxes, contributions, alimony) constitutes less than R100 [rubles]. Yet even in 1988, according to the data of the family budget and prices, the minimum wage was, on average, R90 per person. Not only have prices "leaped" considerably in one year but many commodities have become scarce. This means that the minimum budgeted prices, in accordance with which the poverty line is calculated, have become fictitious and that the poverty factor has grown more than might be imagined given the minimum wage and nominal income of the population. As a result of inflation the living standard of those people on a fixed income—students, pensioners, people working in education and culture, and medical personnel—whose income is already the lowest, is declining. At the same time people see no incentives to work better, the source of illegal income is growing, and the quality of social services is deteriorating. This cannot go on. It is our duty to clearly tell these strata of the population about their prospects in life with regard to the proposed reforms in pricing, property relations, and other economic actions. On the other hand, we need to guarantee sources for the solution of these social problems and to formulate the appropriate mechanism for legal and organizational-economic measures.

With every passing day we are becoming increasingly convinced that the economy is not moving closer to but, rather, further away from its main and only goal—a rise in people's well-being. Planning remains an unsuccessful improvisation, and spontaneity is taking possession of all market relations. The main goal of reproduction remains the same—to re-create the command system and distribution and not to try to engage in buying and selling, and to increase poverty and not to raise the people's living standard. In the language of figures this means uncontrollable market prices, profiteering, and an almost unmanageable growth of the population's monetary income. Deposits last year increased by a further R625.8 million. But the increase in monetary payments to the population is only being satisfied by a one-third increase in the commodity supply.

The world has advanced considerably in man's social protection. Take just the Scandinavian countries. At the official rate of exchange, per capita national income in 1986 in Denmark amounted to \$8,012, in Norway to \$8,009, in Finland to \$6,372, and in Sweden to \$6,812. According to the calculations for 1987 made in accordance with Soviet methods, this level in Lithuania constitutes approximately \$3,000. Even 10 years would be clearly insufficient to reach Sweden's 1988 level, for example. Other figures are noteworthy also. The work week in Denmark is now 33 hours, in Finland 33.9, in Sweden 38.3, in Norway 30.6, and in Lithuania, officially, 40.4 hours. But if we add to this the eight hours waiting in line, the result is approximately 49 hours. Approximately as many people are "employed" daily in lines in Lithuania as the people in industry. The number of automobiles per 1,000 of the population, according to 1985 figures, was 296 in Denmark, 322 in Finland, 369

in Norway, 380 in Sweden, and 103 in Lithuania (1987). Production efficiency is also lower in Lithuania than in the Scandinavian countries: In terms of the use of certain resources, by a factor of 2-2.5, and in terms of the consumption of oil, metal, and timber, by a factor of 2-3. As before, we are uneconomical and irrational and have not mastered the science and practice of management and marketing. The technological structure of our economy and industry is hopelessly outdated and lags behind many developed countries. Some 43 percent of fixed capital in the republic's industry is obsolete, and approximately 80 percent of active capital is obsolete.

The 1989 plan for capital construction was not fulfilled. This means, specifically, that 80,000 square meters of total living space was not commissioned, hospitals with 400 beds were not built, out-patient and general clinics received almost 1,000 fewer visits per shift and the number of places in general schools declined theoretically by 730. As a result of nonfulfillment of the planned target pertaining to fixed capital, R225 million worth of incomplete facilities appeared. It should be noted that only 88 percent of planned total living space was built from enterprise resources.

Why did this happen? A principal reason was the unsatisfactory supply of material resources. A second factor was our inability and reluctance to manage. But supply frightens us more. Lithuania does not have its own army, security service, police, independent system of communications and transport, and a number of essential industrial enterprises. The inefficient economy of the republic (although it is considerably more efficient than the other republics) is almost two-thirds dependent on USSR sources of raw material and is bound by cooperative ties to more than 1,000 of the country's enterprises. Therefore, given even a negligible reduction in supplies of this resource or the other, the republic's economy could be influenced to the extent that thousands of workers and employees would find themselves cast overboard. Unfortunately, as an analysis shows, there is a direct dependence between supplies and recession and potential unemployment. The center's policy toward our republic is also based on this.

We are easily wounded and have found ourselves, after consciously pursuing a regional policy for decades, in a situation which has ultimately proved disastrous for everyone. A powerful center keeps hold, as before, of the levers which enable it, if necessary, to fundamentally undermine Lithuania's economy. Our deputies in Moscow are trying to protect the republic's interests. But condemning to catastrophe approximately two percent of the USSR economy in an emergency is no big problem. For the world's biggest state, with its irrational economic and political system, this is merely a nuisance. The world is entering the 21st century, but when we look out the window we see only the mid-20th century.

We will inevitably have to come to terms with the Eastern market if we wish ourselves to be taken into consideration. If en route to Lithuania's independence

we wish to build a strong economic base which will enable us to maintain normal economic relations, we need in the course of qualitative restructuring to expand economic relations horizontally with both East and West. And with the help of these relations we should form new technology, raw material, and fuel markets. This will take more than just a year. But there is evidently no other way. No other method for a swift and effective victory. There is only a long, arduous path to the formation of the economy of a sovereign and free Lithuania.

And the first real economic threat is emerging on this path. We can, of course, take comfort from the fact that Yu.D. Maslyukov, chairman of the USSR Gosplan [State Planning Committee], who visited us recently, strictly condemned those who do not adhere to state contracts. But the near future will tell how practically useful his position is.... Meanwhile the future is nebulous. Thus, although the USSR Gosplan has recognized that the republic is in need of 350,000 cubic meters of timber, we only have confirmed supplies of 194,000 cubic meters or 67 percent of the required timber. The situation is similar when it comes to lumber also. Many problems of material and technical supply have also arisen at the wood-processing and light industry enterprises.

Agriculture is suffering also, it seems. From January through November last year the agro-industrial complex was supplied, per contracts, with 93 percent of the silage- and fodder-harvesting combines, 92 percent of the tractor-driven mowing machines, 89 percent of the tractor-driven plows and 97 percent of the pickup balers. There is a multitude of such examples.

The greatest apprehensions have to do with whether the "oil and gas faucets will be turned off". It is really a serious business. After all, gas is supplied to 979,000 apartments in the republic; over 8,000 municipal service, agricultural, and industrial enterprises consume natural and liquefied gas; and over 3,000 km gas distribution systems are in operation. The 1990 situation is such: With our increased requirements (individual transport, new agricultural facilities) it will be necessary to additionally receive, or rather purchase, exchange, and obtain, 5,000-7,000 tons of liquefied gas. There will be no less of an obstacle to overcome in catering to oil requirements. Excluding agriculture, in the present year the republic's consumers have been allocated on average 20 percent less fuel (gasoline and diesel fuel). It may be assumed that given the decline in centrally allocated commodities and to balance supply and demand, the price of gasoline will have to rise, say, twofold (other things being equal). There are in the country no timber, oil, paper, or cotton exchanges, nor will such be created in the immediate future, therefore relations with the Eastern market will have to be built not only on the basis of money and stock but of physical exchange and a capacity for doing business also.

Nor is the consumer market in any less of a scarcity fever. Last year the ordinary customer failed to obtain

many basic necessities. According to recent data, the republic's population fell R91.5 million short in terms of being provided with centrally allocated consumer commodities, including R46 million of imported goods. We failed to receive approximately 1,000 Moskvich 21412 automobiles, approximately 600 VAZ 21602 automobiles and R27.7 million worth of fruit and vegetables. To judge by the nature of the general crisis in the country and the bureaucratization of management, the future does not look rosy. As can be seen from an analysis of centrally allocated commodities for 1990, the small allocations of nonfood commodities will be insufficient for normal satisfaction of the requirements of the republic's population. Consequently, it will henceforth be necessary for the republic's economists and managers not only to prepare bills and other normative documents geared to the realization of economic independence but also to seek ways to stabilize economic relations, particularly supply. Otherwise all the institutional prerequisites for the reorganization of the economy will remain merely good intentions. The shortage of material resources, as also the increase in prices for them, will to a certain extent serve as an incentive to scientific and technical progress. But we have already approached this critical line. If production stops, there is simultaneously a halt in exchange, distribution, and consumption. In this case the shortage of material resources becomes a stimulus to subsistence farming and a factor in the destruction of the economy.

Continuing the subject of supplies, I would like to add that we must not always see some people's ill intentions here. After all, we are not that brilliant either, as they say, here. Take just oil. The Mazheykyay Refinery last year under supplied 339 tons of gasoline and 445 tons of diesel fuel. This was undoubtedly reflected both in the supply plans and in exports. The Lithuanian Fish Industry Production Association under supplied R26 million worth of products. As a whole, the plan for the contracted sale of products republic-wide was only 98.6 percent fulfilled, and there was a shortfall in the product supply of R156.9 million or 4.4 times more than in 1988. One out of every 10 of the republic's enterprises failed to fulfill supply contracts. Labor discipline is declining, non-economic excuses are spreading, and an increasingly large number of people wish to live better, but work less. These are the worst results of all the years of the last five-year plan.

We have been rejoicing currently: Although we have been involved in politics, we have nonetheless grown a record grain harvest (over 3.6 million tons). But there was a shortage of fodder. The result: We sold the state less livestock and poultry, and the arrears to all-union stocks amounted to 30,600 tons of meat and meat products (169,400 tons were supplied). The farmer's position is well known: He will continue to suffer and work hard and live not always as he should. All conceivable decisions and resolutions and organization and reorganization of management structures have not changed the farmer's interests and his work and social

conditions. Under conditions where we are short of everything the farmer and his problems should be given priority not in word but in deed, for he feeds us.

It is understandable that all these economic anomalies could essentially be successfully solved by the creation of a market. This is also the cornerstone of our economic policy. A few words about relations between economics and politics at this stage. The central departments have to a certain extent politicized or provoked the conditions for the politicization of supplies, contracts, and relations, although the latter are ultimately the object of policy to the same extent as the horse pulling the plow. This has occurred in respect of fields of interrepublic exchange. There is under way simultaneously an indirect politicization of management in the republic, and the time has come to professionalize the management of economic activity. Professional managers appointed or hired by economic associations must manage enterprises and economic organizations. This is very important since many of the republic's enterprise managers intend to submit their resignations not only because of supply difficulties but also because of moral pressure.

We are living under conditions of shortages in the economy. Many conditions are needed in order to create a market. Almost all inhabitants of Lithuania know them. In order to effect a transition to market relations it is essential, together with many institutional economic, social, cultural, psychological, and other measures to refashion the mechanism of interests and motives such that man himself be responsible for a deterioration in the economic situation. It should be clear to everyone that the situation is deteriorating because people are failing to display economic initiative, and not because the government—and it will be elected by the people—fails to create the conditions for the display of this initiative.

It will be necessary to create not only legislative prerequisites (it is essential to urgently enact a package of laws and protect the republic's enterprises from the arbitrary action of the central departments and local bureaucrats) but also administrative prerequisites, that is, the organizational structures of management, since the latter are called upon to implement the laws and master economic processes. Economists' attention should be directed toward the creation of an economically strong and independent Lithuania, and not economic geography and an analysis of definitions. The economic befuddlement of people spreads like a virus when, owing to political considerations, no account is taken of reality and the world experience of economic science. According to Marx, all mysteries capable of leading theory to mysticism are solved more rationally by human practice and an understanding of this practice. Now, surveying the past year in retrospect, we recognize particularly clearly how harmful for the economy and the future of reconstruction was the decision to hold elections immediately upon the expiration of the term of the Supreme Soviet.

The protracted government crisis is increasingly hampering progress toward independent management. Unnecessary tension is growing, and destructive energy is gaining the ascendancy.

The new government will have to simultaneously solve problems of the stabilization and reconstruction of the Lithuanian economy. It is essential to create our own monetary system and banking and finance system, implement measures to clear up the market, reduce the budget deficit, lower state subsidies to the minimum, change the system of prices and the logic of pricing and denationalize the economy, having created identical opportunities for all inhabitants of Lithuania wishing to participate in the privatization process. It will be necessary to decentralize the economy, accelerate the formation of joint ventures with foreign partners, develop foreign tourism, implement a new structural and investment policy and become a member of the World Bank. These are only directions for the creation of a general market. There may be much discussion of this.

But let us return to man. It is not hard to predict that unemployed persons will inevitably emerge and inflation will increase under the conditions of the structural reorganization of economics and the functioning of the economy. The example of other countries and the economic dependence between structural changes of inflation [as published] and the level of unemployment make it possible to conclude that in order to reduce if only by half the level of inflation, which will constitute approximately 15-20 percent, we will be forced to reconcile ourselves to an increased level of unemployment. Aside from kolkhoz members and cooperative workers, approximately 1.5 million persons are employed in the national economy, and for this reason, according to our calculations, we can forecast approximately 75,000 (in the opinion of others, 100,000) future unemployed. I do not lay claim to accuracy, but the example just given graphically testifies to the scale of the immediate problems.

For this reason realization of a Lithuanian SSR law on the protection of social rights providing for guaranteed income, education, accommodation, and protection of the population's health becomes particularly urgent. Organizational questions about implementing this law will undoubtedly be decided also: A form of income declaration will be formulated, a system to check on its compliance will be created, and a network of social insurance funds will be organized. But the main thing is economic guarantees for implementing this law. It will be essential in this sphere to consistently and immediately implement the following measures:

First, it is necessary at the level of the organs of state power of the USSR to gain authorization for the independent creation of a budget system for an independent Lithuania. This is entirely in keeping with the provisions of the Law on the Economic Independence of the Baltic Republics enshrining: a) fixed, long-term payments between the budgets of Lithuania and the union; b) taxes

and deductions from all enterprises located on the territory of Lithuania and other unified taxes and deductions going only to Lithuania.

Second, to provide for firm sources of budget revenue from organs of the state, self-management, and social insurance of the Lithuanian SSR and for channeling the use of their income and interaction between them for the purpose of solving the problems of all of Lithuania and its regions, rayons, and cities.

Third, to so reorganize the tax system as to ensure that all budgets be non-deficit and to permit the creation of reserves of budget resources and the expansion of the minimum social programs provided for by the law. Excise duty is a currently unused reserve of budget revenue. Together with a reform in pricing it should be raised to a level which guarantees that demand will be limited to the level of the supply of socially dangerous commodities (tobacco, alcohol), rare commodities (home-made and imported), and luxuries. This will ensure the maximum budget revenue. We will in this way be able to tackle not only problems of a rise in material well-being but to also undermine the roots of profiteering and to increase the psychological well-being of society.

Fourth, to determine deductions for the social insurance fund which make it possible to fully satisfy pension requirements in an amount no less than the minimum wage and the needs of primary territorial health care and unemployment benefits. It is essential to link the variable part of deductions for social insurance with the characteristics of the insured parties (enterprises, establishments, organizations) on which the need for social insurance resources depends (morbidity, occupational illness, industrial accident and disability, average pension age).

These are some of the fundamentals of social and fiscal policy aimed at stabilizing and enhancing the living standard. In conjunction with scientists we are preparing a program to increase the efficiency of the national economy. We all come into contact with various people, with the workers. I have not met one who in the name of the prosperity of the population of Lithuania does not agree to give up something or other and limit his daily requirements. This is the spiritual culture and creative force which can overcome all obstacles en route to independence. The people cannot be disappointed, and we are all answerable for this.

First Secretary Ivashko, Kiev Aktiv Meet

90UN0846B Kiev PRAVDA UKRAINY in Russian
6 Jan 90 p 1

[Unattributed article: "Meeting With the Kiev Party Aktiv"]

[Text] As we have already reported, a meeting took place on 4 January between V.A. Ivashko, member of the

CPSU Central Committee Politburo and first secretary of the Ukrainian CP Central Committee, and the Kiev party aktiv.

The thorough, practical conversation touched upon a large number of phenomena and events in the political, social, economic, and spiritual life of the republic, and the approach of the Ukrainian CP Central Committee to the solution of a number of immediate tasks which will occupy the center of attention in 1990 was disclosed. The meeting's participants were informed about several aspects of the discussions that took place in December of last year at the CPSU Central Committee plenums.

Characterizing the basic tendencies of the work to extend perestroika farther, V.A. Ivashko stressed that the mind, the training, and the responsibility of the worker must guarantee the success of the matter today. The first secretary of the Ukrainian CP Central Committee spoke in detail about the processes of perestroika occurring in the republic's party organization. Much attention was allotted to the goals of bringing democracy to interparty life, understanding and designing on a collective basis new approaches for obtaining party leadership under contemporary conditions, and eliminating any stereotypes, both old and new, from the activities of the party committees. Today many of the restrictions which hinder the free will and actions of communists have been removed from the party. But there must be a single criterion here—a deed, a concrete result that people will be aware of.

As never before, the issue of the high moral appearance of the communist and the party leader has become crucial. The Ukrainian CP Central Committee firmly intends to reject any who tolerate a faulty style of leadership, violations of party etiquette, or abuse of official position.

V.A. Ivashko especially stressed the need to strengthen the unity of the CPSU. The step which the Lithuanian Communist Party undertook at its 20th congress has no precedent and strikes a blow against political reform and our plans to renew society. At the same time, the independence of the parties of the union republics should attain a qualitatively new level. And in the course of the party-wide discussion in preparation for the 28th CPSU Congress it must be clearly defined, on a wide democratic basis, how and where this will manifest itself.

Any step that rallies the party and strengthens the Union of the SSR's [Soviet Socialist Republics] is a correct step. The party stands on the path to the construction of a humane, democratic socialism in the country. Considering the stormy, anxious state of society, it is necessary to seek out contacts and discover not that which divides, but that which unites.

In his speeches the first secretary of the Ukrainian CP Central Committee pointed out that today's primary front is the economy. There are currently a number of opinions on how to repair it. And it is necessary to give people enough complete, objective information to allow

them to come to the correct conclusions. Accordingly any appeals to go back, in essence, to an administrative and command economy are completely unacceptable. This leads to a historical dead end. But equally dangerous are those calls to introduce market relations on an immediate basis. Such haste can lead to very negative social consequences. Extremes cannot be tolerated here. They would be catastrophic for the country and for the people. For this reason N.I. Ryzhkov, chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers, proposed measures in his report to the Second USSR Congress of People's Deputies for a gradual transition to an economy which includes market relations as well as planned regulation. At the present time these measures appear to be the most acceptable.

When implementing radical economic reform, V.A. Ivashko said, we cannot get away from one very important idea. That is to guarantee the republic full economic sovereignty and maximum observance of its interests. It is no secret that the amount of national per capita income in the Ukraine is already lower than in a number of the other republics. This is not because we do not work as well. The first reason is the structure of production that has historically arisen: Coal, ore, and metal are very labor-intensive and there is not much income in them. We must "swing" this structure over to the side of those fields which are less "nature-intensive" and more science-oriented. But a great deal of time and resources are required for this. As a result, the appropriate all-union compensations are needed for the transition to regional, republic economic accountability.

The second reason is that prices for products are not based on the economy. For example, for a ton of bituminous coal from the Donets Basin we receive from Lithuania...5-7 pairs of panty hose. For a ton of steel plate sent to Latvia—three perfume and cosmetic kits. Therefore fair wholesale and retail prices which reflect the public's required costs for production must be introduced no later than in the first 6 months.

We must also remember that the Ukraine receives much from the other republics that we cannot do without. For instance, we can guarantee enough natural gas to supply our own needs for only 80- 85 days. Oil comes from Siberia and cotton from Central Asia. We bring in almost 60 percent of the lumber, as well as many other goods that we use. And we must increase the productivity of production so we have something with which to pay for all this.

Today the task of the republic's party organizations, V.I. Ivashko stressed, is to ensure that each individual is guided by a clear understanding of all these particulars and the resulting approaches reflecting the interests of the republic. This would promote the elimination of parasitical attitudes as well as of ultraradical demands.

The speaker defined the most important task as improving the republic's financial condition. The establishment everywhere of a direct and immediate correlation between the costs of labor and the growth of the workers' income is required for this. It is extremely important to ensure that the pace of increasing production of consumer goods significantly exceeds the increase in profits. On the same subject, industry in Kiev was subjected to criticism because production has been increasing extremely slowly. There is also a need to close off all the channels through which money seeps out into circulation without cash transfer, destabilizing the market and causing deficits.

Speaking about the ways to implement economic reform in the republic, V.A. Ivashko said we are firmly convinced that we will not solve these full-grown economic problems on the basis of the traditional departmental system of management. One of the ways of eliminating this system is through the creation of production associations and stock companies and associations specializing in the output of certain types of products. Party, soviet, and economic organs are called upon to stimulate that process any way they can. We must also make more active use of broad opportunities opening up now to attract the technological and financial potential of foreign firms in order to repair our economy. In this manner initiative, bravery, and aggressive actions are needed in the implementation of economic reform.

The need to consolidate society on the basis of the development of Ukrainian culture and the restoration of spirituality was mentioned in the speech. Historic memory is acquiring great significance. In the near future the Ukrainian CP Central Committee Politburo will be examining several issues connected with the elimination of "blank spots" in our history. Political evaluations for the complex pages in the life of our people will be offered, in particular for the famine of 1932-33 and the repressions of 1930-40 and the early 1950's.

In conclusion V.A. Ivashko answered the numerous questions of the audience.

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